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Abstract 
 
 
Decisions on tradeoffs in trade negotiations, or decisions made to procure a win-set for a 
country, do not occur in a silo – rather they occur in a complex interacting web of political-
economic factors. This is especially applicable to pharmaceutical intellectual property (IP), 
where countries often have to consider tradeoffs between public health, commercial interests, 
public security, and market access, and where there is notable historical controversy. When 
a 12-year period of exclusivity for biologics, basically a long monopoly period for a new 
(expensive) class of medications engineered from living organisms, was proposed by the 
United States in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), negotiating parties of differing income 
levels were reluctant and/or opposed to incorporating these IP provisions. Where there is a 
deadlock, the opposing side may offer market access or other benefits to force a concession. 
A number of political-economic factors may play into this, including previous relationships 
between the two nations, the formation of a coalition, and power dynamic. And while scholarly 
literature has described the diminishing hegemony of the United States, examining this power 
dynamic in the context of the TPP and associated negotiation tactics, and in particular as 
regards two upper middle-income countries (UMICs), Chile, and Malaysia, fills a gap in 
literature on trade-related IP. A couple of political-economic factors make this case study 
significant; including that UMICs, despite their higher GNI per capita, cannot often sustainably 
afford the price tags attached to biologic drugs, and that they may have established more 
diversified economic dependence, reducing the need for concessions in some areas solely for 
market access to the United States or membership of the TPP. Drawing upon the testimonials 
of trade negotiators, government officials, and civil society, this thesis analyses tactics utilised 
by UMIC negotiators when faced with biologics tradeoffs, and formulates lessons for other 
developing countries.  
 
(300 words) 
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I.  Introduction  
 
 
This thesis concerns the decisions of Chilean and Malaysian negotiators in considering 
tradeoffs for biologics market exclusivity. It is focused on biologics negotiations specifically 
because it was publicly known that there was a negotiation deadlock on this issue in particular. 
Where there is a deadlock, the opposing side may offer market access or other benefits to 
force a concession. A number of political-economic factors may play into this, including 
previous relationships between the two nations, the formation of a coalition, and power 
  10 
dynamic. In other words, this thesis is centred on the prowess, predilections, and psyche of 
these negotiators, i.e. their negotiating capacity, the mandates given to them, and whether, in 
the face of U.S. demands on biologics exclusivity, those mandates were easily changed, and 
for what those mandates were changed. In considering this, I will examine what domestic and 
international political economy factors influenced their decision-making on intellectual 
property.   
 
The decisions of trade negotiators are influenced by a number of political and economic 
factors, including the entrenchment of a particular economic ideology or tradition, pressure 
from industry players, and geopolitical strategic considerations, such as security.1 These 
decisions are negotiated in the context of tradeoffs – for example, if we gain market access 
into the United States for agricultural produce, what is expected of us in terms of purchases 
of American military equipment, or less tangible tradeoffs, such as, we would like to be invited 
to the next G7 summit and position ourselves as middle powers – would making more 
concessions in this trade agreement to achieve this particular non-monetary goal be worth the 
ire of domestic stakeholders? Understanding why negotiators make decisions cannot occur 
without a political-economy lens through which to analyse their decision-making processes. 
 
In order to understand what political-economic factors affected the negotiations, it would first 
be necessary to define what ‘political economy’ is. A basic definition, as posited by Drazen, is 
that political economy ‘is concerned with how politics will affect economic choices in a society’2 
and goes on to elaborate that politics in this is defined as the study of power and authority, i.e. 
the ability of an individual or group to achieve outcomes which reflect his objectives.3 Power, 
on the other hand, is defined by Weber as ‘the probability that an actor in a social relationship 
will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on 
which this probability rests.’4 In order to assess this probability, Drazen suggests the asking 
of several questions, including ‘how do individuals, classes, or groups within a larger society 
gain power or authority to attempt to have the societal choice reflect their preferred course of 
action’.5 Susan Strange cautions that the international political economy is multidimensional, 
and that players are not ‘motivated by precise and singular goals’ and that it is structural 
power6 that decides outcomes,7  notably security, production, finance, knowledge, but also the 
                                                   
1 Wendy L Hansen and Thomas J Prusa, ‘The Economics and Politics of Trade Policy: An Empirical Analysis of ITC Decision 
Making’ (2002) 5(2) Review of International Economics 230-245; Rosalie L Tung, ‘U.S.-China Trade Negotiations: Practices, 
Procedures and Outcomes’ (1982) 13(2) Journal of International Business Studies 25; Jacob Wood, ‘An Industrial Sector 
Analysis of the Factors Influencing FTA Negotiation Outcomes’ (2017) 18(4) Global Business Review 895-910 
2 Allan Drazen, Political Economy in Macroeconomics (Princeton University Press 2000) 5 
3 Ibid  
4 Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (The Free Press 1947) 152 
5 Drazen (n 2) 6 
6 Discussed further in Section VI below.  
7 Susan Strange, ‘The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony’ (1987) 41(4) International Organization 551-574, 553 
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values of a particular set of actors.8 Strange’s structural power will be discussed further in 
Section VI of this Chapter, but in consideration of the above, for the purposes of this thesis, 
political economy will be taken to mean the way power and authority affects outcomes in an 
economic process – in this case, the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Political economy tradeoffs, 
to expand, would relate to the particular concessions resulting from the shifts in power and 
authority amongst different stakeholders involved in the negotiations.  
  
When I emerged onto the international trade scene as a registered civil society stakeholder 
and greenhorn to the TPP negotiations, I was struck by the sheer enormity of it all – the 
hundreds of negotiators, security barring entry to the negotiating venue (the SkyCity Casino 
and Hotels in Auckland, New Zealand), and everywhere you looked in restaurants and cafes 
near the negotiating venue, side meetings between negotiators and stakeholders. Today, as 
a marginally more seasoned international trade scholar, the feeling of enormity still resonates, 
but less so as regards to the visuals of the TPP negotiations, but rather as pertains to the TPP 
as an agreement and the legal, historical, and political space it inhibits.  
 
The TPP is historically situated in a global trade order that has seen the perceived failure of 
multilateral trade negotiations at the World Trade Organization, a failure precipitated by the 
lack of consensus and coordinated developing country opposition to developed country 
standards. While initially committed to a multilateral approach to trade, as the decades 
passed, developed countries became increasingly aware that the standards they wanted 
would not be easily obtained at the multilateral level, but rather would be more easily 
negotiated in more intimate trade settings, i.e. bilateral trade agreements and regional trade 
agreements.   
 
Among these standards were intellectual property (IP) standards, including a minimum 20-
year patent term established in the 1994 agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS). Since then, intellectual property standards that go above and beyond 
what was contained in TRIPS (i.e. TRIPS-plus standards) have been demanded of developing 
countries.  
 
However, IP standards were only one type of non-tariff standard that developed countries 
were seeking through trade agreements. Pursuant to the Kennedy round of negotiations held 
in Geneva from 1963-1967, a realisation had emerged among developed countries that the 
full benefits gained from the elimination of tariffs would be circumvented if nontariff barriers 
                                                   
8 Christopher May, ‘Strange Fruit: Susan Strange’s Theory of Structural Power in the International Political Economy’ (1996) 
10(2) Global Society 167-189, 174 
  12 
were not addressed.9 These began with antidumping measures and regulations on exchange 
rate manipulations, and today in the TPP include sanitary and phytosanitary measures, 
advertising restrictions as a technical barrier to trade, government procurement favouring 
domestic companies, financial services, and TRIPS plus intellectual property. The TPP, 
however, does not only seek high standards; it seeks the harmonisation of these high 
standards over a large geographical region. Thus, due to the unlikelihood of these being 
advanced through WTO negotiations, the plurilateral, mega-regional,10 agreements known as 
the TPP and TTIP were birthed.  
 
In the face of these standards and the requirement of extensive beyond-the-border regulatory 
harmonisation, the question is, how would the middle-income countries or emerging markets 
in the TPP i.e. the so-called ‘developing countries’, react? Some insights may be drawn from 
the GATT and TRIPS negotiations. At the beginning of the GATT negotiations, developing 
countries were mostly passive participants, and simply did not have the capacity to contribute 
to trade norms.11 The dynamic was therefore characterised by the industrialised West as the 
rule maker and developing countries as rule takers. In the mid 1970s, there was a perception 
that the distribution of capabilities was shifting in favour of developing countries, and for a 
short moment in time, they were able to table and advance their demands.12 Throughout time, 
this changed again as the early 80s saw a global economic recession, and developing 
countries were once again beholden to developed countries.13 More recently, emerging 
markets including the BRICS countries have seen their powers grow in global governance and 
international policymaking,14 although some authors question their power due to a lack of 
cohesion relative to high income nations.15 
 
Power dynamics further changed with the juxtaposition of the AIDS crisis16 and organised 
international civil society (before the finalisation of the TRIPS agreement) in the 1990s, 
                                                   
9 Robert E Baldwin, Nontariff Distortions of International Trade (The Brookings Institution 1971) 2 
10 See section III(b)(ii) below for definition and elaboration of ‘deep integration’ – but basically, a characteristic describing the 
tendency of todays plurilateral and bilateral agreements no longer being about traditional trade matters, but rather beyond-the-
border measures.  
11 Nor was it necessarily in their interests to adopt TRIPS-compatible norms. As Gervais comments, these states benefit from 
obtaining IP ‘as inexpensively as possible’ in parallel with economic development. Daniel J Gervais, Intellectual Property, Trade 
and Development: Strategies to Optimize Economic Development in a TRIPS-Plus Era (Oxford University Press 2014) 39 
12 Susan K Sell, Power and Ideas: North-South Politics of Intellectual Property and Antitrust (State University of New York 
Press 1998) 31 
13 Ibid 32 
14 Mattias Vom Hau, ‘How the BRICS Exert Influence in the Global Politics of Development’ E-International Politics (24 October 
2017) < https://www.e-ir.info/2017/10/24/how-the-brics-exert-influence-in-the-global-politics-of-development/> accessed 1 
October 2019 
15 Deepak Nayyar, ‘BRICS, Developing Countries, and Global Governance’ (2016) 37(4) Third World Quarterly 575-591, 586 
16 The AIDS crisis began to be visible in New York in the early 1980s, with drastically increasing infections through that decade. 
By 1989, AIDS accounted for a ‘very large proportion of total mortality among young men and women in New York City in 
1989’. Albert R Jonsen and Jeff Stryker (eds), The Social Impact of AIDS in the United States (National Academy of Sciences 
1993) 246. HIV also grew by epidemic proportions in Africa at this time, increasing the international imperative to act. William W 
Fisher and Cyrill P Rigamonti, ‘The South Africa AIDS Controversy: A Case Study in Patent Law and Policy’ The Law and 
Business of Patents (10 February 2005) < https://cyber.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/South%20Africa.pdf> accessed 6 November 
2019 
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resulting in increased attention and controversy around trade-related IP and patent systems. 
Largely before then, to quote Parthasarathy, they had been ‘technical and esoteric domains 
operating far from public view, of real interest only to those who seek to gain an exclusive right 
to commercialise their inventions’.17 During this time period, patents were increasingly seen 
as a public health matter of grave consequence, although some countries such as Colombia 
and Brazil had much earlier taken note of overpricing and the possible impact of extended IP 
rights.18 TRIPS negotiators were boosted with support from organised international civil 
society, and when TRIPS was finalised, the U.S., i.e. the principal demandeur of maximalist 
intellectual property rights in trade, were disappointed.19 While they had successfully 
established an agreement for harmonisation of IP rules globally, the U.S. had wanted higher 
standards.  
 
The question is, what do countries give up when they agree to higher intellectual property 
standards, or when they agree to harmonise IP standards with developed nations? While there 
have been a number of scholarly articles on developing country negotiating tactics, there 
hasn’t been much of a focus on the tradeoffs that are made in exchange for IP standards.  
 
IP is not negotiated in a silo, but instead is negotiated in the context of other factors, for 
example market access, promises of foreign direct investment in domestic research and 
development firms, or perceived technology transfer gains.20 Tradeoffs may also occur 
externally to the trade agreement being negotiated – for example Colombia’s intentions to 
issue a compulsory license for a cancer drug was met with a threat to reduce funding for Paz 
Colombia, the country’s peace initiative.21 These are referred to as political economy tradeoffs. 
In the context of the TPP, market access tradeoffs, or ‘compromises’, were prominently 
mentioned in the press in regard to biologic medicines exclusivity by Mexican, Australian, and 
New Zealand negotiators.22  
 
It is for this reason, combined with the fact that biologics exclusivity resulted in a number of 
deadlocks, its relative novelty in trade agreements, and the fact that it was subject to at least 
three official bilateral (US-MY), (US-CL), and (US-VN) decisions in the TPP text, make it a 
                                                   
17 Shobita Parthasarathy, Patent Politics: Life Forms, Markets, and the Public Interest in the United States and Europe 
(University of Chicago Press 2017) 2 
18 Constantine Vaitsos, ‘Patents Revisited: Their Function in Developing Countries’ (1972) 9(1) The Journal of Development 
Studies 71-97, 87-89; Andrea Koury Menescal, ‘Those Behind the TRIPS Agreement: The Influence of the ICC and the AIPPI 
on International Intellectual Property Decisions’ (2005) 2 Intellectual Property Quarterly 155-182 
19 Graham Dutfield and Uma Suthersanen, Global intellectual property law (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 2008) 37 
20 Meir Perez Pugatch, The international political economy of intellectual property rights (Edward Elgar Publishing 2004) 57 
21 Andrew Goldman and Zack Struver, ‘Senator Orrin Hatch, USTR Pressure Colombia over Imatinib Compulsory License’ 
Knowledge Ecology International (10 May 2016) < https://www.keionline.org/23082> accessed 25 September 2019 
22 Peter Clark, ‘Chile and Peru balk at TPPs treatment of intellectual property’ iPolitics (Atlanta, 4 October 2015) 
<http://ipolitics.ca/2015/10/04/tpp-heads-to-the-finish-line-as-deal-appears-imminent-pc/> Accessed 8 March 2018 
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compelling choice for case study on intellectual property political economy tradeoffs. Crucially, 
I am focusing on the responses and negotiations of two upper middle-income TPP countries, 
Chile and Malaysia, for several similarities and differences that I describe in more detail below. 
 
II.  Research question 
 
The conglomeration of factors characterising the TPP, i.e. its intentions on deep integration, 
its massive combined GDP, the unique positions of upper middle-income country participants, 
and other factors discussed in brief above, and in more detail below, led me to consider a 
number of questions, with the main research question being: “How do upper middle-income 
countries strategise for, respond to, and engineer and justify political economy tradeoffs to 
maximalist intellectual property provisions that they may not necessarily agree to?” and 
following from that, “what intrinsic and extrinsic factors influenced negotiator decision making 
processes?” 
 
These questions can be broken down to numerous specific sub-questions, including, but not 
limited to, the following: Due to established market access deals with all TPP countries, was 
Chile in a stronger position? Was it able to demand more and concede less? Are the countries 
equally matched in negotiating capacity? Was the deep integration objective a core reason for 
participation in TPP negotiations? Did domestic industrial development in biologics and/or 
biosimilars influence the decisions of the negotiators? If not, what did? Did the novelty of 
biologics, both as an IP provision in trade agreements and as a public health commodity, 
change political economy tradeoffs? Were the countries seen as potential points where more 
maximalist IP could be spread within their own regions? These questions will guide my 
fieldwork, and frame my findings on IP political economy tradeoffs by upper middle-income 
countries.  
 
III. Continued relevance of the TPP 
At time of writing, the TPP no longer exists in the form discussed in this thesis. It has morphed 
in membership and content pursuant to the U.S. exit, and now has been signed by the 
remaining 11 countries in the form of the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (CPTPP). The following subsections describe why the TPP is still relevant for 
scholarship.  
a) The TPP: essential characteristics  
  15 
The TPP is a plurilateral23 mega-regional agreement containing 30 chapters; four addressing 
traditional matters of trade, for example goods and services, with the other chapters delving 
into, among other topics, government procurement, e-commerce, intellectual property, 
sanitary and phytosanitary measures, labour, environment, and regulatory coherence. In 
specific, the agreement specifically seeks the streamlining of product supply chains so that 
products aren’t faced with different regulations in different countries, the adoption of TRIPS-
plus intellectual property, non-discriminatory access to federal government procurement 
contracts,24 and to ensure that disputes are arbitrated via certain tribunals, among many other 
beyond-the border rules.  
The TPP has its roots in the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership (TPSEP) signed in 
2005 by a group of countries – New Zealand, Singapore, Chile, and Brunei - called the Pacific 
Four or the P4.25 According to the agreement text, the agreement was intended to, among 
other objectives, form a strategic partnership within the Asia-Pacific region, establish a 
predictable commercial framework for planning and investment, promote intellectual property 
rights, and provide a catalyst for broader cooperation at international forums.26  
The United States was not invited to be a part of the agreement until 2008, but when it did, it 
rapidly became the rulemaker. The TPP was a crucial part of Obama’s ‘pivot to Asia’ policy, a 
policy designed to establish an organised trade presence in Asia and curb the rise of China.27 
The TPP is a manifestation of a contest of powers. Historically, assertions of global dominance 
would have manifested at the start of the 20th century and certainly at many moments before 
as catastrophic violent war.28 Today, this has morphed into machinations focused on 
economic domination. Mearsheimer states:  
[T]he great powers that shape the international system fear each other and compete for power 
as a result. Indeed, their ultimate aim is to gain a position of dominant power over others, 
because having dominant power is the best means to ensure one’s own survival.29 
                                                   
23 Plurilateral agreements are defined as agreements between 3 or more countries on specific issues, whether within or 
external to the WTO system. Michitaka Nakatomi, ‘Plurilateral Agreements: A Viable alternative to the World Trade 
Organization?’ (2013) ADBI Working Paper 439, Asian Development Bank Institute <http://www.adbi.org/working-
paper/2013/10/24/5914.plurilateral.agreements.alternative.wto/> accessed 22 April 2017, 2 
24 Olayinka Bandele, Emerging Disciplines on Government Procurement in Trade Agreements (The Commonwealth Secretariat 
2016) <http://thecommonwealth.org/sites/default/files/inline/GovernmentProcurementTPP1008.pdf> accessed 3 June 2019, 3 
25 Gary N Horlick, ‘Trans-Pacific Partnership’ (2016) 11(4) Global Trade and Customs Journal 149-152 
26 TPSEP parties, Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2005) 
<https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/securedfiles/FTAs-agreements-in-force/P4/Full-text-of-P4-agreement.pdf> accessed 22 April 
2017 
27 Michael J Green, ‘The Legacy of Obama’s ‘Pivot’ to Asia’ Foreign Policy (3 September 2016) 
<http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/09/03/the-legacy-of-obamas-pivot-to-asia/> accessed 2 May 2017 
28 Yuval Noah Harari describes the historical shift in the occurrence of war in global domination, i.e. from an era where there 
was ‘temporary absence of war’ to the ‘implausibility of war’. Yuval Noah Harari, Homo Deus (Vintage 2017) 18 
29 John J Mearsheimer, The tragedy of great power politics (Norton 2014) xv 
  16 
While Mearsheimer talks about this in context of great power politics and violent war, his 
thoughts apply equally to great powers asserting economic dominance, and in the case of the 
TPP, it would be the administration of new regulatory norms over a large geographical space, 
to the exclusion of (and perhaps detriment of) another great power. In July 2013, Japan made 
the decision to join the TPP, bringing the tally of negotiating countries to twelve30 and meaning 
that there were now two superpowers intent on two objectives: harmonising new global 
standards, and on containing China’s power.31  
On Japan’s geopolitical interests, Tabuchi elaborates: 
Japan also sees a leadership role in the partnership as a way to return to center stage after 
being eclipsed in the region by the rise of China, which many in Tokyo view as jeopardizing 
Japan’s economic interests and security. China, which is pursuing its own bilateral and 
multilateral trade agreements in the region, is unlikely to join the agreement soon because of 
the concessions on state-owned enterprises, intellectual property and labor that the pact would 
require. That has, in effect, made the partnership a vehicle of sorts for the United States, and 
now Japan, to counter China’s influence.32 
So while the TPP was intended to be a ‘living agreement’,33 meaning countries would be able 
to join the finalised agreement, and that specific provisions could be revised periodically to 
suit changing trade trends, the superpowers knew that in order for China to join, they would 
have to bring their standards up to the TPP standards. Given China’s affinity for state-led 
corporations and its approach to intellectual property, this is an unlikely occurrence in the near 
future. This is turn provided Japan and the U.S. the regulatory space to set up the Asia-Pacific 
trade order. 
Backer stated that while each negotiating country had its own agenda in the TPP, the United 
States’ and Japan’s agenda was ‘particularly strategic’ because they were not only looking to 
obtain access to each other’s markets – they were also both looking ‘to further political and 
regulatory objectives at the international level’.34 In fact, Bown states that the tariff issues were 
less important – introducing rules on perceived non-tariff barriers was the key driver of the 
agreement.35 Others state that maximalist intellectual property was the ‘core negotiating 
                                                   
30 Alphabetically, Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, United States, 
and Vietnam.  
31 William H Cooper and Mark E Manyin, Japan joins the Trans-Pacific Partnership: what are the implications? (Congressional 
Research Service 2013) <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42676.pdf> accessed 3 June 2019, 1 
32 Hiroko Tabuchi, ‘Japan moves to enter talks on Pacific trade’ The New York Times (Tokyo, 15 March 2013) 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/16/world/asia/japan-aims-to-join-trans-pacific-partnership-talks.html> accessed 23 April 2017 
33 Cooper and Manyin (n 31) 3 
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objective’ of the U.S.36 In other words, it can be gleaned that market access and reduction of 
tariffs was not the core focus. Rather, the TPP seeks to establish a ‘gold standard’ of global 
economic rules,37 reduce or eliminate beyond-the-border and non-tariff barriers, including 
regulatory measures and domestic policies, and harmonise these across a large regional 
area.38 In that sense, it is more of an instrument of ‘integrated economic regulation’ rather than 
a trade agreement per se.39  
Critics state that the TPP ‘will handcuff our ability to set regulations in key areas like finance, 
industry, the environment, public procurement and fostering programs to create jobs at 
home’40 and that the TPP would stifle and restrict access to generic medicines.41 The Peterson 
Institute for International Economics assessed the impact as generally positive, although 
noted that the U.S. was to benefit the most with an increase of annual real incomes by $131 
billion.42 The Peterson Institute also, however, noted some costs of some negotiating 
outcomes to the developing country participants, for example that Vietnam was likely to face 
costs to produce fabrics that would be greater than tariff savings.43  
 
Nineteen formal rounds of TPP negotiations were held from 2010-2013, hosted in TPP 
countries globally, with the first occurring in Melbourne, Australia from 15-19 March 2010, and 
the final formal round occurring in Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei, from 23-30 August 2013.44 I 
attended four formal rounds,45 participating as a registered stakeholder in three formal 
negotiator-stakeholder engagement sessions, presenting to negotiators on the inability of 
states to rely on public health exceptions at the investor state dispute settlement (ISDS) 
tribunals, data exclusivity, and the intellectual property and Malaysian disease burden more 
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generally. Formal stakeholder engagement consisted of presentations to negotiators in a 
lecture-style format,46 discussions at designated booths, and a joint briefing by Chief 
Negotiators to civil society, industry, and other stakeholders, after which stakeholders could 
ask questions of Chief Negotiators of their choice. Depending on the specifications of the host 
country, stakeholders were allocated 7-15 minutes to deliver their thoughts to negotiators.47  
 
Stakeholder engagement was not available at all negotiation rounds, and where available, 
were considered to be insufficient.48 On 4 February 2013, a letter was sent to the U.S. Chief 
Negotiator asking for reforms to the stakeholder negotiation process, including Chief 
Negotiator briefings at the beginning and end of negotiations instead of just the end, and a 
minimum of 15 minutes for stakeholder presentations.49 At the same time, ‘cleared advisers’ 
from U.S. industry were given access to full texts.50 MPs from certain countries were given 
access to texts, but made to sign non-disclosure agreements lasting a number of years.51  
 
This transparency imbalance was criticised by civil society, academics, and other stakeholders 
who were only involved when it was ‘too late for their criticisms to actually improve the deal 
itself’52 and said that the lack of transparency was an ‘attack on democratic governance’.53 
Gary Horlick, a former U.S. trade negotiator, commented that it was the least transparent 
negotiations he had ever seen.54 Proponents, on the other hand, stated that the secrecy was 
a strategic necessity to ensure governments’ objectives were not revealed.55 This can only be 
related back to the substance of the TPP – in that it contains standards of domestic, sub-
regional, and international policy regulation at unprecedented levels – and that secrecy was 
necessary to ensure its completion.  
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b) Context of the current state of the TPP  
 
As aforementioned, the TPP evolved into the CPTPP and was signed by the remaining 11 
countries on 8 March 2018.56 The following paragraphs summarise how the agreement 
changed from the TPP into the CPTPP, beginning with the close of formal negotiation rounds 
of the TPP.  
 
After the close of formal negotiation rounds of the TPP, numerous meetings were held 
between trade ministers and country chief negotiators to tie up loose ends and agree final 
concessions. Pursuant to this, on 4th February 2016, the agreement was signed.57 It would 
have then been subject to a two-year waiting period, during which the countries would amend 
domestic laws to comply with the TPP. Following this, the so-called ‘certification process’ 
would have taken place as proposed by the Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities Act of 
2014.58 This process would entail verification that measures taken by TPP partners to 
incorporate new standards in domestic law satisfy the standards of the U.S. Congress. If 
countries did not satisfy the U.S. understanding of its obligations under the agreement, the 
U.S. could have refused to bring the agreement into force.59 If there are shortcomings in the 
domestic law, the TPP partner would have then been consulted and been required to take 
measures to comply.60  
 
The outcome of the U.S. elections meant that certification - and for most TPP countries - 
ratification, would not occur in the expected timeframe. In his first week in office, in January 
2017, U.S. President Donald Trump disavowed the TPP via executive order,61 fulfilling 
promises made during his campaign. These promises were couched in rhetoric that 
denounced foreign countries, and bore the mark of protectionism that has not been seen in 
the U.S. trade agenda for some time. In Pennsylvania, for example, he called foreign currency 
manipulators ‘cheaters’, claimed that the TPP would put the interests of foreign countries 
above the U.S.’s, force American workers to compete with Vietnamese workers, and that all 
in all, the TPP would be the ‘deathblow of American manufacturing’.62  
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One critic stated that Trump’s decision was ‘not the loss of global economic gain. It is the loss 
of global economic direction’.63 As time passed it became clear that the U.S. plan for global 
economic direction was rooted in addressing trade deficits through trade wars64 and the 
redrafting of NAFTA.65 Whatever it was, at the very least, the withdrawal of the United States 
from the helm of a trade agreement intended to introduce the new global standard of beyond-
the-border rules opened possibilities up for removal of certain contentious provisions. So, 
while textually it remained an American agreement, there was now room for manoeuvre.  
 
While Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe had initially stated that the TPP ‘has no meaning’ 
without the U.S.,66 post-inauguration Japan changed their tune, stating that they were 
prepared ‘to carry TPP forward in essentially the same form it was in when Trump killed it’, 
with Deputy Prime Minister Taro Aso stating that discussions on an 11-member TPP (TPP-
11) would be taken forward.67 One reporter stated that this inclination was ‘geopolitical icing’ 
on the cake for Japan, i.e. that given the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership’s 
(RCEP)68 lower standards, Japan could see the agreement as a way to ‘limit China’s ability to 
dominate economic relations with its neighbours’.69  
 
Other countries expressed dismay at the U.S. exit, but kept avenues open to cooperate on 
TPP-11. Australia openly said that TPP continued to be in their national interest, despite the 
U.S. pullout.70 The Malaysian trade minister Mustapa Mohamed said in March 2017, “It is still 
an open question; there was a meeting held in Chile last week and another one coming up in 
May in Vietnam. We will continue to exchange views because the main motivation is to get 
access to the American market.”71 In January 2017, the Chilean Minister of Foreign Affairs 
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Heraldo Muñoz said that the Chilean TPP project was cancelled.72 A few months later in April, 
however, pursuant to a meeting of trade officials in Viña del Mar, Chile, Muñoz seemed more 
optimistic, stating, ‘the Asia-Pacific region is ready to lead the new age of globalization in the 
21st century by continuing the pluralistic approach to trade envisioned in the TPP, even though 
the accord no longer exists as we knew it.’73 These provide a glimpse into the motivations on 
TPP countries – that while they are universally disappointed at the exit of the United States, 
their motivations with the TPP were different.74 For Malaysia, an exporter of automotive and 
electrical parts, market access was the main objective. Chile, who had trade agreements in 
place with all TPP members, saw the TPP as a vehicle to wider rule integration.  
 
As time passed, while the ultimate form of the TPP was unknown, i.e. whether in the form of 
a TPP-11 or TPP-5 agreement,75 there was little doubt of the seepage of the standards in the 
agreement into other trade agreements. Mitchell and Voon comment:  
 
Ratification by the remaining TPP countries may thus provide an internal and external political 
signal - that is, to both domestic constituencies and international actors - of the perceived value 
of trade liberalisation and foreign investment in promoting national and global welfare, with the 
conceivable potential to influence the next steps of other TPP countries, if not the United 
States… Even if the TPP is not renegotiated and never enters into force, its successful 
negotiation and signature are likely to have important and lasting implications for international 
economic law and broader policy issues.76 
 
Crucially, TPP provisions resulted in the amendment of existing agreements, for example the 
amendment of the Singapore-Australia preferential trade agreement to include TPP 
standards.77 Even before the birth of TPP-11 or CPTPP, Vietnam has planned on legal reform 
based on TPP to over 30 legislative instruments.78 And as NAFTA renegotiation began, the 
USTR borrowed language from the TPP to modernise NAFTA into what is now known as the 
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U.S.-Mexico-Canada (USMCA) trade agreement,79 including the provision on biologics.80 
 
In addition to the fact that countries went ahead with TPP-style reforms despite American 
withdrawal, TPP-11 remained significant because of how the U.S. exit shaped geopolitics and 
the new world trade order. The TPP was openly described as a ‘dramatic geopolitical and 
economic bulwark against China’.81 Born from the U.S. exit was a real opportunity for China 
to assert itself in the Asia-Pacific region. While not the subject of this thesis, the role of the 
TPP in geopolitics meant the TPP was/is a significant historical process catalysing changes 
on the global scale. 
 
As aforementioned, in March 2018, the remaining 11 countries signed the agreement, now 
tagged the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). While the 
agreement suspended 22 articles, one scholar insists that these automatically snap back into 
place when the United States rejoins,82 presumably under a subsequent administration. 
 
On this note, documentation of the TPP is salient due to its significance in regard to, and 
contextualised to, (i) the failure of the Doha round of talks, historical pharmaceutical IP, and 
the need of powerful states to advance maximalist IP through different forums; (ii) the agenda 
of the powerful states to create a new world trade order via ‘deep integration’; and (iii) the 
response and role of the upper middle-income states in world trade politics. These are detailed 
below.  
(i) TPP in context of the ‘failure’ of Doha 
In the mid 1980s, the industrialised countries (US and the European Communities) and the 
industries pressuring them were feeling increasingly frustrated by what they saw as the 
toothlessness of the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) in the harmonisation and 
enforcement of intellectual property worldwide. Due to this, in 1986 at the start of the Uruguay 
WTO multilateral trade round negotiations, there was a shift from WIPO to the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) which they saw as the best forum to establish global minimum standards 
of intellectual property. In 1987, the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) upon the instruction 
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of the then-President Ronald Reagan, developed quantitative estimates of U.S. trade 
distortions resulting from insufficient intellectual property protection.83 The results were 
published in 1988, showing unverified industry-estimated aggregate losses of US$23.8 billion 
worldwide due to ‘inadequate intellectual property protection’.84  
 
In 1994, out of the Uruguay round, the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS) agreement was created, and then on WTO member countries were expected to 
adhere to these minimum standards.85 Anything over and beyond these standards were 
known as TRIPS Plus standards. 
 
Behind the scenes, however, at the nexus of civil society concerns of maximalist intellectual 
property and industrialised countries’ concerns of the ‘pirating’ of knowledge,86 tensions were 
bubbling. TRIPS was not the best case scenario for the industrialised West,87 and they set an 
agenda in place for the prescription and harmonisation of TRIPS Plus standards. At the same 
time, industrialised countries were becoming acutely aware of resistance from developing 
countries and civil society groups and the possibility of the WTO possibly not being the best 
forum for them to advance TRIPS Plus standards. Through this process, developing countries 
had become increasingly concerned of the effect of the agreement of the standards on their 
other political interests, for example the advancement of public health.88  
 
The next round of WTO negotiations, the Doha Development Round, commenced in 
November 2001 and was intended to cover a broad developmental agenda.89 The developing 
countries were looking forward to achieving large market access gains for agriculture and 
textiles, while central to the EU’s agenda were the so-called ‘Singapore issues’ of government 
procurement, trade facilitation (customs issues), trade and investment, and trade and 
competition.90   
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At this stage, however, developing countries did not come to the negotiations to be yes-men. 
There were very large disagreements concerning, among other things, intellectual property, 
agriculture, and the protection of domestic service suppliers.91 Gallagher contends that despite 
this, the developing countries knew that they would be giving up generous amounts of 
development sovereignty as part of a grand bargain to gain access to OECD markets.92 This 
knowledge did not mean, however, that developing countries would necessarily and uniformly 
lower the resistance. As negotiations progressed, it became evident to the U.S. and the EU 
that they would have difficulties advancing their interests due to the resourceful and organised 
resistance brought by civil society,93 widely diverse negotiating objectives, the lack of 
enthusiasm towards TRIPS from developing countries, and the structure of the WTO 
agreements being non-conducive to radical revisions of existing texts.94  
 
The ‘egregiously problem-prone’ negotiations broke down in the space of two years,95 and a 
sense of disappointment – although to varying degrees for different countries - emanated from 
both the developed and developing world. The Bush administration post-9/11 was hoping that 
‘a successful conclusion to the Doha talks would send a strong signal of cooperation within 
the international community’, and approached the talks with market access as the prime 
goal.96 The EU on the other hand, was more focused on the post-modern trade agenda, 
including the streamlining of rules on investment, e-commerce, and labour standards.97 And 
while some developing countries claimed that the Doha round negatively affected their 
economies, numerous economic estimates attest that net benefits to developed countries 
were up to the 100-billion-dollar mark.98  
 
Even before the Doha negotiations had broken down, the U.S. was rapidly signing bilateral 
free trade agreements.99 The U.S. had gone into the Doha Round with a sense of 
disappointment about TRIPS over WTOs enforcement of intellectual property, and the 
breakdown of Doha to fix their concerns and advance maximalist rules was the final nail in the 
coffin, and resulted in a ‘regime shift’ to bilateral and regional agreements, where they could 
                                                   
91 Gary Clyde Hufbauer, ‘Liberalisation in Services Trade’ in Kimberly Ann Elliott,  Caroline Freund, Anna Gelpern, Cullen S 
Hendrix, Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Barbara Kotschwar, Theodore H Moran, Tyler Moran, Lindsay Oldenski, Sarah Oliver, Peter A 
Petri, and Michael G Plummer (eds), Assessing the Trans-Pacific Partnership, Volume 1 (Peterson Institute for International 
Economics, 2016) < https://piie.com/system/files/documents/piieb16-1.pdf> accessed 23 April 2017, 82 
92 Gallagher (n 90) 67 
93 Das (n 89) 300 
94 Dutfield and Suthersanen (n 19) 39 
95 Das (n 89) 294 
96 Falke (n 90) 350-351 
97 Ibid 346 
98 Gallagher (n 90) 73 
99 Das (n 89) 296 
  25 
‘more easily leverage their economic and political clout’.100 In the words of TPP proponents 
Petri and Plummer: 
[M]egaregional agreements—offer a way forward. They can include a sufficient number and 
range of partners to limit the costs of trade diversion and to have an impact on global rules. Yet 
their membership can be small enough to reach compromises on difficult issues.101 
Helfer describes the principal objective of regime shifting as the ‘the creation of legal rules in 
one forum as an intermediate strategy for later incorporating those rules into other institutions 
and treaties’.102 The TPP is at its very essence an agreement for a countries over a wide 
region to adopt maximalist IP standards and other non-tariff rules, and is designed so that 
through the passage of time other countries will be able to join and agree to those standards 
and subsequent revisions of these standards.103 For this reason, as Laïdi opines, the TPP and 
the TTIP are instruments that will ‘kill the WTO’ and that the WTO will ‘cease to be the place 
where trade standards are negotiated’.104 In December 2017 a WTO Ministerial was held in 
Buenos Aires, discussing matters of e-commerce and attracting corporate lobbyists,105  but 
otherwise the WTO has faced numerous pressures to reduce its mandate, including recent 
U.S. obstruction on the appointment of new judges to WTO’s appellate body.106  
 
The TPP, as a far-reaching mega-regional, is therefore historically situated in decades and 
decades of evolution of trade-related intellectual property politics and the evolution of the 
global trading order, with great economic powers driving maximalist IP and other standards 
as global norms. Further study on political economy tradeoffs and the unique situation and 
motivations of the upper middle-income countries, while in no way can comprehensively 
diagnose the future of international trade and IP, will help situate the TPP in this historical 
account in terms of the negotiating dynamics between upper-middle income countries and the 
United States, and document the agreement as it advances (or fails) in the form of the TPP-
11. 
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(ii) The TPP and ‘deep integration’: the new political economy of trade 
The TPP is also still relevant because of where it is historically situated in the political economy 
of international trade. Historically, the political economy of trade has been explained in light of 
the elimination of tariffs. It has been explained in terms of abundant products or factors 
supporting the removal of tariffs, or protectionist approaches for new industries.107 A change 
in trade policy eras was precipitated by a greater focus on nontariff distortions in trade 
agreements, i.e. behind the border policy measures, regulatory measures, or practices that 
result of distortions of trade,108 for example, manipulations in real currency exchange rates, 
import quotas, or intellectual property policies.  
Negotiators began to ask, as Krugman states: ‘Why not demand that countries match us, not 
only in what they do at the border, but in internal policies?’109 This began in the 1970s after 
the WTO Kennedy Round of negotiations, where industrialised countries began tabling 
proposals as to what they considered were reasonable standards to be adopted by all WTO 
members to prevent nontariff trade distortions. The attempt to harmonise rules to large 
numbers of countries with varied developmental levels, as aforementioned, met with 
disagreement and failure of the negotiation rounds to complete. Today, as represented in the 
TPP, the rules intended to remove nontariff barriers have evolved and become ever more far-
reaching, insofar as to constitute ‘a process of economic integration that erodes differences in 
national economic policies and regulations and renders them more compatible for economic 
exchange’, i.e. deep integration.110 From the beginning of the TPP negotiations, it was evident 
that especially in regard to the Latin American TPP countries, there was already favourable 
access to the US market, and at least for this region, the tariff was not at the top of the 
agenda.111  
Since history has shown that deep integration per U.S. standards cannot occur in the WTO 
setting, industrialised nations have now, with the TPP and TTIP, sought to harmonise and 
standardise them among select regions via these plurilateral agreements. According to Kim, 
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it is deep integration, and not preferential market access due to the elimination of tariffs, that 
is the hallmark of the modern regional trade agreement (RTA).112  
Given that the character of these agreements has changed, one wonders whether there is a 
corresponding change in the nature of tradeoffs. Fernández and Portes take this query further 
and ask whether it changes the behaviour of states,113 and ‘insofar as the RTA does alter 
future incentives and behaviour, how does it change the expectations of all parties 
involved?’114 Duina and Morano-Foadi discuss RTAs that exhibit more institutionalism, i.e. 
RTAs that are marked by rich legislative measures, robust administration, and established 
judicial mechanisms, such as MERCOSUR.115 The authors further stress that RTAs are not 
‘isolated or insulated exercises’, but rather that they evolve according to domestic political 
agenda and shape institutional outcomes.116 These agreements not only involve more political 
commitment, but also financial and technical resources to integrate the rules therein. The 
literature suggests that even the finalization of an ordinary trade agreement leads to 
uncertainty about the costs of compliance.117 In a deep integration plurilateral agreement, 
given the need for strong multidisciplinary technical and regulatory capacity, it may well be 
that this is magnified.  
To illustrate, deep integration regional trade agreements (RTAs) are often supported by 
industries producing parts and components, i.e. intermediate goods, and their movement 
across and beyond borders would generate nontariff costs borne from domestic regulation. 
Kim states that their success in generating profits and gaining from economies of scale relies 
not only on reducing these costs, but also, that they have ‘stable expectations regarding these 
regulations’.118 In essence, the industrialised West expects regulatory homogeneity from 
developing countries in these agreements, and the decisions that developing country 
negotiators make in these agreements could be contingent on something as tangible as 
access to a market as large as the U.S. or domestic industries’ concerns about non-
discriminatory beyond border regulations, or something as intangible as a promise to increase 
technology transfer, or that the agreement will improve the credibility of domestic policies 
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(therefore increase negotiating leverage with other negotiating partners).119 Furthermore, a 
state in late development (for example upper middle-income countries like Chile or Malaysia) 
may find that they have more leverage (compared to lower middle-income countries) in these 
agreements due to a combination of factors including income levels, industrial capabilities, 
and moderate to high levels of technological capacity. Manger and Shadlen discuss:  
[T]rade needs to be understood in the context of broader constellations of economic policies, 
and that scholars need to keep in mind the overarching commonalities with regard to the role 
of the state in late development.120 
It is also worth remembering that while homogenous standards are expected of these states, 
these countries are not homogenous, and so while commonalities that drive states to make 
similar tradeoffs are important, so are the differences. Krugman illustrates: ‘Nations may 
legitimately have different ideas about what is a reasonable standard… even nations that 
share the same values will typically choose different standards if they have different 
incomes.’121 The inverse is also true: that countries with same incomes will typically choose 
different standards if they have different values. Basically, negotiating decisions are 
multifactorial, and what countries choose in terms of standards would depend on their values 
and the histories that have determined those values.  
Similarly, in terms of intellectual property, the decision for countries to agree to TRIPS Plus 
standards occurs in the context of ‘compromises’122 i.e. political economy tradeoffs. Muzaka 
emphasizes that ‘contests over IPR cannot be considered in isolation’ and refers to broader 
developments that may have an impact on these processes.123 As mentioned in Section IV of 
this chapter, in the TPP, market access tradeoffs were particularly visible in the context of 
exclusivity for biologic medicines. There may have been other forms of tradeoffs. Pugatch 
observes that decisions not to grant IP rights to foreigners are contingent on that countries’ 
access to foreign markets,124 i.e. the ability of its domestic firms to purchase alternative IP 
products, and that the country may be forced to accept maximalist IP in the face of a threat of 
trade retaliation.125  
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In any case, with increasingly maximalist IP, and other rules in these deep integration mega-
regional agreements, the global trade order is changing. Hamilton posits:  
In Washington’s view, successful TPP and TTIP negotiations might create momentum that 
could in fact push Doha forward. In addition, if TPP and TTIP partners went even further and 
codified and aligned their existing free trade agreements with all others with whom they have 
such free trade agreements, such a step would be a major boost to the global trading order.126 
While the TTIP never to fruition, and the TPP eventually became the CPTPP and suspended 
biologics exclusivity, the rules negotiated in these agreements, as Kwakwa explains, are likely 
to go on from there to be introduced in North-South bilateral agreements, where the 
negotiating dynamic is different and developing countries ‘in all likelihood, have less leverage 
than they would have in the multilateral setting’.127 The Asian Development Bank concurred, 
saying that the diversity of the members could result in the plurilateral agreement 
disintegrating and the rules therein instead reappearing as ‘loosely-tied bilateral deals’.128 
The TPP and the TTIP is attempting the gradual adoption of EU-US rules as the basic norms 
and the core of new global standards in trade,129 and the effective diminution of any chance 
of an equal arena for the Global South.  
(iii)  The response and role of the upper middle-income states in world trade politics 
Middle-income country trade gains in response to maximalist intellectual property have 
historically occurred in an environment of coercion. Evidence of resistance to maximalist 
intellectual property is aplenty, particularly from Brazil and India, and there is agreement that 
there were ‘inducements’ to accede to TRIPS.130 Middle-income countries were concerned 
about the development costs of TRIPS - not only the costs of longer medicines monopolies, 
but also the costs of drafting new laws, enhancing administrative capacities, and strengthening 
enforcement mechanisms.131 As the TRIPS negotiations progressed, it became increasingly 
clear to Western industrialised nations that they would have to make concessions on 
agriculture and textiles.132 Combined with the threat that developing countries would lose 
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access to the U.S. and EU markets previously negotiated under GATT, developing countries 
reluctantly agreed to the agreement.133 They were given transition periods to become TRIPS 
compliant.  
 
In international trade literature, developing countries have been traditionally seen as part of 
the same bloc, i.e. the bloc that is concerned about maximalist intellectual property because 
of philosophical, social, developmental, or economic priorities.134 The industrialised nations, 
on the other hand, are homogenously characterised as countries which seek higher standards 
of intellectual property in order to minimise trade losses and provide an incentive for 
innovation. The reality is much more complex, in that upper middle-income countries are in a 
unique position, and behave differently from their lesser-developed bloc-mates.  
 
In specific, they are countries aspiring to become developed countries and thus are seen as 
easier targets for maximalist IP, but at the same time are seen as conduits for greater 
harmonisation of maximalist IP due to several reasons: their recent experience of being lesser-
developed, sufficient income levels and IP capacity, their geographical proximity to lower 
middle-income countries, established political relationships with the lesser developed, and 
may have sufficient indigenous technological and industrial capabilities to generate IP, and 
therefore be less inhibited in terms of stronger IP. 135 I suggest that given the deep integration 
characteristic of the TPP, the upper middle-income role and distinction is more evident, and 
this research will seek to elucidate the distinction and provide, from an upper middle-income 
country perspective, lessons for lesser-developed countries seeking to engage in, or already 
commencing, trade negotiations. This brief explanation allows me now to segue into why Chile 
and Malaysia will be used as illustrative examples of how different upper-middle income 
countries make political economy tradeoffs.  
 
IV. Chile and Malaysia: illustrating upper middle-income country 
approaches in trade negotiations 
 
Chile, a Latin American presidential constitutional republic and former Spanish colony of 18 
million people stretching over 6000 kilometers of South America’s western coastline, could not 
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seem more different from Malaysia, a majority Muslim constitutional monarchy and 
Commonwealth country of 32 million people situated in the centre of Southeast Asia.136 They 
have vastly different historical backstories, with Chile achieving independence from the 
Spanish in 1818s, undergoing an economic crisis in 1982, and following that, consolidation of 
market-oriented reforms and trade liberalisation. In 2003, Chile signed the U.S.-Chile FTA, 
eliminating tariffs for 90% of U.S. agricultural products and adopting TRIPS-plus provisions.137  
 
British Malaya, as it was loosely termed from the 19th century through to the formation of the 
Malayan Union in 1946, was an agriculture- and mineral-rich land, and in the year 1900 saw 
influxes of Chinese and Indian immigration for tin mining and rubber plantations.138 After 
independence from the British in 1957, it was for many decades protectionist for the purpose 
of import-substituting industrialisation (ISI).139 In the mid-1970s to early-1980s, it had a boom 
in revenue due to petroleum exports,140 but was still wary of United States interests. In 2006 
negotiations began for a U.S.-Malaysia FTA, with the then-U.S. Trade Representative stating 
that Malaysia was at the ‘forefront of economic dynamism’ in Asia,141 but by 2007 negotiations 
had broken down due to disagreements on government procurement, intellectual property, 
and economic impact of tariff elimination.142 Malaysia has only relatively recently signed 
multiple bilateral trade agreements.  
 
The countries (chosen out of 4 upper-middle income TPP countries) also, however, have a 
number of uniting similarities, and it is the combination of these similarities and differences 
that will make an illuminating narrative, and are key to their negotiations and/or losses or gains 
on biologic medicines.143 These include income levels, similar negotiating expertise, alliances 
on IP, and specific TPP biologics negotiating events, and are elaborated upon below.  
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Grounds for Comparison 
 
For ease of reference, the grounds are set out numerically below and substantiated further.  
 
Similarities 
 
1) Income levels & negotiating capacity 
2) Human development levels & negotiating capacity 
3) Alliances on IP in the TPP, specifically on U.S.-proposed provisions 
4) Approaches at the WTO – close to big economies, and allied with regional partners 
5) Experience/familiarity in making concessions to U.S. demands. Both countries 
accepted data exclusivity as a result of U.S. pressure/negotiations/agreements 
6) Governmental focus and interest in biopharmaceutical innovation, and domestic 
manufacturing capacities 
 
Differences 
 
7) Chile having pre-existing bilateral trade agreements with all TPP countries, 
therefore established market access deals.  
8) Chile already having 5 years of market exclusivity on biologics.  
9) Chile being in a stronger economic position and implications on concessions. 
 
1. Similar income levels as an indicator of similar negotiating capacity 
 
Among the four upper-middle-income TPP countries, Chile and Malaysia are the closest in 
terms of GDP, GNI per capita, and real GDP growth.144 Country income levels lend relevance 
to several phenomena in the international trade environment, including how countries 
negotiate (power dynamics), what commitments they are subject to, eligibility for trade 
expertise funding, negotiating capacity, and administrative capacity of the state and domestic 
implementing actors.145  
 
How countries behave in trade negotiations is often dependent on economic prowess, 
because it indicates not only what products they can bring to the table, but also what aid or 
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technical assistance they can withhold or withdraw. The U.S., for example, is seen as a ‘heavy-
handed hegemon’146 in international trade, and often resorts to a number of bullying or threat 
tactics, including threats against ambassadors147, withdrawal of foreign aid and technical 
assistance, putting pressure on capitals, and including countries in their intellectual property 
naughty list, the Special 301 Priority Watch List.148   
 
Jawara and Kwa describe the ‘bullying hierarchy’ in more detail:  
 
While both developed and developing countries participate in the sophisticated political games 
played by different blocs to try to get what they want at the WTO, the Quad (Canada, European 
Communities, Japan, Luxembourg, Sweden, USA) and other developed countries, being the 
most powerful players by far, are firmly entrenched at the top of the bullying hierarchy. Their 
much greater political and economic muscle means they are better placed to call the shots, and 
to issue threats and promises where necessary to further their interests.149 
 
The authors then described upper-middle income (and a handful of lower middle income) 
countries as being next in the hierarchy, but with a game that is more complex, reflecting a 
balance of interests between appearing friendly with the major powers and reaping the 
benefits of strategic alliances with least developed countries. On their role, the authors state: 
One of the main bargaining chips they can offer in this process is the influence they can exert 
on other developing countries, particularly through regional and other groupings.150  
 
Least developed countries, historically have had limited participation in trade, with Hoekman 
and Kostecki commenting on the GATT agreement as ‘primarily of relevance to OECD 
countries. Developing countries did not participate fully.’151 While the authors did not state 
expressly that this was due to a lack of negotiating capacity, others have noted weak domestic 
institutions and human capacity as a key factor to this lack of participation.152 In the 1990s, 
emphasis on trade-related technical expertise to least developed countries (LDCs) emerged 
and was funded by developed nations. That is to say, there is a nexus between country 
incomes and negotiating expertise, albeit an imprecise one, as arguably some Indian and 
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Brazilian negotiators are better skilled than high income country negotiators. While the 
strength of this nexus has not been conclusively established in academic literature, it is an 
accepted truth in the international trade scene that countries of similar incomes exhibit similar 
negotiating expertise, and that expertise is central to effective trade gains. 
 
In a 2010 study, Jones et al. describe the threats and intimidation that small state negotiators 
face, and that these threats ‘severely constrains their perceived ability to negotiate 
successfully and their determination to persist’.153 The authors also describe how small states 
are constrained in their ability to design and deploy negotiating strategies.  
 
This lack of participation, and a lack of gains from international trade negotiations has also 
been documented in the access to medicines sphere, with Drahos suggesting four lessons for 
developing countries to learn for increased efficacy in negotiations.154 These include the need 
for developing countries to prepare strategies to realise negotiating gains, and to be wary of 
‘negotiating fatigue’ resulting from developed countries bearing down and renegotiating issues 
repeatedly in order to break the weaker party down.  
 
This is not to say, however, that developing countries cannot win negotiating gains against a 
stronger power. Developing countries can and have won gains against developed countries 
via a multitude of different tactics, including tradeoffs, coalition-building, and agenda-setting, 
among others. However, this is dependent on negotiating capacity. Singh elaborates:  
 
[D]eveloping countries can “win” only through clever combinations of knowledge, flexibility and 
daring… Negotiation environments, in particular, can be directly derived from particular power 
configurations of the global economy and determine the negotiating ‘rules of the game’ and the 
availability of alternatives to the developing world.155  
 
In the 1990s, it became obvious at least in the multilateral trading sphere that developing 
countries were ill equipped to negotiate to their best interests. In 1996, a WTO ministerial 
event was held in Singapore, where ministers of trade discussed and agreed upon a Plan of 
Action to end the marginalisation of LDCs in trade, and elucidate funding streams for trade-
related technical expertise programmes for LDCs.156  
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Today these programmes are carried out by the WTO and are funded by major donors such 
as Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.157 According to a survey conducted by the 
WTO on these international support measures among least developed countries, financial 
constraints mean that they are often unable to access information available in their countries’ 
public administration, they were not able to understand questions in the survey, and 
inadequate human resources.158 Upper middle-income countries are precluded from receiving 
trade-related technical assistance from this fund.  
 
Negotiating countries with similar incomes often choose similar standards, even if they have 
different values.159 In the context of this PhD, this nexus between country income and 
negotiating capacity and negotiating behaviours is salient because I seek to document how 
different countries of similar income, developmental level, and negotiating capacity responded 
to demands that they did not necessarily agree with. This will provide useful lessons for other 
middle-income countries.  
 
In my view, a comparison with a high-income TPP country would have lent a different narrative 
– i.e. how different financial prowess and political dynamic affects how different countries 
negotiate, but this has already been documented numerous times elsewhere.160 In addition, 
the example of one upper middle-income country simply would not capture unique regional 
histories that affect trade negotiations. It is also for that reason that I did not select two 
countries in the same region. A choice of Chile and Mexico, for example, would simply be 
another study on trade in Latin America.161  
 
IP capacity is a different thing altogether. Even in the TRIPS negotiations, neither the chief 
negotiators from the GATT contracting parties nor Ambassador Anell and the members of the 
GATT Secretariat assigned to the TRIPS negotiations were intellectual property experts.162 
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However, given different geographical regions, and different political systems, cultures, and 
historical backstories, I wish to further substantiate the choice by comparing human 
development levels of the two countries.  
 
2. Human development levels 
 
The first Human Development Report, released in 1990, introduced the Human Development 
Index (HDI) as an alternative to looking at development from solely an ‘expansion of income 
and wealth’ perspective163 and aims to capture a broader characterisation of development by 
looking at education, inequality, trade, and employment, among other things.164 In the context 
of this PhD, consideration of HDI may reveal certain meaningful differences pertaining to the 
stake of the country in intellectual property and access to medicines, and/or their capacity to 
negotiate on intellectual property at the level of trade negotiations. 
 
Among the four upper middle-income countries in the TPP, Chile and Malaysia have the 
highest ranked HDI, although the margin of difference in rank and HDI is larger between Chile 
and Malaysia as compared to Malaysia and Mexico.  
 
The below table presents the human development index and corresponding global ranking of 
the upper middle-income countries in the TPP: 
  
Figure 1: Human Development Index (Source: UNDP) 
Country  
(alphabetical  
order) 
HDI Rank Expected years  
of  
schooling (years) 
Population with  
at least some  
secondary education  
(% aged 25 and above) 
Exports & Imports  
(% of GDP) 
Chile 0.832 42 15.2 74.8 65.5 
Malaysia 0.779 62 12.7 68.2 154.1 
Mexico 0.756 74 13.1 58.0 64.2 
Peru 0.734 84 13.1 61.1 48.8 
 
Malaysia has the least expected years of schooling, but the second highest percentage of 
population with at least some secondary education. Chile ranked highest out of the four 
countries with respect to most indicators pertaining to education. While this cannot be 
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conclusively linked to negotiating capacity, other studies assist in illustrating value of human 
capital in these countries. Beine et al. conducted an empirical analysis of data, including 
emigration rates by educational and skill level, factoring for credit constraints on education, 
and found that both Chile and Malaysia are undergoing a ‘beneficial brain drain’, meaning that 
emigration rates are having a ‘positive impact on gross human capital formation’, and that this 
may foster investment in education at home.165 However, according to this economic model, 
Chile’s human capital formation gains more from skilled migration prospects as compared to 
Malaysia.  
 
Malaysia also differs to the other countries in terms of exports & imports as a percentage of 
GDP, which is often used as a general indicator of openness to foreign trade,166 and is an 
indicator of higher human development. It also indicates the dependence of domestic 
producers and consumers on foreign supply relative to GDP.167 The International Chamber of 
Commerce looks at openness to trade in greater depth, and ranks Chile and Malaysia both in 
the ‘above average openness’ category, with Peru and Mexico in the ‘average openness’ 
category, as tabulated below.  
 
Category Country (alphabetical 
order) 
Rank Score 
Above average 
openness 
Chile 29 4.1 
Malaysia 33 4.0 
Average openness Mexico  54 3.1 
Peru 40 3.8 
Table 1: Openness to trade of upper-middle income TPP countries (Source: ICC, 2015, p. 11) 
Chile has double the number of bilateral trade agreements in force compared to Malaysia, 
with 15 bilateral trade agreements. In total, Chile has 21 free trade agreements, whereas 
Malaysia has 13. Out of Malaysia’s 13 free trade agreements, 7 are bilateral.168 These lead 
me to the question: how does trade openness influence concessions? Will a country that is 
hungrier for an FTA make more concessions that it is not ready for?  
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FTA hunger, as was demonstrated in the case of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), was mainly because of Mexico’s intention to improve the credibility of its domestic 
policies rather than market access targets.169 As a result of FTA hunger, Mexico significantly 
reduced tariffs in exchange for only partially reduced tariffs, and deregulated investment and 
supplemental agreements.170 Turkey similarly made deep concessions, simply in order to 
avoid economic marginalisation from not being included in a regional trade bloc.171  
 
Trade openness, however, does not automatically equate to desperation to sign an FTA. A 
country with high export & import figures may feel that it has sufficient or adequate openness 
to grow its economy, and may not feel the need to make major concessions for an FTA that 
would only give it marginal benefits. On the other hand, Milner describes how openness to 
trade changes domestic preferences in that it increases the number of supporters of free 
trade.172 This would in turn provide more room for concessions.  
 
3. Allied on intellectual property 
 
As leaked TPP texts came to the fore, it became clear that alliances among developing 
countries and occasionally alliances between developing countries and select developed 
countries were being formed. In the IP text, Chile and Malaysia were allied on, among other 
things, trademark protection for scents (Article QQ.C.1) (TPP IP group country negotiators, 
,173 recordal of trademark licenses as a condition to join infringement proceedings (Article 
QQ.C.10), geographic indications (QQ.D.5), and the issue of the denial of patents solely due 
to the fact that the product did not result in increased efficacy (QQ.E.1). Importantly, Chile and 
Malaysia were part of an alliance of five countries (New Zealand, Canada, Singapore, Chile, 
and Malaysia) in proposing pre- and/or post-patent grant opposition procedures (QQ.E.4).174 
 
Kolsky Lewis discusses these alliances in the TPP negotiations, and says that while the TPP 
environment was less favourable to developing country participants as compared to the WTO, 
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it was likely to be more favourable as compared to bilaterals with developed countries, where 
they would have less bargaining leverage as compared to the multilateral setting.175  
 
For the purposes of this project, given that by the final release of the IP chapter all bracketed 
text had been removed and it is not apparent whether alliances were formed on biologics 
exclusivity, it would be interesting and novel to document whether alliance-forming was one 
of the strategies employed in addition to or in lieu of a market access tradeoff.176  
 
4. Position at the WTO – closeness to developed countries and established alliances 
with regional developing country partners 
 
Chile has been described as a favourite of the big economies, and has persuaded other Latin 
American countries to agree to positions demanded by the big economies. Similarly, while 
traditionally Malaysia has been a strong leader of developing countries and impervious to 
threats from industrialised nations, from 2003 onwards demonstrated their agreeability to 
industrialised nation proposals, and even persuaded African countries to agree.177  
 
This matters for the main reason that the TPP is at its core a deep integration agreement. As 
discussed above, the rule makers in the TPP (i.e. U.S. and Japan) want to establish new 
global norms. In addition, upper middle-income countries and lesser-developed countries 
(LDCs) have a ‘development proximity’ in that they understand the technical needs of LDCs 
and are seen as models for the next stage of development.178 In order for new rules to be 
accepted as the norm, industrialised nations need not only developing country practitioners of 
their rules, but also for those developing countries to be advocates of those rules to lesser 
developed countries.  
 
Political closeness (which in turn often comes hand in hand with some form of economic 
interdependence) can affect domestic trade choices. For example, countries with military 
cooperation trade more with each other, opening up the possibility of more trade concessions.  
Adding to this equation is that a country with military dependence on another country means 
that there is a position of dominance, increasing the likelihood of concessions. An example of 
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this has been documented in regard to the Colombia-U.S. FTA, which Healey describes as 
being an FTA rooted in security motives179 as opposed to general developmental goals, and 
keeps Colombia dependent on U.S. military aid.180 Milner also describes the effect of previous 
trade relationships on current trade choices, in that if previous trade has cultivated a pacific 
relationship between two countries, it is likely that further liberalisation will be stimulated.181 
Following on from this train of thought, it would be necessary, therefore, to determine whether 
Chile’s previous negotiations with the U.S. brought on a pacific relationship that contributed to 
Chile’s proclivity towards the TPP, and whether Malaysia being at loggerheads with the U.S. 
in the U.S.-Malaysia bilateral FTA negotiations in 2006 dictated a more cautious approach, 
and therefore less concessions.  
 
5. Experience with IP concessions as a result of U.S. demands 
 
Previous experience with U.S. IP demands in trade is something that both Chile and Malaysia 
have in common. Chile agreed to data exclusivity via the Chile-U.S. bilateral trade agreement 
in 2003.182 Malaysia, on the other hand, was asked to accept data exclusivity in the 
negotiations for the Malaysia-U.S. bilateral agreement in 2006, but given that negotiations 
broke down and the agreement was never concluded, data exclusivity was not accepted at 
that point of time.  
 
In 2010, however, Malaysia was put on the US Trade Representative’s Special 301 Priority 
Watch List (PWL) for failing to include data exclusivity in its laws. One year after being 
including in the PWL, Malaysia adopted and implemented data exclusivity for pharmaceuticals 
via a government directive.183 In 2012, Malaysia was removed off the PWL, and US Trade 
Representative Ron Kirk in his Special 301 Report specifically mentioned data exclusivity as 
one of the key reasons for removing Malaysia off the PWL.184 Chile, on the other hand, 
continues to be included in the Special 301 PWL due to ‘longstanding IPR issues’ on patent-
data linkage,185 and may suggest either disagreement with the U.S. on implementation, or a 
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disregard of the ‘aggressive unilateralism’ of the Special 301 list.186  
 
It is unclear at this stage how previous experience with U.S. negotiators could have influenced 
concessions. Theoretically, learning from previous negotiations would’ve better prepared 
developing country negotiators to anticipate U.S. demands and respond by creating issue-
linkages and alliances. This theory assumes that learning from previous experience has 
passed completely from trade negotiations of one era to another, or that the trade negotiation 
authority had a predefined idea of a win-set and corresponding strategy.  
 
Zeng, detailing American coercive diplomacy in trade,187 states that discussions on most-
favoured nation status during the U.S.-China bilateral trade negotiation process in the 1990s 
brought ‘virtually no discernible change in Beijing’s policies’,188 and that threats to use the 
Special 301 was met with strong Chinese resistance. On IP protection, at three different 
incidences did the U.S. threaten China with trade sanctions if they did not occur, but at all 
three times last-minute agreements were achieved, with the 1996 sanctions withdrawn without 
any concessions from China.189 This suggests some unit-level learning, but with China having 
enormous economic prowess, it may have been easier to leverage their resources and deny 
American demands on IP.  
 
 
6. Domestic biopharmaceutical and biosimilar industries – political commitment and 
manufacturing capacity 
 
Weatherall states: 
 
A states’ interests in framing domestic IP law will depend on a variety of factors: its development 
status, the level of indigenous research and innovation, the local mix of industries (a country 
with a strong export industry in education, for example, may have an interest in copyright 
exceptions for educational uses), and other issues such as the health status of the population 
(a country suffering an AIDS or other pandemic, for example, may wish to make use of 
flexibilities in patent law to reduce the cost of, and increase access to, essential medicines).190 
[Emphasis added]. 
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Basically, trade preferences change based on domestic actors, i.e. whether import competition 
or the opening of markets abroad would affect their incomes.191 Applying this to the biologics 
or biosimilar industries in Malaysia and Chile, a country with a burgeoning biosimilar industry, 
established innovation of biosimilars, or even political plans towards investing in biosimilars 
may be more inclined towards insisting for an exception for biologics exclusivity.  
 
Governmental agencies in charge of development and investment in Chile and Malaysia have 
both emphasised the strategic value of biotechnological or biosimilar drugs, and provides 
incentives for biotechnological companies to invest in their countries.192 CORFO, the Chilean 
Economic Development Agency, who works towards ‘transforming Chile into a global 
innovation and entrepreneurial hub’, has stated that they view the biotechnological industry 
as of strategic value to Chile, and so facilitate the incorporation of biomedical companies that 
seek to transfer technology and install manufacturing capacity in Chile.193  
 
Malaysian interest in biotechnology was noticed by U.S. stakeholders as early as 2006, when 
the Biotechnology Innovation Organization (BIO), the world’s largest trade agency focused on 
biotechnology based in Washington, D. C., in lauding the commencement of bilateral U.S.-
Malaysia negotiations, noted that Malaysia was an ‘important market with a strong interest in 
developing in biotechnology industry’.194 CORFO’s parallel agency in Malaysia, MIDA 
(Malaysian Investment Development Agency) on its website notes the ‘huge potential demand 
globally’ and provides for ‘pioneer status’ or ‘investments tax allowance incentives’ for 
companies manufacturing pharmaceuticals, biopharmaceuticals, neutraceuticals195, 
microbials and probiotics.196 It is unclear, however, whether these policies are tailored towards 
attracting originator biotechnology companies, or whether they benefit domestic biosimilar 
producers.  
 
In terms of biosimilar manufacturing capacity, Malaysia has two companies producing 
biosimilars, InnoBio and Biocon, with the latter focusing solely on the production of 
recombinant insulin. Innobio is financed by the Malaysian government and is equipped with 
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bioreactors that can be run 15-18 times a year, and has thus far produced 7 biosimilar 
components for the Indian and Korean markets. They are also working with Cuban entities for 
the production of novel antibodies. These two companies are the two main biomedicine 
companies, although Malaysia has had an established small-molecule medicine generic 
pharmaceutical industry for some time. It is unclear, however, as to the extent of engagement 
these companies had with trade negotiators on pharmaceutical IP.  
 
While there are Santiago-based companies providing laboratory testing of biosimilar 
products,197 Chile does not have the capacity at present to produce biosimilars despite the 
government being very keen on developing a commercialised biosimilars market.198 Similarly 
to Malaysia, Chile has a growing domestic small-molecule pharmaceutical industry, with an 
estimated growth rate of 11.3% per year.199  
 
The state of the domestic industry in both countries is salient for the reason that in the 
development stages, these industries rely on lower IP regimes in order to reverse engineer 
products and to develop indigenous technological and industrial capacity. It is only when there 
is indigenous capacity and intensity of effort to generate IP that IP becomes beneficial for 
these industries.200 Given the political commitment towards biotechnological development in 
both countries, it would be intriguing to discover in my research whether this eventually was a 
factor contributing to negotiating outcomes.  
 
Among other TPP countries that were at loggerheads with the U.S. over biologics exclusivity, 
Australia has a blooming biomedical industry, with biomedical exports earning more than cars 
and wine, and domestic companies aiming to produce novel treatments in the near future.201 
One of these domestic companies, Mesoblast, has several novel stem cell treatments in the 
pipeline, and has recently received backing from an American company.202 In addition to this, 
towards the end of 2016, the Turnbull government launched a $500 million Biomedical 
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Translation Fund to stimulate development of biomedical products from the laboratory into the 
final product stages.203  
 
Despite Australia’s prospects in the production of novel biologics, Australia was a key 
opponent of the U.S. proposals for extended biologics market exclusivity, as they would not 
go beyond 5 years of exclusivity. Because of this, they were on the receiving end of vitriol from 
U.S. Senator Orrin Hatch, who said they wanted to ‘steal U.S. patents’ for biologics.204 In 
Atlanta, the pivotal round for the conclusion of TPP negotiations, the then-Trade Minister 
Andrew Robb told U.S. magazine Inside Trade that they were close to a compromise on 
biologics. So despite biomedical developments back home, limited biologics exclusivity still 
became a sticking point for Australia, possibly due to pressures from local public health 
groups.205  
 
While a comparison with Australia would also be interesting because it would help elucidate 
why some developed countries object to maximalist IP for pharmaceuticals despite having the 
wealth and industrial background that is usually consistent with maximalist IP, this would not 
assist my objective in providing an illustrative documentation of how economies intending to 
become high income deal with demands from IP maximalist countries. 
 
7. Pre-existing exclusivity for biologics 
 
In the Chile-U.S. FTA which entered into force on 1 January 2004, Chile entered into 
commitments related to the protection of undisclosed data in a way which would prevent 
regulatory agencies from marketing a generic product in reliance of the originator’s data.206 
The relevant article states:  
 
 Article 17.10: Measures related to certain regulated products 
 
1. If a Party requires the submission of undisclosed information concerning the safety and 
efficacy of a pharmaceutical or agricultural chemical product which utilizes a new chemical 
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entity, which product has not been previously approved, to grant a marketing approval or 
sanitary permit for such product, the Party shall not permit third parties not having the consent 
of the person providing the information to market a product based on this new chemical entity, 
on the basis of the approval granted to the party submitting such information. A Party shall 
maintain this prohibition for a period of at least five years from the date of approval for a 
pharmaceutical product and ten years from the date of approval for an agricultural chemical 
product. Each Party shall protect such information against disclosure except where necessary 
to protect the public. [Emphasis added]. 
 
This article is market exclusivity, meaning that generic companies may rely on data from the 
originator company to produce the generic copy and register it within the stipulated time, but 
that they may not market it during the stipulated time.  
 
Chile includes the TPP biologics market exclusivity within this definition, so their key position 
may have been to ensure that U.S. negotiators in the TPP did not go beyond 5 years. Malaysia 
may have been in a weaker position, due to the fact that its exclusivity provision was data 
exclusivity as opposed to market exclusivity, and it was not applied to all products, but rather 
discretionarily applied. The distinction is significant because in the case of data exclusivity, 
the generic company is not able to rely on originator company data to register their product, 
meaning that that may only register the product after the 5-year period is over.  
 
Effectively, because market approval would take longer, data exclusivity provides for a longer 
monopoly period. The distinction is described in more detail in Section III below, but it remains 
to be seen whether this consideration was at all material in the context of the negotiations. 
Malaysian negotiators repeatedly stated the TPP final provisions meant that it was ‘status quo’ 
for biologics when compared to Malaysian law,207 presumably meaning that they operated on 
the assumption they would not have to amend their law pursuant to TPP finalisation, and that 
5 years data exclusivity was the same as 5-8 years market exclusivity in the TPP.  
 
 
8. Economic vulnerability 
 
Fears of recessions and economic instability have resulted in developing countries agreeing 
to concessions or entirely new negotiation rounds.208 In addition, bad economic trends often 
result in political leaders overturning any remaining protectionist policies, and embracing more 
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liberalisation in order to further integrate into the global economy, as seen in the 1980s debt 
crises.209  
 
A fall in commodities prices, depleted foreign exchange reserves, and the 1MDB scandal, 
resulted in a financial credibility crisis, leaving Malaysia in an economically frail position.210 
While it has a current account surplus, as opposed to Chile which has a current account deficit, 
slowing economic growth and reliance on credit places it in a vulnerable position within the 
region. The 1MDB scandal, marked by the siphoning of funds from a sovereign wealth fund to 
the Prime Minister’s personal bank account and towards funding, among other things, the Wolf 
of Wall Street movie, has been said to have eroded external financial confidence in Malaysian 
markets, and at the time was seen as an omen for a ratings downgrade.211  
 
Despite the current account deficit, however, Chile has been described as having low levels 
of economic vulnerability.212 Despite this, in 2017, a reduction in copper exports as a result of 
domestic strikes, and rising unemployment, indicates some weaknesses that Chilean 
negotiators could have foreseen and acted to rectify – whether correctly or erroneously – via 
the TPP. I will seek to elucidate these questions during fieldwork.  
 
This difference between the two countries lends depth to the comparison between the two – 
that while upper middle-income countries share many similarities in negotiating prowess, 
numerous other factors influence trade outcomes and tradeoffs that they may make.  
 
V. Relevance of a focus on biologics 
 
a) Why a focus on biologics? 
 
Biologics are complex therapies synthesised from living things, for example plant or animal 
cells, or viruses. They are different from small molecule drugs which are produced through 
chemical synthesis, have well-defined molecular structures, and are generally relatively 
stable. Biologics, on the other hand, have complex, heterogenous structures, and are very 
sensitive to environmental conditions such as light or and temperature. These factors translate 
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into the fact that even if a minor variation in manufacturing technique is made, clinical 
outcomes may be drastically different.213 Most are created via recombinant DNA technology, 
although experiments are being done to produce biologics via total chemical synthesis.214 In 
an era where molecular individualised medicine is replacing the one-size-fits-all medicine, the 
medicines innovation landscape is changing.215 As part of this changing innovation landscape, 
biologics have seen an increasing market share over the years.  
 
Heled elaborates: 
 
They are large in size, sensitive to environmental changes (both during production and 
afterwards), and expensive to develop and manufacture. But in their complexity lies their 
advantage: unparalleled effectiveness in the treatment of serious, and sometimes previously 
untreatable, ailments that renders biologics, in many cases, nothing short of wonder drugs.216 
 
This unparalleled effectiveness is reflected in market trends. In 2006, only one of the top-ten 
drugs on the market was biologic. By 2015, seven out of the top-ten selling drugs were 
biologic, accounting for $67.2 billion in revenue.217 In the projected top-ten selling drugs in 
2017, all but one were biologic, accounting for $70.2 billion in revenue.218 Brown also predicted 
the launch of a number of new biologics in 2017, including Roche’s Ocrevus (multiple 
sclerosis) and Sanofi’s Dupilumab (atopic dermatitis), with projected revenues of $4.1 billion 
each.219 In 2016 alone, the FDA approved 12 new biologics and 3 biosimilars, including for 
cancer, muscular dystrophy and rheumatoid arthritis.220 The Pharmaceutical Research 
Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) states that American companies are using biological 
process to research 907 medicines and vaccines targeting more than 100 diseases.221 The 
exponential growth and domination of biologic drugs is expected to continue, with the global 
market potential of biologics to reach $250 billion globally by 2020.222  
 
In addition to a rapidly increasing market share, trends have shown that the top 25-selling 
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biologics have undergone ‘aggressively increased prices regardless of years on the market or 
indication’.223 This raises important questions in terms of patient access, and whether 
negotiators considered these factors during the negotiation on biologics tradeoffs. In Section 
VI of this Chapter, I draw upon Sell’s observations that ‘unit-level learning’ leads negotiators 
to redefine their interests.224 This leads to a reciprocal change in behaviour from negotiators 
on the opposing side.225 and simultaneously resulting in negotiators from the opposing side 
changing their behaviour. Basically, in the case of biologics negotiations, were negotiators 
informed by biomedicine market data, whether international or domestic, and if not, what were 
their main considerations? And, how did this modify their behaviour? 
 
In any case, the surge in biologic medicines, motivated by research environments that are 
increasingly tailored to individual biomarkers and genes,226 has brought a corresponding 
response in terms of intellectual property governing biologics and regulatory pathways for 
biosimilar drugs.227 
 
The manufacture of biologic drugs is expensive, requiring significant upfront investment on 
human and infrastructural capacity. Production is highly complex, as the final 
biopharmaceutical product is highly sensitive to external factors such as temperature, growth 
conditions, and the conditions during storage and transport.228 Some have claimed that 
manufacturing a new drug generally costs $2.6 billion dollars, however this figure includes 
cost of capital and does not take into account public research grants or subsidies.229 It has 
been estimated that follow-on biologics or biosimilars take 8-10 years to develop, costing 
between US$100-200 million.230 The cost of creating a biosimilar is significantly higher than 
producing a generic of a small molecule drug, estimated to cost from US$2-3 million.231  
 
Relatively recently, there has been a flurry of interest around biosimilars as governments 
struggled to afford originator biologic prices, and at the same time realised the investment and 
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economic potential of commercialising production of biosimilars.232 In addition, a number of 
countries have successfully substituted novel biologic medicines with biosimilars. For 
example, following government policy incentivising doctors to substitute, in Norway, the 
biosimilar infliximab has reached 92.9% of market share.233 Country medicines regulators 
have also embraced biosimilars, stating that treatment-naïve patients may be started on 
biosimilars, and that those already on treatment may be switched to biosimilars under 
physician supervision.234  
 
Global sales of biosimilars are expected to reach US$25 billion by 2020, with an estimated 
annual compound growth rate of 7.7%,235 and the American and EU markets have in the past 
year approved substitutions of key originator biologics with biosimilars, including replacing 
genetically engineered insulin analogue Lantus with biosimilar Basaglar, and Zarxio being 
approved as a substitute for Neupogen, to treat neutropenia in cancer patients and acute 
myeloid leukemia, among other indications.236 At the closing of 2016, there were 12 pending 
biosimilar applications for the European market, including applications for biosimilars of 
pegfilgrastim (for patients undergoing chemotherapy) and trastuzumab (breast cancer).237  
 
The entry of biosimilars into the market, the corresponding reduction of revenue to originators, 
may precipitate a stronger intellectual property response238 in the form of increased 
exclusivities. Heled, however, comments that the primary rationale for these exclusivities has 
been to compensate product developers for what they see as insufficient incentivisation 
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provided by the patent system.239 That is to say, product developers say that more time is 
needed to recoup R&D costs and generate rewards for innovation, as studies taken after the 
patent filing can effectively reduce the patent term from 20 years to single digits.240 The U.S. 
Federal Trade Commission has refuted this, stating that ‘pioneer biologic drugs are covered 
by more and varied patents, including manufacturing and technology platform patents, than 
small-molecule branded products’ and that contentions of unpatentability of pioneer biologics 
are backed by very little data.241 In addition, Kinch states that clinical development times for 
biologics are generally shorter compared to small-molecule drugs, averaging 7.4 years.242 
Assuming that clinical development runs from the first patent, the company would have 12.6 
years of patent protection.  
 
Proponents of long data and market exclusivity provisions argue further, that under 7-year and 
10-year market exclusivity periods, even if the pioneer biologic retains substantial market 
share after biosimilar entry, that biologic would fail to recover the average costs of 
development, manufacturing, promotion, and the cost of capital.243 Grabowski et al. state that 
this would only be possible in 12.9-16.2 years, justifying a market exclusivity period of 12 
years. It is this period that U.S. negotiators sought, and as Heled mentions, was intended to 
‘set minimum standards for the regulation of biologics and biosimilars globally.’244 Biologics 
exclusivity in the context of the TPP is discussed further in Section c below.  
 
b) Relevance of biologics to upper-middle income countries 
 
Upper-middle income countries are in a unique position economically and demographically. 
From an economic standpoint, these countries are relatively wealthy; however they exist at 
the crossroads of economic development, aging, and non-communicable disease (NCD).245 
That is to say, these countries have longer life expectancies when compared to lesser-
developed countries, and that NCDs disproportionately affect older people, presenting 
countries with important social policy, budgetary, and political questions. Upper middle-income 
countries are also the key targets for maximalist intellectual property, presenting governments 
with unique budgetary and health prioritisation challenges.  
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From a disease burden perspective, causes of death in upper middle-income countries are 
more similar to high-income countries rather than lower-middle income countries, that is, 
focused more on non-communicable diseases. For example, the top three causes of death for 
the United States and Australia (high income countries) are ischemic heart disease, 
cardiovascular diseases, and Alzheimer’s disease.246 The corresponding causes in Chile and 
Malaysia (upper-middle income countries) are ischemic heart disease, cardiovascular 
diseases, and lower respiratory diseases. Lung, stomach, and colorectal cancers round up 
higher- and upper middle-income countries.247 Whereas lower middle-income countries have 
diseases like tuberculosis (Indonesia), cirrhosis from Hepatitis C (Egypt), diarrheal diseases 
(Nigeria, Guatemala), and protein energy malnutrition (Guatemala) as part of their top ten 
causes of deaths.248  
 
Dutfield explains:  
 
[T]he disease profiles of many developing countries are becom(ing) more similar to those of 
the developed countries. This is not just because wealthier people anywhere in the world live 
longer than the poor, and diseases that tend to affect the elderly most are broadly similar 
everywhere: non-communicable ones such as cancer, cardio-vascular diseases, Alzheimer’s, 
etc. It is also because there is a certain amount of uniformity in the lifestyles including diets of 
people having similar levels of income and purchasing power wherever they happen to live. 
This means disease affecting people are becom(ing) more and more the same wherever they 
live. This prospect for industry of the global similarity of disease profiles and life expectancies 
with their attendant market and economies of scale opportunities appears to be quite new.249 
 
The increasing similarity to developed nation disease trends results in an increasing 
dependence on biologic drugs. These drugs are exorbitantly priced, and even developed 
countries have pushed for biosimilar substitution to ease pressures on national health 
budgets.  
 
Di Biase elaborates:  
 
As governments in emerging markets extend health coverage, and as the disease profile shifts, 
they will push for lower prices and gravitate toward non-original biologics, making life more 
difficult for originators. Phamerging country governments are adopting increasingly 
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protectionist stances, favoring non-original biologics, particularly in BRICs. The desire to 
develop local industry initiatives will continue to shape government policies in BRICs and 
beyond.250 (Emphasis added) 
 
Di Biase’s comment on ‘phamerging’ country governments responding in an increasingly 
protectionist way may relate to TPP countries’ strenuous objections to exclusivities for 
biologics. This of course is to be explored further. Given extortionate prices for biologics and 
the predicted IP harmonisation push on biologics, the response of upper-middle income 
countries may not be so different from that of high-income countries, i.e. facilitating the entry 
of biosimilars the moment patents expire.251 
 
Several other factors also may have influenced the significance of biologics and biosimilars to 
the decision-making of Chile and Malaysia in the TPP negotiations, for example, government 
and physician commitment to interchangeability of biologics and biosimilars, and potential of 
local biosimilars industry. Heled suggests that TPP countries agreeing to the vague and 
flexible biologics exclusivity term in the TPP could have been a reflection of high-income 
signatories’ views that they were not as vulnerable to biosimilars competition from the 
developing countries at present market and regulatory conditions.252 Arguably, however, the 
end result for biologics in the TPP could have also been a result of ‘negotiating fatigue’253 or 
political economy tradeoffs.  
 
c) TPP Biologics Provisions 
 
Under Article 18.50.1(a) on marketing approval of pharmaceutical products, the TPP restricts 
the ability of third persons to market their product based on undisclosed test or other data for 
at least 5 years. This means that the undisclosed data is only exclusive for the purposes of 
market approval, and therefore does not prohibit reliance on the data for development of the 
relevant pharmaceutical product.  
 
Article 18.50: Protection of Undisclosed Test or Other Data 
1. (a) If a Party requires, as a condition for granting marketing approval for a new 
pharmaceutical product, the submission of undisclosed test or other data concerning the 
safety and efficacy of the product, that Party shall not permit third persons, without the 
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consent of the person that previously submitted such information, to market the same or a 
similar product on the basis of: 
(i) that information; or 
(ii) the marketing approval granted to the person that submitted such information, 
for at least five years53 from the date of marketing approval of the new 
pharmaceutical product in the territory of the Party. 
 
Specifically in regard to biologics, the TPP text states in Article 18.52.1(a) that a party may 
provide effective market protection by utilising Article 18.50.1(a) as stated above with Article 
18.50.3 (protections on TRIPS and public health) for at least 8 years from the date of marketing 
approval, or (b) 5 years market exclusivity provided there are ‘other measures’ in place and 
that market circumstances also contribute to effective market protection. Therefore, 5 years 
exclusivity would only be able to apply if there is a comparable market outcome.254  
 
Article 18.52: Biologics 
1. With regard to protecting new biologics, a Party shall either:  
(a) with respect to the first marketing approval in a Party of a new pharmaceutical product 
that is or contains a biologic,
 
provide effective market protection through the 
implementation of Article 18.50.1 (Protection of Undisclosed Test or Other Data) and 
Article 18.50.3, mutatis mutandis, for a period of at least eight years from the date of first 
marketing approval of that product in that Party; or, alternatively,  
(b) with respect to the first marketing approval in a Party of a new pharmaceutical product 
that is or contains a biologic, provide effective market protection:  
(i) through the implementation of Article 18.50.1 (Protection of Undisclosed Test or 
Other Data) and Article 18.50.3, mutatis mutandis, for a period of at least five years 
from the date of first marketing approval of that product in that Party,  
(ii) through other measures, and  
(iii) recognising that market circumstances also contribute to effective market 
protection 
 
 
‘Other measures’ is not defined in the text. The text has been criticised as ambiguous and 
vague,255 resulting in different interpretations of the text. While Malaysia, Chile, New Zealand, 
and Australia officials have all said that the TPP results in ‘status quo’ data exclusivity 
provisions, i.e. that they would not have to change their preexisting laws, U.S. Senators and 
negotiators have stated that it is 8 years market exclusivity. Probir Mehta, USTR Deputy 
                                                   
254 Public Citizen, ‘Analysis: Ambiguity Leads to Fallacy: Biologics Exclusivity in the Trans-Pacific Partnership’ Public Citizen 
(2015) <https://www.citizen.org/documents/tpp-biologics-exclusivity-memo-november-2015.pdf> accessed 5 March 2017 
255 ibid; Jeff Overley, ‘TPP Leaves Leeway on Biologics Exclusivity’ Law 360 (5 November 2015) 
<https://www.law360.com/articles/723618/tpp-leaves-leeway-on-biologics-exclusivity> accessed 5 March 2017 
  54 
Assistant for the Office of Intellectual Property and Innovation and U.S. TPP Chief Intellectual 
Property negotiator stated: ‘anyone who interprets option B as requiring only five years of 
biologics exclusivity is misreading the text of the agreement.’256  
 
Footnote 53 in the TPP text clarifies:  
 
For greater certainty, a Party may limit the period of protection under paragraph 1 to five years, 
and the period of protection under Article 18.52.1(a) (Biologics) to eight years.   
 
As to what constitutes a ‘comparable market outcome’, the TPP is entirely silent. This may 
mean that had the TPP gone forward, the definition may have been left to trade tribunals via 
investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS), or it may have been clarified by the U.S. Congress 
at the certification stage.257 Others have speculated that the ‘comparable market outcome’ 
would include patents and regulatory efforts,258 possibly meaning that market exclusivity is 
less restrictive than data exclusivity for registration purposes per se.  
 
Heled discusses this lack of a clear definition, and how the provision does not describe how 
‘‘market outcomes’ may be quantified and measured, if at all.’259 He further states, that the 
provision seemingly blurs the lines between ‘de jure standards of protection of biologics and 
de facto outcomes of such protection’. Given that the TPP provides that the biologics provision 
should be reviewed after 10 years,260 the vague wording of the provision may reflect a 
corresponding lack of clarity as to market effects of exclusivity and biosimilar competition in 
TPP countries, or alternatively may simply has been settled for as a minimum standard, i.e. 
that so long as some biologics exclusivity was achieved, it could be expanded upon later.  
 
Discussions around the TPP negotiations also reflected a conflation of the terms ‘data 
exclusivity’ and ‘market exclusivity’. Crucially, the biologics provision prohibits the use of data 
to market a follow-on biologic, but not to register one. Grabowski et al. explain that ‘data 
exclusivity is one factor contributing to market exclusivity — the period of time during which a 
therapy is the only marketed version of that molecule — but not the only determinant.’261 
Basically, a biosimilar would only be able to enter the market after the expiry of patents, data 
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exclusivity, and market exclusivity.262 This interchangeability of terms may or may not have 
been significant – country officials continued to use the term ‘data exclusivity’ post-TPP 
signing.263  
 
A market exclusivity provision is arguably better than a data exclusivity provision applied to 
registration of a product, as a biosimilars manufacturer could rely on originator data to market 
their biosimilar. In both Chile and Malaysia, however, 5 years data exclusivity was already in 
place, raising questions as to whether the TPP establishes a 5+3 years of data and market 
exclusivity (8 years of market exclusivity), instead of the ‘status quo’ amount of exclusivity 
claimed by Australian, Chilean, and Malaysian negotiators.264 Given these considerations, 
further exploration is needed on negotiator understanding of U.S. demands and whether this 
may have influenced resulting tradeoffs. 
 
In any case, the pharmaceutical industry and its proponents reacted with dismay to the 
finalisation of 5-8 years of market exclusivity for biologics with pro-Pharma Republican U.S. 
Senator Orrin Hatch stating that “There are ways of doing it – they’ll just have to do it”265 and 
“We have to come up with a methodology where they agree to 12 years”.266  
 
As early as July 2015 countries were deadlocked on biologics, with countries meeting in Maui 
to resolve these differences, but coming to no agreement.267 It appears, however, that some 
countries may have come to agreement on biologics earlier. Malaysia, for example, in a side 
letter dated 4 February 2016 to the U.S. Trade Representative Michael Froman, stated that it 
had come to agreement on biologics, and Froman responded his confirmation of this 
agreement.268 
 
IP political-economy tradeoffs were particularly visible with the biologics provision, given the 
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biologics ‘deadlock’ at the final negotiation round in Atlanta, Georgia,269 leading to the 
conclusion of the negotiations being delayed due to lack of consensus. The Australian press 
included demands to know what Australia ‘has horse-traded in other chapters of the 
agreement’ to get an acceptable outcome on biologics.270 Market access for dairy was 
mentioned as being the key tradeoff for biologics exclusivity for New Zealand (‘once biologics 
is in the bag, and not before then, the dairy saga can end’)271 whereas the Mexican Minister 
for Economy stated that he could not reveal details of the compromise on biologics “until 
everyone has signed up and we are all on the same page”.272 [Emphasis added.] 
 
The media visibility of the deadlock on biologics provides a useful starting point for interviews 
with Chilean and Malaysian negotiators. Interview domains will focus not only on 
predetermined mandates and the influence of unit-level learning on negotiating outcomes, but 
also on the novelty of biologics within trade agreements and whether these impacted 
negotiating power differentials, i.e. whether or not negotiators were aware of factors that could 
influence the biologics exclusivity decision: for example domestic biosimilars industrial 
prospects, patient group concerns and cancer burdens, and possible economic gains from 
protection of domestic industries. 
 
d) Future IP around biologics and relevance for international trade 
 
No one could have predicted the sheer expansion of the biotechnology industry since 
Diamond v Chakrabarty (1980), which famously decreed that patents were to include ‘anything 
under the sun that is made by man’, and allowed the patentability of a single bacterium 
containing multiple plasmids capable of degrading different hydrocarbon compounds during 
an oil spill.273 Chakrabarty was interpreted broadly by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 
(PTO), and issued patents on plants. A patent on a genetically engineered oyster had been 
rejected, but in 1987, the court deemed that this decision was erroneous because there was 
no evidence that the said oysters ‘occur naturally without the intervention of man’.274 Soon 
after the decision, the PTO Commissioner issued a memo allowing patents on all ‘non-
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naturally occurring non-human multicellular living organisms.’275 This was the beginning of 
intellectual property applicable to biologics. 
 
Thirty years later, biologics IP has only grown more complex. Firstly, the biotechnology 
industry believes that international standards of patentability are fragmented, and that some 
form of harmonisation is necessary to ensure legal and commercial certainty.276 Secondly, 
given the resource-intensive nature of biologics production, many multinational companies are 
producing both original biologics and biosimilars. This complicates the role of IP in biomedicine 
because companies want to increase the monopolies applicable to their originator products 
while at the same time ensuring a market for their biosimilars.277 This may mean there will be 
an increasing focus on non-patent intellectual property. Thirdly, the future of biologics IP is 
increasingly punctuated with ethical questions, but also with questions of secrecy. For 
example, there has been a proposal for the deposit of cell lines as a condition of marketing 
authorization278 – which could be controversial in future reiterations of IP harmonization on 
biologics. The European Patent Office in particular has acknowledged the distributive effects 
of biotechnology patents on farmers, scientists, and patients, and in consideration of this, 
increased their patentability standards.279  
 
As aforementioned, TPP provisions were likely to have been meant to set global minimum 
standards for the regulation of biologics and biosimilars.280 This means that establishing 
biologics exclusivity in trade would be the starting point for further maximalist IP on these 
drugs. Given that the U.S. will continue to be ‘the world’s principal demandeur’ for maximalist 
IP,281 it was not unrealistic to foresee the U.S. demanding biologics exclusivity via bilateral 
deals as preferred by the Trump administration. Indeed these manifested in the reincarnation 
of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), dubbed the USMCA.282 This is 
concerning for the reason that in a bilateral setting, developing countries are weaker as they 
are unable to form coalitions on similar matters, among other things, and this creates more 
disparate power dynamics.283  
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In 2017 it was surmised that regardless of the U.S. exit, as mentioned in Section II above, 
ongoing talks and a potential U.S. re-entry into the agreement with a new (Democratic) 
presidency in 2020 could potentially mean that these global minimum standards could still be 
a reality,284 however as USMCA talks progressed into 2019, and drug pricing debates 
continued to rage in the United States, it became clear that advancing biologics intellectual 
property in trade agreements was increasingly difficult.285 Indeed, at the conclusion of the 
USMCA in 2019, biologics intellectual property standards did not make the final text, and U.S. 
Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer said, “We conceded on biologics.”286 
 
The starting point of biologics market exclusivity could eventually open up the global 
pharmaceutical paradigm to include harmonised gene patents, narrow bolar exemptions, 
‘patent dance’ dispute resolution discussed below,287 special protection certificates like in EU 
law, and exclusivity specifically for paediatric formulations.  
 
Gene patents in particular could pose complex conundrums for scientists, national regulators, 
negotiators, and policymakers alike. At the very basis of these conundrums is, essentially, as 
geneticist and oncologist Siddharta Mukherjee discussed in a podcast with neuroscientist and 
philosopher Sam Harris: ‘Why is a BRCA gene mutation any different from your nose? It is 
part of your body… sure, these tools are borrowed from the microbiological world, but they 
were refined and changed and programmed and reprogrammed by individual scientists’.288 
Biomedicine today is characterised by products that specifically target certain genes. 
Scientists can isolate specific strands or segments of DNA, extract mitochondrial RNA and 
create it in DNA form, i.e. creating what is known as complementary DNA (cDNA).289 These 
in turn will be used in creating biologic wonderdrugs. In the case of Myriad Genetics, 
concerning the patenting of the isolated strands of BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes, the U.S. 
Supreme Court ruled unanimously that isolated human genes were unpatentable, but that 
cDNA could.290 Given the failure to patent these in the U.S., a proposal to include them in 
future trade agreements would be unlikely to proceed without intense domestic and 
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international scrutiny.  
 
The U.S. ‘patent dance’ on the other hand, is a dispute resolution mechanism that delays the 
introduction of a biosimilar by providing cumbersome procedural requirements – beginning 
with the biosimilar applicant providing manufacturing details to the manufacturer of the 
reference product (the originator). This would be followed by the originator providing a list of 
patents which it believes is being infringed by the biosimilar application. Pursuant to this, the 
biosimilar applicant must respond to the patent list and respond legally and factually as to why 
the originator’s patents are invalid. The originator company would then be given 60 days to 
respond, after which both parties would be able to negotiate within the space of 15 days to 
come to an agreement as to which patents would be subject to an infringement action.291  
 
Narrow bolar exemptions are a current concern in Europe for the production of biosimilars. 
Because of the variability of biosimilars, clinical trials are necessary to ensure clinical efficacy 
and safety of the biosimilar, so a narrow bolar exemption would prevent the necessary clinical 
trials to occur, thus delaying the entry of a biosimilar. However, given that the same 
multinational companies that produce innovator biologics sometimes make biosimilars, it is 
unclear whether broad bolar exemptions would be a negotiating objective in future trade 
agreements.  
 
Regardless of the form of the IP measure, given the trajectory of the world trade order and 
intellectual property politics, maximalist IP will continue to respond to legal, philosophical, and 
economic developments, and these will be done most visibly in the context of trade 
agreements. Trade agreements allow these provisions to be subject to maximum 
enforceability, with trade sanctions and investor-state dispute settlement as primary tools to 
respond to infringement. Given current and accelerating biomedical global domination, 
pharmaceutical IP will promulgate accordingly.  
VI. Theoretical considerations: structural power, game theory, and 
deadlock theory 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the research project primarily seeks to answer the 
question of how upper middle-income countries respond to, and negotiate for, political 
economy tradeoffs to maximalist intellectual property.292 At the genesis of this question are a 
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myriad of other questions: whether negotiators had a predetermined mandate, what unit-level 
learning influenced this mandate, what strategic imperatives formed the structure of 
concessions or political economy tradeoffs, whether there was a deadlock, and how 
negotiators and government officials responded to those tradeoffs. In that sense, it draws from 
some game theory, in that there is ‘not only goal-oriented behaviour and mutual gains, but 
also rational decisions and conscious coordination’.293  
It is impossible to examine tradeoffs and how it affects international trade law without drawing 
upon literature on international trade politics and international political economy. Hence this 
PhD draws upon international relations and international negotiations theory, and well as 
literature on international political economy  to examine progressions through the negotiations 
and how that progression affects tradeoffs on intellectual property provisions. In that sense, 
this thesis contributes to the need for a ‘joint discipline’ bridging the gap between international 
law (international trade law in the context of this PhD) and international relations, as argued 
by other authors.294 Slaughter et al. describe how international lawyers have relied on 
international relations theory, i.e. notably to (1) diagnose international policy problems and 
formulate solutions to them; (2) to explain the function and structure of particular legal 
institutions; and (3) to examine and reconceptualise particular institutions or international law 
generally.295  
The topic of this thesis centres around the progression of trade-related IP within plurilateral 
‘deep integration’ trade agreements,296 that is to say, trade agreements that no longer deal 
only with trade, but seek to influence beyond-the-border domestic regulation in matters outside 
of trade. With the decline in influence of the WTO,297 preferential trade agreements have been 
the key ‘institutions’ or vehicles through which nations seek enforceable trade-related rules. 
Trade law alone cannot explain a deadlock in intellectual property negotiations, or tradeoffs 
made in that context. Thus this thesis draws upon international relations as well as theory 
around power in the international political economy literature to help rationalise changes in 
international trade-related intellectual property law.  
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Putnam’s two-level game theory formed the basis of my theoretical approach, although as the 
thesis progressed, it became clear that this alone was insufficient, and that Susan Strange’s 
theories on structural power, as well as theories around coalitions and deadlocks were 
relevant and necessary for analysis. This is elaborated further in Chapter 6 of this thesis.  
Putnam’s game theory is as follows:  
The politics of many international negotiations can usefully be conceived as a two-level game. 
At the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the government to 
adopt favourable policies, and politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among those 
groups. At the international level, national governments seek to maximise their own ability to 
satisfy domestic pressures, while minimising the adverse consequences of foreign 
developments.298  
Contextualised to the subject matter of this thesis, at the national level, non-government health 
coalitions, domestic pharmaceutical industries, and chambers of commerce, were pursuing 
their interests via multiple modes of discourse with government negotiators. For analytical 
ease, Putnam calls this Level II.299 Informed by the interests of these stakeholders, negotiating 
governments at the international level face a balancing exercise between domestic interests 
and mitigating possible negative consequences arising from foreign developments, for 
example, U.S. insistence on 12 years of market exclusivity for biologic medicines. This 
bargaining between negotiators is called Level I.300  
The theory is elaborated further in terms of ‘win-sets’ i.e. a set of objectives that each 
negotiating government would consider a win. For example, a U.S. TPP win-set would include 
12-years of market exclusivity for biologics (per domestic commercial pressures and domestic 
laws), and less concessions on hotly contested agricultural tariffs. A Malaysian win-set could 
include the minimum number of years of biologics market exclusivity possible and market 
access to the United States. A Chilean win-set could similarly include a minimum number of 
years of biologics market exclusivity, with other market access demands.  
Janusch,301 drawing upon both Putnam and Schelling states that ‘a smaller win-set can be a 
bargaining advantage at Level I (Schelling conjecture), because the smaller the win-set, the 
more credibly governments can refer to their tied hands at Level II to receive more 
concessions at Level I’.302 Von Braun elaborated further on the notion of ‘tied hands’ in the 
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context of the US-Peru and US-Colombia trade negotiations, i.e. that the U.S. negotiators 
were operating ‘within the realms of a strict negotiation mandate’ and had very little negotiation 
slack.303 According to the Schelling conjecture, this means that they would have more 
bargaining power. Von Braun also noted that in addition to less negotiating slack, the U.S. 
negotiators ‘were negotiating on the back of a more powerful economy’,304 further increasing 
their bargaining power.  
Depending on whether the U.S. considered the final agreed exclusivity period of 5 years to be 
a negotiation breakdown, Janusch’s introduction of social conflicts305 into Putnam’s two-level 
game theory may be relevant as well to frame this thesis. Social conflicts, for example 
negotiators citing audience costs caused by the salience of the issue to the public, or 
reputation costs, better explains why negotiations fail.306  
In exploring political economy tradeoffs and concessions, it would be essential to understand 
domestic politics leading to different negotiating outcomes or trajectories.307 Putnam states 
that to do this, a theory must be formulated about the power and the preferences of the major 
actors at Level II.308 My hypothesis is that Chile, having established market access deals with 
all countries in the TPP, and working on the back of a stronger economy compared to 
Malaysia, had more power and thus conceded less. As to negotiating preferences, there is 
less clarity, and I hope to address this gap through fieldwork.  
Game theory alone is insufficient to understand the complexities within these negotiations and 
the resulting tradeoffs. Notably, as elaborated by Susan Strange: 
[R]epresentations of Game Theory habitually deal with situations in which the ‘players’ are 
engaged in one game at a time; in which the players are limited to two, or some quite small 
number, and in which the game is played in vacuo and the players are motivated by precise 
and singular goals. These situations are the very opposite of the reality of international political 
economy, in which the players (including ‘bit players’) are engaged simultaneously in a whole 
series of bargaining games, some domestic and some international, and are motivated by a 
complex and shifting tapestry of interacting, sometimes contradictory, motivations.309 
[Emphasis added.] 
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To understand this complex and shifting tapestry, I use a methodology set out in the next 
section designed to specifically identify points of conflict and other significant points during the 
negotiations, and the precipitants, or causes, of these events. But the methodology alone is 
unsufficient to understanding political economy tradeoffs. The nature of power in these 
negotiations must be elaborated, and where there is this complexity, structural power as 
defined by Strange is relevant. Notably, Strange states: 
In this new great game of states, structural power decides outcomes (both positive and 
negative) much more than relational power does… Structural power is the power to choose 
and to shape the structures of the global political economy within which other states, their 
political institutions, their economic enterprises, and (not least) their professional people have 
to operate.310 
Strange then describes structural power as lying with the person or group who is able to 
exercise control over other people’s security from violence, the person or group who can 
control the system of production of goods, those who are able to control the system of finance, 
and those who have the most influence over knowledge.311 Based on these it would 
undoubtedly be that the United States, the rulemaker in the TPP, would undoubtedly have 
structural power in the negotiations – and would easily obtain outcomes. We know that the 
outcomes in biologics negotiations were not per the United States’ expectations – the question 
is how do we explain it?  
There are additional considerations in Strange’s theories. Notably, as Christopher May 
explains, in an analysis of Strange’s work: 
It is structural power that determines the relationship, or bargain, between authority and market. 
Market solutions cannot play a major role in the way in which a political economy functions 
unless they are allowed to do so by the actor that wields economic power and possesses 
authority.312 [Emphasis added] 
Does this mean, therefore, that when Malaysia, Chile, and partners in the TPP pushed against 
U.S. demands in the TPP, that they only obtained the outcomes they wanted because they 
were allowed to by the United States? Additional considerations are relevant. In the case of 
biologics and concerns about medicine prices, Strange’s writings on values in the international 
political economy (IPE) may be relevant. May explains: 
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Strange’s aim is make IPE value sensitive; recognising where values are being ordered and 
traded off, and the history of such decisions and bargains. It is also necessary to understand 
how and when the ordering of values informs analysis.313  
Notably, a fifth structure suggested by Strange may be relevant – notably the structure of 
welfare, elaborated specifically with the example of threats to human life and contentment, 
and the idea that these should be avoided, alleviated, or compensated.314 This is particularly 
relevant to the issue at hand, but it still raises further questions about whether the first four 
elements of structural power (security, production, finance, and knowledge) can and was 
tempered by the fifth structure. Christopher May states that while Strange is ‘explicitly 
concerned with producing an explanatory theory, she remains sceptical of to the possibility of 
an all-embracing, all-explanatory theory of international political economy’, 315 and that she 
doesn’t directly analyse the dynamics of authoritative, technological, and market shifts that 
influence structural power.316 And while it is not the object of this thesis either to provide an 
all-explanatory theory, drawing on these different complementary and contrasting sources 
may help illustrate why decisions were made the way they were.  
A paper by Haugaard may help expand on Strange’s theory. Notably, he states: 
Power over of the pre-modern kind, as described by Machiavelli and Schitt, is usually zero-
sum. To the extent to which A prevails over B, B loses… In the episodic moment that A 
exercises power over B, structures are reproduced that constitute the democratic game, which 
gives both the actors the dispositional power to replay. Structural reproduction entails the 
possibility of B exercising power over A at a different future episodic moment.317  
Caporaso, writing earlier than Strange, on the other hand characterises structural power as a 
‘higher power order because it involves the ability to manipulate the choices, capabilities, 
alliance opportunities, and payoffs that actors may utilise’.318 In analysing these, we can say 
that while structural power per Strange belongs to the United States, a number of factors per 
Caporaso and Haugaard can reproduce and amend these structures, enabling an apparently 
weaker party to exercise power over the structurally stronger party.  
Several other theoretical writings help underpin my research questions. First and foremost, 
that negotiations always involve reciprocal concessions. There is general agreement that this 
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is almost always in terms of access to the home market.319 But this is not always the case. 
Reciprocal concessions may be in the form of vague promises to ensure increased technology 
transfer, or even perceived supply-chain benefits from rule harmonisation. They may also be 
in the form of threats to withdraw existing support, for example foreign aid or military 
support.320 Basically, negotiators may agree on concessions in one area in return for a 
‘package deal’ of gains in all or some other issue areas.321  
Putnam describes a situation where Level II partners may initially oppose oil price decontrol 
as a policy issue, but may be able to switch their vote and agree on concessions if the chief 
negotiator could broker a deal to deliver more jobs.322 So while this does not alter the Level II 
actor’s preferences, it creates a policy option that was previously beyond the Level II actor’s 
domestic control. Putnam calls this particular type of issue linkage ‘synergistic linkage’.323 
Through this PhD, I hope to identify where possible synergistic linkages were, and whether 
those linkages were finalised into political economy tradeoffs.  
In addition to identifying synergistic linkages, completeness would dictate that it would be 
necessary to identify what unit-level learning the negotiators had participated in (from either 
the Level I or Level II actors) that influenced how states approached issues in particular 
negotiations. Sell states that negotiators choices are not preordained,324 and that unit-level 
learning can lead states ‘to redefine their interests’.325  
VII. Research methodology 
From a methodological standpoint, empirical data gained from fieldwork interviews with 
negotiators, government officials advising negotiators, and civil society stakeholders were be 
subjected to a turning points analysis as proposed by Crump and Druckman.326  
 
Interviews were based on a topic guide seen in Annex C of this thesis – with domains on:  
1) Country approach to TPP negotiations (ideological/historical/politico-economic) 
2) Unit-level learning 
3) Turning points 
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Negotiators in particular were asked all questions and subquestions under each domain. 
Some stakeholders had not attended negotiations but had conducted advocacy with local 
politicians and attended post-negotiation briefings by negotiators, so questions under the 
‘country approach to TPP negotiations’ domain such as ‘What were your key negotiating aims’ 
were less relevant, but questions under the unit-level learning domain, such as ‘can you tell 
about your engagement with negotiators’ and ‘how would you characterise your relationship’ 
was more relevant. The variance in the questioning was managed by way of writing up a profile 
of the interviewee beforehand – and crossing out questions which likely had less relevance. 
To plot a chronology of key turning points, the question of ‘Do you remember when you first 
found out that the U.S. were asking for 12 years of market exclusivity for biologics? What were 
your thoughts?’ under the turning points domain was most relevant. All negotiators and former 
negotiators were asked this question. On the other hand, for questions directed to Pedro Roffe, 
for example, who is an expert in the history of Chilean trade and intellectual property but had 
not attended the negotiations, only the first domain was relevant.  
 
The turning points analysis as proposed by Crump and Druckman327 essentially involved 
plotting a detailed chronology of events using ‘turning points’ and ‘departures’ – in other words, 
identifying where substantive issues arise and finding out what were the precipitants or 
causes. I rely predominantly on what negotiators and government advisors identified as the 
most important negotiation rounds for disputes and disagreements on biologics negotiations, 
and how they characterise those departures. Once a list of departures are plotted, precipitants, 
or causes of those departures will be plotted out using the process model shown in Figure 2 
below.  
 
Crump and Druckman established a detailed chronology of events occurring during the TRIPS 
agreement negotiations, for example listing that in October 2001, the WTO chair was unable 
to secure a compromise between two sides, and in November 2001, a representative of 
Mexico was appointed to mediate the TRIPS/health issue.328 From this chronology, 
precipitants of departures, consequences of those departures, and outcomes are identified, 
and this renders useful lessons about the negotiation process and effective negotiator 
behaviour.329  
 
Crump and Druckman clarify as follows: 
 
                                                   
327 Ibid 9 
 
328 Ibid 25 
329 Ibid 9 
  67 
By identifying departures during the negotiation process, the analysis highlights the critical 
moments that move the process from impasse to agreement. By discovering the precipitants 
of those departures, the analysis distinguishes from external and internal causes of departures. 
By tracing the consequences of the departures, the analysis extends the path from prior to 
posterior events on the way to outcomes.330 
 
Following Crump and Druckman’s example, departures will be extracted from interviews – for 
example, if an interviewer said disagreements occurred at a negotiation round in Salt Lake 
City, that would be plotted as a departure and be numbered based on chronological order. 
This methodology will also enable me to logically and methodically identify the precipitants or 
causes of issues arising in the negotiations. The following process model331 applies: 
 
Figure 2: Process Model Linking Departures to Precipitants 
Substantive issue 
“bubbles-up” from rule-
setter to negotiators 
Re-Framed issue 
becomes a 
symbol of 
significant conflict 
Substantive 
Precipitant 
 
Abrupt 
Departure 
Toward Agreement 
(Brief Stalemate) 
Away from 
Agreement 
(Extended Delay) 
 
 
Process models specifically linked to findings from interviews can be seen in Figures 5 and 6 
in Chapter 5 of this thesis. At the initial stage of this PhD, I predicted that the Singapore round 
of negotiations was bound to feature in this chronology, as it was at this round that rumours 
of 12 years of biologics exclusivity was most prominent, events leading up to the Malaysia-
U.S. side letter on biologics exclusivity, and the trade representative meeting in Maui in August 
2015 that rendered no agreement, among other notable events where departures were clear. 
Before this research, while I had theories about what caused departures, for example 
concerns about drug prices and access to medicines, these were not evidence-based. 
Interviews with negotiators and other stakeholders in attendance at negotiating rounds helped 
elucidate the significance or non-significance of departures, eventually yielding, as shown in 
Chapter 5 of this thesis, that four negotiation rounds were especially significant on this issue. 
 
As departures are plotted and tradeoffs become clearer, theories on power, deadlocks, and 
coalitions may be useful to help explain why negotiators behaved in a certain way. Notably, 
when there is a deadlock, negotiators on both sides may opt for vague and/or ambiguous 
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language that may satisfy both parties,332 or they could employ a number of tools to break 
deadlock, including coalition building, unofficial channels (such as meeting at an informal 
venue – Camp David is an example, or on the golf course a la Obama),333 or via ‘shuttle 
mediation’.334 In essence, the tools contained in Crump and Druckman’s turning points 
framework will be analysed in the context of theoretical considerations in Section VI above.  
 
VIII. Organisation of the thesis 
 
By drawing on two-level game theory, elucidating the deep integration characteristic of the 
TPP, explaining the importance of biologics, and historically situating TPP IP in the larger 
pharmaceutical intellectual property politics picture, this chapter demonstrates the salience of 
an examination of political economy tradeoffs in trade-related intellectual property, particularly 
as regards the TPP, as a norm-setting agreement. I point out how IP is never negotiated in 
isolation, but rather in the context of concessions, and that these concessions may not 
necessarily be in the form of market access, but also in the form of vague promises, for 
example, that the trade agreement would create more jobs, or a perception that longer 
monopolies on biologics can increase technology transfer. 
 
I also consider what factors influence negotiator decision-making, i.e. whether there was a 
predetermined mandate, whether negotiating positions changed, what unit-level learning 
influenced these changes, the existence of upper middle-income country alliances, what 
domestic pressures influenced decision-making on biologics, and what tactics negotiators 
used when confronted with tradeoffs. UMICs are in a unique position as regards trade 
negotiations of this magnitude and reach – they aspire to be developed nations, and thus are 
more susceptible to accepting developed country standards, but at the same time exist in a 
less generous fiscal space where they must take into account budgetary health constraints 
and developing domestic industries. At the same time, they serve as conduits towards wider 
harmonisation of norms among developing countries, due to their special position or 
‘development proximity’ to lesser developed countries and positions within regional alliances 
(ASEAN, MERCOSUR) that could prove as launching pads for newly adopted norms. This is 
contextualised to the industrialised nation belief that the WTO is no longer the forum for the 
harmonisation of norms – at least not at the level the industrialised nations believe is fair and 
equitable.  
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This thesis is divided into five chapters organised thematically. This chapter provides a 
backdrop for the problem at hand: the sheer enormity and norm-setting nature of the TPP, 
and the perceived obsoleteness of the WTO as a forum for furthering maximalist intellectual 
property. The chapter engages with the idea of capacity, domestic influences, and strategy of 
upper middle-income country negotiatiors, highlighting their unique positions as conduits of 
norm change and influences to lesser-developed nations. The main focus of the chapter is to 
introduce the main question: i.e. how do upper middle-income countries strategise for, 
respond to, and engineer and justify political economy tradeoffs to maximalist intellectual 
property provisions that they may not necessarily agree to? Framing this notion is several 
agential factors – that stronger economies enable negotiators to make less tradeoffs, that 
domestic stakeholders play a strong role in changing a predetermined win-set, if any, and that 
decisions at Level I that may not necessarily be accepted at Level II and vice versa may be 
justified with strategy suggesting that one’s hands are tied.  
 
Chapter 2 is focused on the role of the industrialised nation in pharmaceutical intellectual 
property, introducing a historical overview of the convergence of hegemonic power, corporate 
rulemaking, and international diplomatic institutions. It then segues into the emergence of 
North-South IP disputes and disagreements, and chronologically details how these deadlocks 
led to industrialised nations moving away from the WTO as a fundamental norm-making 
agency. 
 
Chapters 3 and 4 consider current trade policies and salient historical events that may lend 
context to Chile and Malaysia’s decisions and negotiating outcomes in the TPP, answering 
questions on domestic factors that influenced negotiating win-sets, the level of unit-level 
learning gained from previous trade engagement, and whether the novelty of biologics IP was 
in any way a factor for negotiating decisions.  
 
Chapter 5 synthesises the findings from fieldwork and the literature review. It is here that I 
hope to provide my most original contribution: what political economy tradeoffs were made, 
and whether lessons from this thesis can predict what role upper middle-income countries 
should play in the face of maximalist intellectual property in the near future.  
 
Chapter 6 contains analysis on the findings, including a discussion on how negotiation tactics 
modify asymmetry in negotiations and how the changing global philosophy on access to 
medicines may alter how trade-related pharmaceutical IP in the future. The chapter details my 
theoretical contribution, i.e. ‘common precedent’ and how negotiators can effectively rely on 
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it, and from a practical standpoint, provides recommendations for developing countries 
entering similar trade negotiations.  
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Chapter Two: Politics of Intellectual Property and Pharmaceuticals: An 
Historical Overview 
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I. Introduction 
 
The history of international intellectual property (IP) politics has been characterised by the 
imposition of developed country intellectual property standards on developing countries, 
threats, the shifting or opening of trade forums when there is too much developing country 
resistance, and political economy tradeoffs. It is grounded in an aspiration of a harmonised 
supranational intellectual property code extending pharmaceutical industry monopolies as 
long as is viable. It is also grounded on the idea that so long as developing countries want 
access to U.S. (or European) markets, or even for less tangible goals, like them wanting to be 
seen as part of an established trade diplomacy with the most powerful country on earth, it is 
possible to keep asking for more maximalist intellectual property. The history of intellectual 
property as a tool for incentivising innovation is a long one; in a 1922 hearing to revise patent 
laws, one William Dodge cited the patent system as a way to serve national security, that it 
would do so long as it continues to be the engine of America’s progress, that it was the ‘best 
incentive’, and that compulsory licenses ‘posed uncertainties for innovation and the 
economy’.335 The historical development since this time is beyond the scope of this thesis, but 
it is notable that the arguments for intellectual property today, as can be seen in the following 
paragraphs, continue to be defined along these lines. For the purposes of this thesis, the 
account of the history of pharmaceutical IP begins with the Uruguay Round of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) system, which was the starting point for global 
enforceability of pharmaceutical IP. 
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II. Where it began: the Uruguay round 
 
The Uruguay round marked the beginning of the intellectual property moving into the realm of 
international trade. To quote Taubman, it was ‘a turning point for multilateral governance and 
a catalyst for transformation of law, policy, and international relations in IP’.336 The U.S. was 
irked by the fact that many countries did not provide patents for pharmaceutical products, and 
that its attempts to advance intellectual property during the 1973-1979 Tokyo Round of GATT 
negotiations were unsuccessful.337 According to Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss, it was activities after 
this Round, including coordinated lobbying by U.S. industry, that paved the way for inclusion 
of intellectual property into the Uruguay Round.338 
 
The U.S. approach to the Uruguay round was strongly motivated by domestic policy. The 1984 
U.S. Trade and Tariff Act, had the central message that access to U.S. markets would be 
contingent on other markets not only opening their markets to U.S. foreign direct investment 
and U.S. high technology products, but also to introduce and implement new forms of IP 
protection.339 A 1988 report by the U.S. International Trade Commission compiled industry 
data and found that U.S. companies lost between $43-61 billion due to foreign infringement 
or insufficient coverage of intellectual property rights. This further bolstered their international 
IP approach and became an oft-quoted argument for expanding IP into the international trade 
regime.340   
 
At the same time, there was a growing dissatisfaction was the pre-existing trading system, the 
GATT. For a long time the GATT had been a platform favouring developed nations, and one 
that marginalised lesser-developed countries.341 But leading up to the Uruguay Round, there 
was a sea change in how developing countries viewed the role of trade in economic and social 
development, largely spurred by success stories of export-oriented policies of East Asian 
‘tiger’ economies and Chile, and a debt crisis that paralysed domestic economies.342 As a 
consequence, in the words of Otten, ‘there was a growing kernel of developing countries 
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committed to a major strengthening of the multilateral trading system from the outset’.343 The 
developing countries had also attempted a reform of the Paris Convention on IP to ensure 
them the maximum liberty to enact IP laws according to their developmental levels and 
emphasising ‘the economic inequalities between nations’. This 1977 attempt for more 
‘balanced’ IP was viewed as too radical by developed nations, and thus failed.344  While this 
was an unprecedented pushback by developing countries, this merely showed to developing 
countries that ‘balance’ was not something the developed countries were interested in, and to 
the developed countries, that there was a necessity to cement IP rules within the trade regime 
as soon as possible. These factors combined provided a fertile ground for pushing the agenda 
on IP into the international trading system and IP concessions for developing countries.  
 
The Uruguay Round was launched on 20 September 1986 in Punta del Este, Uruguay. The 
Punta del Este Ministerial Declaration directed negotiators to ‘promote effective and adequate 
protection of intellectual property rights’.345 It also said, although in light of the results of the 
negotiations, more as a diplomatic nod to developing country interests rather than as a non-
negotiable guiding principle, that developed countries shall not seek or require that less 
developed countries make concessions that were ‘inconsistent with the latter's development, 
financial and trade needs’.346 The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS) that was born of the Uruguay Round resulted in enforceable 
supranational intellectual property code that went beyond developing countries’ needs,347 and 
was the most significant starting point for the expansion of trade-related IP. Indeed, the TRIPS 
Agreement was ‘one of the Round’s most enduring accomplishments’.348 
 
The Agreement came to pass with strategic lobbying by the U.S., European, and Japanese 
pharmaceutical industries, including working closely with developed country negotiators, 
GATT, and WIPO Secretariats during the course of the Uruguay Round negotiations to ensure 
their interests were included in final texts, and sending delegates from the Intellectual Property 
Committee (IPC) for various lobbying missions, including to emerging markets like Singapore, 
prior to the Uruguay Round starting.349  The IPC, consisting of up to fourteen corporations 
including Merck, Monsanto, and Pfizer, had direct access to the office of the U.S. Trade 
Representative through the Advisory Committee for Trade Negotiations, and they had also 
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mobilised actors in the EU and Japan, constituting a ‘cohesive working group, ready to supply 
Northern diplomats with statistics, theoretical arguments, framing devices, etc’.350  
 
Also prior to the Uruguay Round beginning, the U.S. had entered into a number of bilateral 
trade agreements that included intellectual provisions. These were strategic decisions to 
normalise the language of ‘trade-related IP’ in international trade circles, and by the time the 
Uruguay Round was launched, according to Carolyn Deere, ‘the idea that intellectual property 
protection was ‘trade-related’ had firmly taken hold’.351 
 
Despite this, IP negotiations moved extremely slowly during the first four years (1986-1989) 
of the Uruguay Round negotiations. This was for two reasons – negotiations progressed based 
on previous IP work in the GATT, meaning that negotiators were working from a very limited 
IP viewpoint, and that many participants – notably developing country participants – felt that 
WIPO was still the ‘normal’ forum for IP and they wanted to avoid prejudicing them.352 So while 
there was general acceptance of ‘trade-related’ IP, countries for some time were still treading 
with caution.  
 
Approaching the mid-term review of the negotiations, various forms of pressure had been 
exerted upon developing countries, resulting in developing countries agreeing to discuss 
norms and standards for IP at the April 1989 meeting in Geneva, a meeting intended to 
complete the mid-term review.353   
 
In January of the fifth year of the Uruguay Round (1990), industrialised countries began tabling 
legal texts on IP and by spring of that year these texts had become more comprehensive, with 
texts drafted by developed nations (United States, EC, Switzerland, Japan) and a group of 
developing countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Egypt, India, Nigeria, 
Pakistan, Peru, Tanzania, Uruguay and Zimbabwe).354 The first composite IP text was issued 
by the GATT Secretariat in June 1990.355  
 
On 23 July 1990, the Chairman of the TRIPS working group, Lars Anell of Sweden, reported 
on the Status of Work in the Negotiating Group and attributed the progress in the text to 
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informal consultations that had been held up to then.356 The report shows what language had 
been agreed to at that moment in time (unbracketed text) and that which had yet to be agreed 
upon (bracketed text). At this point, it had yet to be agreed whether patents would be either 
‘available’ or ‘granted’, whether they would be provided for ‘any inventions’ in ‘all fields of 
technology’, and whether they would be granted for pharmaceutical processes.357 Also yet to 
be agreed was whether inventions contrary to public health would be excluded from 
patentability.358 
 
The informal discussions continued, and when the Chairman reported on the Status of Work 
again in September 1990, he noted that developing countries had expressed concern at ‘the 
tendency to treat intellectual property as a purely commercial issue’ and that there was 
‘insufficient attention paid to the national policy objectives of developing countries’.359 
 
The TRIPS negotiating group met formally on a number of dates after that, including the 10th 
and 21st of September and the 8th and 15th of October, with numerous informal consultations 
in between. In a note by the GATT Secretariat dated 8 October 1990, reference was made to 
the continuing ‘major divergences’ between developed and developing nations.360 In the same 
document, developing countries reminded all participants of the Punta del Este declaration, 
emphasising that less-developed parties should not be required to make concessions 
inconsistent with their development needs.361 
 
This sentiment did not change throughout the negotiations, with the entire negotiations on 
pharmaceutical IP being drawn along North-South lines, resulting in significant tensions.362 
Furthermore, because it was originally intended for the Uruguay Round negotiations to come 
to a close in December 1990, considerable pressure was placed upon developing countries 
to agree to the consolidated texts. However when the draft final text authored by the GATT 
Director-General Arthur Dunkel (hereinafter the ‘Dunkel Draft’) was tabled, it became clear 
that negotiations would continue into 1991 due to continuing tensions between developed and 
developing countries.363 While the U.S. pharmaceutical industry expressed strong 
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dissatisfaction with the Dunkel Draft for not providing monopolies for products still in the 
pipeline, developing countries struggled with the fact that the text did not at all reflect what the 
Punta del Este Declaration promised.364  Thirteen Latin American countries continued to say 
that patent protection for pharmaceuticals was not necessary.365 The Dunkel Draft was 
described as being a ‘total sell-out to the U.S. position’366 and a ‘complete denial of developing 
country interests’.367 Due to this impasse, negotiations were ‘officially’ dissolved, but in reality 
continued into the new year.  
 
The new year galvanised increasing threats and coercion by the U.S. upon developing 
countries. This included threats against ambassadors, withdrawal of special trade 
preferences, and including countries in the Special 301 Priority Watch List.368 As these threats 
came to a climax, as Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss describe, ‘developing countries begun to look 
at the emerging TRIPS agreement as the lesser of two evils.369 
 
While developing countries continued to disagree in principle on broad patent terminology 
including patents for processes and patents ‘in all fields of technology’, economic threats 
meant that developing countries would make the IP concessions. It was the last issue to be 
resolved prior to the tabling of the final Dunkel draft agreement in December 1991,370 and as 
expected, the reaction to the final agreement was muted as it was presented as an ‘up or 
down’ draft, meaning that countries could vote yes or no but had limited space for changing 
text.371 A reflection of economic threats, most countries had expressed a ‘general willingness’ 
to move forward beyond IP to market access and services.372  
 
The TRIPS agreement was signed on 15 April 1994 in Marrakech, and countries were given 
different dates for application of the agreement, with developing countries having to apply 
TRIPS by 1 January 2000. Despite securing globally enforceable pharmaceutical patent 
standards, the American pharmaceutical industry was not happy. They had managed to 
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secure higher intellectual property standards through bilateral trade agreements and the use 
of the Special 301 watch lists, and they were disappointed not only at the lower standards in 
TRIPS but also at the transition periods allotted to developing countries.373  
 
III. The ‘failure’ of the Doha round 
The politics of pharmaceutical IP in the WTO must be seen in the light of wider non-
pharmaceutical sector negotiations. The total domination of developed countries, the blocking 
of developing country proposals, and the unbalanced outcomes in the Uruguay Round led to 
developing countries feeling marginalised.374 The next round of negotiations was due to be 
launched at the biannual WTO ministerial conference in Seattle in 1999, but disagreements 
with developing countries, as well as massive street protests by civil society, led to a 
‘spectacular launch-failure’.375 The launch failure led a crisis of legitimacy in the WTO, and 
increased pressure to include developing countries in the decision-making process.376  
From then on, leading towards what would be the Doha Round, developing countries quickly 
learned the value of strategic alliances.377 Brazil, for example, came to the Doha Round 
seeking major gains on agriculture, and knew it needed to build an alliance with India to be 
seen as credible by other developing nations.378 Sector-specific negotiations in 2000 allowed 
developing countries to reach out to each other and establish alliances.379  When the WTO 
Doha Round of negotiations launched in November 2001, major alliances were in formation, 
including the Core Group of developing countries resisting the so called ‘Singapore issues’ 
i.e. transparency of government procurement, trade facilitation, trade and investment, and 
trade and competition (hereinafter ‘the Core Group’).  
Officially called the Doha Development Round, it contained a broad development agenda 
intended to address economic inequalities in the Global South. While the EU joined the Doha 
Round enthusiastically and with the core position that the Singapore issues were conducive 
to development, the United States were less enthusiastic; they did not foresee economic gains 
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from the Doha Round and their support for the Round was mainly grounded in geostrategic 
considerations post-9/11.380 
The Doha Round was characterised with recurrent North-South conflict, including ‘walkouts 
from negotiating sessions and heated rhetoric concerning the very purpose of free trade 
talks’.381 Throughout the negotiations, leading up to the next scheduled WTO ministerial 
conference in Cancun, it became clear that there were ‘new constellations of power’ involving 
the merging markets of China, India, and Brazil, and that these challenged the hegemony of 
the United States and the multilateralist role of the European Union.382 India played a leading 
role in mobilising the Core Group in insisting that the Singapore issues could not be grouped 
together as a negotiating concession.383 This was a key factor that led to the breakdown at 
the Cancun ministerial.  
Unique characteristics of these three countries created a powerful new dynamic at the WTO. 
Brazil saw itself as a potential leader of developing country interests, representing growing 
economic power, but also being relatable in terms of social indicators such as poverty and 
access to affordable medication, and thus saw itself as uniquely positioned to bridge North-
South chasms.384 India, while less inclined to take a leadership role, was a powerful alliance 
builder, whereas China utilised its sheer economic might. This new power dynamic meant, 
and still means, that it is not possible to conclude any deal at the WTO without these three 
countries.385  
In the first quarter of 2001, Zimbabwe through its ambassador Boniface Chidyausiku chaired 
the WTO TRIPS Council, and emphasised that ‘the WTO could not longer ignore the access 
to medicines issue’, and he requested a special TRIPS Council session on access to 
medicines in April 2001.386 Discussions during this meeting, and subsequent TRIPS Council 
meetings in July and September of that same year, are what planted the seeds for what would 
grow into the most pressing intellectual property issue for the Doha Development agenda, 
much to the consternation of the United States.387 In October 2001, Stuart Harbinson, the 
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Chair of WTO General Council, who had a key role in establishing the WTO agenda, submitted 
to the WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha a single text on TRIPS and Public Health with two 
options – one preferred by developing countries and the other by developed countries.388 The 
U.S. then attempted to divide the developing country coalition. This was followed up by Brazil 
strategically threatening to reopen the entire Doha agenda if the developing country text was 
not adopted. Harbinson and Mike Moore, the WTO Director-General, seeking to avoid this, 
unsuccessfully tried to mediate a compromise.389 Evident in this process for the developing 
countries was the ‘intellectual property fundamentalism’ exhibited by the developed countries; 
i.e. that the only way to achieve development was to adopt developed country 
standards.390 Developing countries viewed IP differently, i.e. as only one component that could 
be part of a development strategy.  
In November 2001, largely due to the efforts of developing countries who were concerned 
about access to medicines, the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health 
was adopted by the WTO at the 2001 Doha Ministerial Conference. It clarified that countries 
had the right to determine what constituted a national emergency or circumstances of extreme 
urgency when issuing a compulsory licences, and urged the WTO TRIPS Council to look into 
solutions pertaining to the fact that countries with limited manufacturing capacity had 
difficulties utilising compulsory licences.391  
The next biannual WTO conference in Cancun in 2003 was intended to be an important 
milestone for the Doha Round of negotiations. 146 member countries of the WTO attended. 
The U.S. and the EU had put forward a joint proposal on agriculture that they thought might 
meet the developing countries halfway.392 Agriculture had long since been the most protected 
sector in international trade and both the U.S. and the EU were extremely defensive 
throughout the Doha Round due to the extensive support both countries provided to domestic 
farmers.393 Developing countries were not satisfied with the joint proposal. In Cancun, the 
Core Group led by India succeeded in forcing the Singapore issues off the negotiating table. 
In addition, Brazil, India, and South Africa led the charge on negotiating outcomes pertaining 
to intellectual property and access to medicines.394 
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Instead, the Cancun Ministerial was dominated by an insurmountable stalemate on agricultural 
subsidies, intellectual property, the Singapore issues, and capital controls. In the wake of the 
1997 Asian financial crisis, investors had rapidly pulled out of a number of countries including 
Malaysia and Korea, resulting in stock market crashes and recessions.395 The stalemate 
meant that there was a ‘recalibration of North-South relations in WTO negotiations’.396 The 
extent to and ease of which a smaller group of developed countries could dictate norms to the 
whole of the WTO was changing. It moved further away the traditional duopoly of the U.S. and 
the EU, although these countries are still very much needed for the successful conclusion of 
WTO negotiations.397 This new reality resulted in developed countries shifting to different trade 
forums. Since the Doha Round stalemate, more than 300 Preferential Trade Agreements 
(PTAs) and over 500 Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) have been signed.398 
IV. Forum ‘shifting’ in intellectual property regimes 
When developed countries are unable to score the wins they want from developing countries, 
they ‘shift’ their demands to bilateral or preferential trade agreements (PTAs) where the power 
imbalance is higher. In the words of Hartman: ‘[W]hen a multilateral trade system does not 
respond to a nation’s needs, PTAs becomes the path of least resistance’.399 According to 
Gathii and Ho, forum shifting focuses on ‘destabilising existing understandings’ in one forum 
by establishing new norms in another.400 These norms are almost always in favour of 
intellectual property owners. Especially in regional preferential trade agreements, these new 
norms are adopted uniformly by all negotiating countries, further isolating norms that the 
developed world deems outdated. But because there has been a proliferation of forum shifting, 
there are a plethora of divergent rules, actors, and values.401 Intellectual property lawmaking 
post-Doha, therefore, occurs predominantly through bilateral and regional trade agreements.  
In intellectual property, forum shifting has been triggered especially when developing countries 
effectively veto developed country demands. In 1986, a group of developing countries led by 
Brazil successfully criticised WIPOs Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated 
Circuits.402  Demandeurs of relevant provisions then shifted forums to the WTO and integrated 
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these provisions into TRIPS. Drahos calls the shifting of IP from WIPO to the Uruguay Round 
‘one of the greatest forum shifts in the second part of the twentieth century’.403 
As regards IP, the TPP is not only another notch in the forum shifting process, but also 
testament to the declining strategic relevance of the WTO and WIPO to the United States.404 
V. TRIPS plus – maximalist IP through bilateral and regional 
agreements 
 
TRIPS was not to the satisfaction of developed country pharmaceutical industries. Forum 
shifting, as aforementioned, enabled the United States to achieve measures beyond TRIPS 
(TRIPS-plus) in bilateral and regional trade agreements. Underlying their efforts was a 
mandate contained in domestic law: that a principal negotiating objective of the United States 
would be to ensure that intellectual property provisions in any trade agreement entered into 
by the United States ‘reflect a standard of protection similar to that found in United States 
law’.405 
 
Data exclusivity, or the protection of undisclosed information concerning the safety of a 
pharmaceutical that utilizes a new chemical entity, was and continues to be one of the key IP 
provisions that the U.S. includes in their trade agreements. It is one of the principal means for 
the pharmaceutical industry to block generic competition, as it serves to delay generic 
companies from relying on the originator companies’ test data in their own applications for 
regulatory and/or marketing approval of similar products.406 The United States has had a 5-
year data exclusivity term in their law since 1984, when the Hatch-Waxman Act was enacted, 
and thus sought to ensure that its trading partners incorporated the same standards.407 
 
The 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between the U.S., Canada, and 
Mexico, was the first trade agreement to adopt data exclusivity as a condition for marketing 
approval, with conditions that disclosure would only be permissible ‘to protect the public’ or 
where other steps have been taken to prevent ‘unfair commercial use’.408 A period of 7 years 
passed before it would be included in another agreement, owing to initial hopes that it would 
                                                   
403 Peter Drahos, ‘China, the TPP, and Intellectual Property’ (2016) 47(1) IIC – International Review of Intellectual Property and 
Competition Law 1, 3 
404 ibid  
405 19 U.S. Code § 4201 Trade Negotiating Objectives 5(A)(i)(II) 
406 Lisa Diependaele, Julian Cockbain, and Sigrid Sterckx, ‘Raising the Barriers to Access to Medicines in the Developing World 
– The Relentless Push for Data Exclusivity’ (2017) 17 Developing World Bioethics 11 
407 Drug Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act (Hatch-Waxman Act) 21 U.S.C. Sect. 355(c)(3)(E)(ii) (1984) 
408 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (1994), Article 1711(5) < https://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/Home/Texts-of-
the-Agreement/North-American-Free-Trade-Agreement?mvid=1&secid=b6e715c1-ec07-4c96-b18e-d762b2ebe511#A1711> 
Accessed 7 March 2018 
  82 
have been included in the Doha Round of WTO negotiations. When this failed, the U.S. 
negotiated a bilateral FTA with Jordan, and in December 2001, Jordan became the first 
country to agree to TRIPS plus rules through a U.S. FTA.409 These provisions included data 
exclusivity and patent linkage - a mechanism to ensure a product’s patent status is reported 
to pharmaceutical regulatory authorities. 
 
In 2003, the U.S. negotiated an FTA with Chile and successfully included data exclusivity as 
a condition for marketing approval, with additional text specifying that Chile would ‘maintain 
this prohibition for a period of at least five years from the date of approval for a pharmaceutical 
product’.410 This wording would serve as the negotiating template for data exclusivity in future 
U.S. FTAs, and is seen in Australian, Bahraini, Moroccan, and Korean FTAs with the U.S.411 
The Moroccan and Bahraini U.S. FTAs went slightly further, stating that a presentation of any 
new clinical information would attract an additional three years of data exclusivity.412 
 
The Hatch-Waxman Act also provides for patent term adjustments if the ‘issue of an original 
patent is delayed’ due to failures at the Patent and Trademark Office.413 This language was 
modified in the U.S. FTAs, specifying that the patent term adjustment was to ‘compensate for 
unreasonable delays that occur in granting the patent’ and that an ‘unreasonable delay’ was 
a delay in the issuance of the patent of more than four years from the date of filing or two 
years after a request for the examination of the patent application has been made.414 This 
language is also found in all U.S. FTAs since then. 
 
The U.S. approach to biologics can be traced back to the 1980 case of Chakrabarty discussed 
in Chapter 1 of this thesis. It was when the Supreme Court of the United States took the case 
that the patenting of life forms became ‘a legal issue of public importance’ due to the myriad 
of moral questions juxtaposing themselves with the interests of the emerging biotechnology 
industry. Notably, in the words of Parthasarathy: ‘[T]he patentability of life forms would 
influence business strategies and likely change the shape of the emerging industry overall’.415 
Finally, it was decided that all ‘nonnaturally occurring non-human multicellular living 
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organisms’ should be patented.416 For some time the U.S. tried to incorporate the patenting of 
life forms, and in 2006 successfully included it in the Morocco-U.S. FTA.417 This continues to 
be the strongest language on life forms and patents in any U.S. FTA.418 However, as time 
progressed, the United States realised that patents on biologic material were problematic – 
because of the complexity of the molecules more time was being spent developing the drug 
after the first patent filing, the inability in some cases to satisfy patentability criteria,419 and in 
addition to that, they became concerned about administrative challenges to biologics 
patents.420  
 
Responding to this realisation, and market trends showing that the biggest grossing drugs 
were biologic, the originator biotechnology industry set into motion to incorporate biologics 
market exclusivity within national, and then, international intellectual property law. In American 
law, biologics market exclusivity is provided in the 2009 Biologics Price Competition and 
Innovation Act (BPCIA) which prohibits the market approval of a biosimilar ‘until the date that 
is 12 years after the date on which the reference product was first licensed’.421 
 
The negotiation of biologics exclusivity during the TPP saw those who wanted the minimum 
number of years of exclusivity for biologics against those that wanted 8 or 12 years. The result, 
a vague provision providing for 8 years exclusivity, or 5 years exclusivity with other measures 
that provided a ‘comparable market outcome’, was a compromise reached after multiple 
deadlocked rounds. A Chilean TPP negotiator interviewed for this PhD expressed that it was 
a good thing that the language was vague, and that it was the only compromise that could be 
agreed upon. The negotiator stated:  
 
[I]n the text, there is a lot of wording that could be subject to interpretation. We do wanted to 
make sure that we had some interpretive tools within the chapter that would tip the balance in 
one way or another, and that’s why one of the very complex things that we achieved was 
incorporating the objectives and principles of the TRIPS agreement here, as well as some 
flexibilities for HIV, malaria and tuberculosis, because there we were thinking that even though 
we are drafting obligations here, there is a higher interest on public policy regarding public 
health or social security or national interest, when comparing it to intellectual property it needs 
to be on a higher level. I don’t know if I can explain myself even more, but that’s why you have 
those provisions. We understood that in order to have an agreement, there was necessarily the 
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language that was kind of ambiguous and drafting that was kind of ambiguous. Because you 
kind of need to be on a middle ground.422 
 
Vague language as a compromise in deadlocked negotiations has been seen elsewhere in 
trade-related IP, for example in the negotiation on exhaustion in the TRIPS agreement, which 
pitted countries that wanted silence on the issue (mostly developed countries) against 
countries who wanted their own exhaustion regimes. According to Gorlin, ‘once a consensus 
was developed not to address exhaustion in TRIPS, the negotiators paid scant attention to the 
actual wording of the final language’.423  
 
The above shows not only that the U.S. will continue to be the principal demandeur of TRIPS 
plus provisions, but also that these provisions are based on domestic law, that will morph with 
market realities, and they will continue to overwhelmingly favour IP owners. 
 
VI. Political economy tradeoffs 
Political economy factors underlie IP concessions. This ranges from international relations 
considerations such as who a countries’ biggest trading partner is, to internal policy such as 
wanting to map oneself as a future intellectual property shaper, to the perceived benefits from 
the optics of being seen as allies with a world superpower, or the need to avoid trade 
sanctions. Hudson and Marquette describe political economy analysis as being concerned 
with the ‘interaction of political and economic processes in a society: the distribution of power 
and wealth between different groups and individuals, and the processes that create, sustain 
and transform these relationships over time.424 The authors also place emphasis on ideas and 
how ideas that, among other things, underpin legitimate forms of rule and guide domestic 
interests, help explain why actors often act ‘against their own obvious economic self-
interest’.425  Notably, they ask readers to consider that they are not ‘actors’ but people, which 
lends an additional layer of complexity to political economy considerations.426 Collinson and 
others talk about how a political economy approach involves the examination of the ‘nature of 
power in the societies concerned’ and what processes ‘create, sustain, and transform these 
relationships over time’.427 
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In an analysis of international IP, Shadlen and others find that it is membership of the WTO 
and bilateral pressures from the United States, particularly those on reciprocal concessions, 
is the main political economy factor resulting in increases of IP protection.428 These then go 
on to have deep impacts in country, including on access to medicines and perceived credibility 
with foreign multinationals. Due to that, in regard to pharmaceutical IP, the State through its 
negotiators must balance the commercial interests with public health interests. The political 
sensitivity of these issues makes managing tradeoffs particularly complex.429 Furthermore, 
politically sensitive issues in trade negotiations are often left to the end of negotiations, when 
tradeoffs between different sectors may occur, with these final negotiations often led by Chief 
Negotiators or Ministers who might not appreciate the full spectrum of interests involved.430  
The political economy factors preceding TRIPS contextualises why developing countries had 
to accept IP standards. Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss elaborate: 
Developed countries were facing significant challenges as production shifted to countries with 
lower labour costs. At the same time, however, global wealth was increasing and tastes were 
changing. Profits from creative output were becoming a potential source of foreign exchange, 
crucial to correcting trade imbalances in other sectors of the economy… It was no longer 
acceptable to the North for countries of the South to refuse to recognise intellectual property 
rights and take a free ride on investments in creativity – to use knowledge products without 
contributing to right holders’ development costs through the payment of royalties.431 
When the U.S. began to pressure developing countries with trade sanctions, the choice 
became clear. It would be a tradeoff of more IP for no trade sanctions. In addition, developing 
countries were persuaded that the incorporation of these IP standards would result in the entry 
of large multinationals, stabilising local business and raising their reputations. Developing 
countries were also persuaded that associations with these multinationals would lead to joint 
venturing, technology transfer, and strategic alliances.432 
Political economy tradeoffs can be further illustrated by the example of international 
exhaustion in the Uruguay Round in 1991, where least-developed country (LDC) language on 
international exhaustion was vigorously opposed by the United States and European 
industries for appearing to support international exhaustion. To break the deadlock, a tradeoff 
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was suggested between Article 6 (international exhaustion) and Article 28 (rights conferred on 
patent owners), notably the removal of the word ‘importing’ from Article 28 (favouring LDCs) 
in exchange for the deletion of Article 6.433 While this particular tradeoff did not come to pass 
in the final text of the TRIPS Agreement, this example illustrates one type of tradeoff that may 
occur for pharmaceutical IP.  
 
For others, the tradeoff is grounded in tangible goods. For New Zealand in the TPP, agreement 
to the biologics exclusivity clause was contingent upon there being a market access deal for 
dairy products.434 Tradeoffs are characterised by reciprocity, and not necessarily balance. 
While the TRIPS Agreement was overwhelmingly in favour of developed countries, detailed 
rules on compulsory licences were viewed as a sufficient concession for the enforcement of 
pharmaceutical IP.435 Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss opine that despite coercion and questionable 
market-access-for-IP tradeoffs, the TRIPS Agreement ‘reflects compromise both on the 
economic impact of protection and on the continued relevance of broader social values… 
TRIPS is a product of a single moment in history and reflects the national and international 
policies and interests pertaining to that moment.436 This sentiment in the coming chapters is 
extrapolated to the TPP. 
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I. Introduction 
 
The economic policy of Chile today is characterised by market openness and reciprocal 
international demand of its exports. Along with the EU, Singapore, and India, Chile is one of 
the most active users of preferential trade agreements.437 It is a relatively small economy with 
a GDP of $247b, putting them between Singapore and Hong Kong, and its orientation towards 
external markets is considered the ‘motor’ of its economic growth.438  
 
It has advanced much since its early approach beginning at the end of the 19th century, which 
was initially heavily influenced by the dominant ideology in developed countries, i.e. 
consolidation of power through mercantilism, which involved protectionism by the state and 
the development of national industries, establishing colonies, and accumulating bullion in 
national reserves.439  
 
It was during the rule of the dictator Augusto Pinochet, following a period of hyperinflation and 
economic uncertainty, that Chile opened their markets. This was a decision driven and 
designed by the Chicago boys, a group of Chilean technocrats who had studied under Milton 
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Friedman at the University of Chicago, and who went on to hold many senior positions in 
Pinochet’s government. The policies they instituted survived long after the fall of the brutal 
Pinochet regime and into their transition to democracy in 1990, and the obvious economic 
growth occurring as a result of market openness means that a majority of Chileans to this day 
continue to embrace neoliberal ideologies, although tempered with social policies.440 Of late, 
however, there has been increasing social unrest and protests against the neoliberal model, 
arising from concerns about for-profit education, workers conditions, and consumer rights.441 
The neoliberal model saw the signing of numerous free trade agreements, and with the signing 
of an FTA with the United States, several maximalist intellectual property provisions were 
incorporated within domestic law and practice, extending monopolies for essential medicines. 
 
As described in previous chapters, economic policies are not the sole influencing factor of 
trade negotiator decisions, but rather they take into account a number of considerations 
including developmental concerns. Chile has the highest inequality among OECD countries,442 
and while recent writings - including that of the American cognitive psychologist and linguist 
Steven Pinker - have denounced inequality indicators as rooted in a lump fallacy that ‘if some 
people end up with more, others must have less’, it continues to be a widely accepted indicator 
of less ideal socioeconomic conditions.443 Chilean social scientists, in line with the latter 
ideology, have illustrated that this socioeconomic inequality has resulted in increasing petty 
crime, worsening perception of insecurity, a huge disparity in costs of public and private 
education, resulting in educational segregation, and the existence of the private health system 
of better quality than the public health system and that discriminates against people in need.444 
In October 2019, Chile underwent popular civil unrest due to frustrations with ‘growing income 
inequality and a weak social safety net’,445 resulting in violent rallies.  
 
In other areas of health, while Chile has a well-established network of primary healthcare 
providers and a public health system financed by mandatory salary contributions to one of two 
insurance systems, its health budget is stretched, it has a large debt due to the import of 
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medications, and it is characterised by inequity.446 
 
Any number of these factors could underlie the decisions made by negotiators analysed in 
Chapter 5 of this thesis, whether alone or in relation to each other. As I describe these factors 
in greater detail below, a cohesive picture should come together and contextualise why Chile 
made the decisions on any tradeoffs in the TPP. 
 
II. An overview of trade and economic policy – Pinochet to present day 
 
Chile was not always a bastion of the free market that it is today. For some time, including 
during the reign of Presidents Salvador Allende (1970-1973) and Frei Montalva (1964-1970) 
before him, statism and the protection of domestic industry was the centre of their economic 
policies.447 The young Salvador Allende had been involved in the 1932 socialist experiment 
as part of the aftermath of the military takeover by the left-wing Colonel Marmaduke Grove, 
and thereon devoted himself towards shaping policy to help the poor.448 Part of this involved 
nationalising foreign-owned firms so that profits from the sale of natural resources could be 
directed towards social welfare.449 Expansionary economic policy without relying on taxes 
resulted in increasing fiscal deficits, and Allende’s government dipped into the large foreign 
reserves it had inherited from the previous government to finance those deficits.450 By the 
early 1970s, it became clear that import substitution schemes had failed.451 Allende’s policies 
resulted in declining foreign reserves, hyperinflation up to 500%, and widespread 
unemployment.452 
 
His romantic ambitions of a peaceful transition to socialism would end in blood and bombs.453 
In September 1973, a military junta led by General Augusto Pinochet stormed La Moneda, 
where Allende was holed up with key advisors. Under heavy fire, Allende transmitted his last 
message to the Chilean people, including the iconic phrase ‘I will pay with my life for the loyalty 
of the people’, and attributing the coup to ‘foreign capital and imperialism’.454 He then 
committed suicide.  
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The coup that ensued is normally attributed to one of two causes - the hyperinflation caused 
by Allende’s economic policies, or the cause preferred by the right-wing camp, that there was 
to be a leftist coup in September 1973, and the only way to prevent that was via a preemptive 
coup of their own.455 Underlying these attributions were several realities – that Allende’s 
policies were hostile to U.S. economic interests and thus the U.S. instituted an official policy 
to destabilise his regime.456 These sentiments are apparent in several declassified U.S. 
documents circa 1970, including a declassified memo dated 3 November 1970 intended for 
the then-U.S. National Security Advisor Henry A Kissinger. This document warned that the 
Allende government will ‘have a profound anti-American bias and will work to extirpate U.S. 
influence from the country’ and suggested ‘carefully measured actions’ to weaken the Allende 
government, including discouraging multilateral and third party investment in Chile.457 
The American neoliberal influence however did not begin in 1970. In 1956, an academic 
exchange agreement was signed between the University of Chicago and the Catholic 
University of Chile. This resulted in a group of young Chilean economists undertaking 
postgraduate studies in Chicago under Arnold Harberger and Milton Friedman, who both 
espoused free market economic philosophies.458 These economists, which included Sergio de 
Castro, Rolf Lüders Schwarzenberg, and Hernán Büchi, who would all later hold Ministerial 
positions under the Pinochet government, were dubbed the ‘Chicago Boys’. The role of the 
‘Chicago Boys’ is inextricable from Chile’s economic history – Sergio de Castro authored the 
Chicago Boys’ economic recommendations, and but a few weeks before the coup, delivered 
the document to Navy Admiral José Toribio Merino, who would be part of the junta that would 
install Augusto Pinochet as the new head of state.459 Due to the immensity of the task, these 
recommendations were further substantiated with the addition of other economists within the 
group and compiled into one publication,460 called El Ladrillo (‘The Brick’) due to its sheer 
weight. It became the guiding tome of the Chicago Boys in their unprecedented rewriting of 
the Chilean economy. As time passed, the ideologies of the Chicago Boys – i.e. the creation 
of a market economy - permeated all levels of Chilean society.461  
                                                   
455 ibid 9 
456 ibid 13 
457 National Security Council, Options Paper on Chile (NSSM 97, 1970) 
<https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB8/docs/doc24.pdf> accessed 27 June 2018 
458 Timothy David Clark, ‘Rethinking Chile’s “Chicago Boys”: Neoliberal Technocrats or Revolutionary Vanguard?” (2017) 38(6) 
Third World Quarterly 1350 
459 Tania Opazo, ‘The Boys who Got to Remake an Economy’ Slate (12 January 2016) 
<http://www.slate.com/business/2018/05/millennials-are-in-a-deep-financial-hole-compared-to-past-generations.html> 
accessed 28 May 2018 
460 Centro de Estudios Públicos, “El Ladrillo”: Bases de Política Económica del Gobierno Militar Chileno (Centro de Estudios 
Públicos, 1992) 
461 Clark (n 458) 1354 
  91 
Clark elaborates: 
[T]he Chicago Boys were much more than neoliberal technocrats: they were a revolutionary 
vanguard that fostered a capitalist revolution that radically transformed the material and 
ideological foundations of the nation.462 
The U.S. neoliberal influence continued in the background. The influential Edwards family in 
Chile played a key role in strengthening the influence and acceptance of neoliberalism – they 
used their influence to establish the first free market think tank in Chile in 1963, the Center for 
Social and Economic Studies (CESEC), which allowed the Chicago Boys a place to 
congregate and proliferate their ideas. 463 The Edwards Group then invited several Chicago 
Boys to author op-eds in their newspaper El Mercurio, which was the most influential 
conservative newspaper at that time.464 A scion of the Edwards family, the media mogul 
Agustín Edwards Eastman collaborated with the CIA to facilitate and prop up the coup that led 
to the installation of Pinochet as President.465  
 
In the mid-1970s and early 1980s, Chile suffered the same external shocks suffered by other 
developing countries. The severe recession in 1975 led to 13 per cent decline in GDP.466 The 
Pinochet military government in the mid-1970s instituted widespread economic reform, the 
best known of which is the opening up of Chile to external markets, i.e. the elimination of all 
non-tariff barriers and a rapid reduction of tariffs.467 Andrés Rebolledo, the current Minister of 
Energy and former Director-General of DIRECON, the government office in charge of 
international economic relations and oversaw the TPP negotiations, wrote in his postgraduate 
dissertation that while Chile underwent a profound political, social, and economic 
transformation, it was the opening up of the economy which was its most ‘transcendental 
structural reform’.468 Following the 1982-1984 recession due to the external debt crisis, which 
was felt by the rest of Latin America, the Pinochet government reversed these trade reforms 
and increased the import tariffs to the GATT consolidated rate of 35%.469  
 
These structural reforms did not translate into success overnight.470 In fact, free market 
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adjustments meant that total imports ‘rose significantly in relation to the level of domestic 
economic activity’.471 Financial reforms continued into the mid-70s, with the privatisation of 
banks that had been nationalised under the Allende government, the abolition of price 
controls, financial market deregulation, and tax reform, among others.472 Despite these efforts, 
growth continued to be slow up to the early- to mid-80s. 473 According to the Chilean economist 
Ricardo Ffrench-Davis:  
 
Investment was low for a number of reasons. High interest rates were an important factor, but 
the drop in public investment also played a significant role, as did the swift liberalization of 
imports (which pushed up the relative cost of imported capital goods, discouraged the domestic 
production of importables and sharply boosted imports of consumer goods) and the low rate of 
capacity utilization. Thus, employment prospects and the outlook for wage hikes were dimmed 
by the low level of investment and capacity utilization.474 
 
In 1976, external debt increased as imports dominated the market and crowded out nationally 
produced goods.475 This required readjustment and in 1979, a new stage of macroeconomic 
policies was adopted that eventually achieved a fiscal surplus.476 Ffrench-Davis explains 
further that Chile did not show signs of economic stability until 1986, when trends showed 
predictability and strength with accelerated economic activity and an increase in aggregate 
demand.477 Chile’s position was further improved by the increase in copper prices that year.  
 
In September of 1986, the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations commenced in Punta del 
Este, Uruguay, and was intended to be the most ambitious set of multilateral negotiations, 
established most-favoured nation rules and reduction of tariffs. The Uruguay Round concluded 
in 1994. Chile’s positions in the Uruguay Round depended on where they were in their 
domestic economy; in the beginning of the negotiations, Chile’s economy was improving, but 
by no means could one say that it had sustained economic strength. Furthermore, the 
Pinochet military regime’s foreign strategy was ‘imbued with a complex combination of 
"nationalism" and "realism"’ that prioritised bilateral relations to the detriment of 
multilateralism.478 Thus Chile was heavily influenced by the problems facing its economy.479 
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While it was willing to engage on the multilateral stage with a broad agenda in mind, it called 
on industrialised countries to take the lead, but at the same times focusing on its own interests 
in terms of improving its terms of trade.480 
 
In the late 1980s, as the Uruguay Round of negotiations progressed, the political climate in 
Chile was changing. In October 1988 Chileans had voted to bring an end to the military 
dictatorship, in a plebiscite where Augusto Pinochet had offered to govern for another 8 years 
and had fully expected to win.481 This set the scene for elections to take place in December 
1989 and Patricio Aylwin, a socialist democrat from the Christian Democratic Party in the 
Concertación coalition, won the elections. Several factors helped this – the fact that 
Concertación coalition had managed to attract a centre right party, the Partido Acción de 
Centro (PAC), some of them previously staunch Pinochet supporters, was one of them. They 
also appealed to the urban and rural poor and middle class who had been disenchanted by 
the policies of the Pinochet government.482 
 
But the changing political flavour in the late-1980s/early 1990s meant that while Chile 
continued to espouse a liberal and open trade policy, it had yet to form established national 
positions to present to the world at large.483 In the early nineties domestic economic conditions 
had changed substantially from Chile’s position at the beginning of the Uruguay Round, with 
five years of consistent economic growth, the improvement of its terms of trade, and the fact 
that international interest rates had fallen significantly.484  
 
In the early 1990s, Chile sought to undo some of the poverty and inequality that had developed 
under the Pinochet government by correcting some of the ‘serious deficiencies of neoliberal 
economic policies’.485 This included restoring workers’ rights and increasing social spending, 
while at the same time adopting measures to reduce Chile’s vulnerability to external financial 
volatility.486 It also sought to re-establish itself in the international relations arena by repairing 
damaged bilateral, regional, and global relations, not just in the international trade arena, but 
also in terms of international human rights and good governance approaches.487 Aylwin’s 
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presidency (1990-1994) saw the promotion of multilateralism, the signing of FTAs with Canada 
and Mexico, and the expansion of ties with Asia, starting with Malaysia.488 This period also 
saw Chile’s support for including services within the Uruguay Round of negotiations.489  
 
The second Concertación government under President Eduardo Frei (1994-2000) saw more 
trade diplomacy, with business leaders following him on diplomatic TRIPS with the specific 
mission of attracting business.490 He participated in the first APEC summit, which would later 
be an important venue for Chile and its preferential trade agreement goals. It was during his 
reign that the WTO reflected a concern with Chile’s preoccupation with regionalism rather than 
‘locking in these reforms through binding commitments at the multilateral level’.491 
 
The third Concertación government saw another socialist democrat, Ricardo Lagos (2000-
2006) seek to improve regional trade ties by seeking incorporation into MERCOSUR, although 
it never could achieve the requisite domestic support.492 Lagos also strengthened ties with his 
American counterpart, George W Bush, lauding the two countries common goals in terms of 
human rights and a market economy.493 For Lagos, the FTA was a key part of his strategy to 
counteract the relatively low rate of growth compared to the previous decade.494 At the same 
time, the United States, who had enjoyed a trade surplus with Chile for some time, had 
become concerned by a recent trade deficit, and sought to correct this via an FTA.495 Bush 
obtained fast track authority to negotiate a Chile-U.S. FTA on 1 August 2002,496 and this would 
eventually become the United States’ first free bilateral trade agreement with a Latin American 
country. The agreement, with liberalised 85% of consumer and industrial products between 
the two nations,497 also introduced to Chile intellectual property requirements described further 
in Section IV of this Chapter. The business community in Chile had active participation in the 
U.S.-Chile FTA, with their different unions holding numerous meetings with DIRECON 
(Directorate for International Economic Affairs) throughout the negotiations.498  
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Through this agreement, Chile experienced well-known U.S. bullying tactics – as a political 
economy tradeoff for making concessions on tariffs, the United States pressured Chile for their 
vote in favour of military intervention in Iraq at the U.N. Security Council.499 Lagos and his 
foreign policy advisor Heraldo Muñoz stood firm, however, and Chile voted against military 
intervention.500 Muñoz later became Minister of Foreign Affairs under the fourth Concertación 
government, and oversaw the negotiation of the TPP agreement. It is unclear at this point 
whether his previous experiences with U.S. pressure had any bearing on tradeoffs in the TPP.  
 
The U.S.-Chile FTA was finalised on 11 December 2002 and George W Bush notified 
Congress of its intent to sign the FTA on 31 January 2003.501 Despite Chile’s no-vote on Iraq, 
the agreement came into force on 1 January 2004. A year later in an April 2005 meeting in 
Santiago with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Lagos would extol the virtues of the U.S.-
Chile FTA, notably an increase of trade by more than 31 per cent, more manufacturing exports 
and more quality employment.502  
 
The fourth Concertación government under Michelle Bachelet (2006-2010) upheld 
multilateralism, regionalism, and promoted free trade, much like her predecessors. That is, all 
four Concertación democratic governments maintained free market policies. But what was 
different about the Concertación governments compared to the Pinochet dictatorship was the 
economic growth and an increased social spending. While per capita GDP averaged 5.1% in 
the 20 years between 1990 and 2009, compared to 1.3% during the Pinochet reign,503 at the 
same time the proportion of Chileans living under the poverty line fell from 40% to 15%, and 
quality of life for the average Chilean improved greatly.504 As political sociologist Tomás 
Undurraga comments: ‘Concertación did not break up with neoliberalism, but only aimed to 
temper it by orchestrating greater social equality’.505 
 
Chile’s economy today is thriving, with its top exports being copper, fruit, fish products, and 
wine, among others. It is also an exporter of pharmaceuticals, with countries like Peru 
importing 22% of its pharmaceuticals from Chile.506 Its top export destination is China at 
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$17.4B followed by the United States ($8.86B) and Japan ($5.19B).507 Its relationship with 
China has been described as the ‘most solid in Latin America’,508 and this is reflected in a 
history of diplomatic engagements post-Pinochet. Minister of Foreign Affairs Hernán Cubillos 
visited China in 1978 and signed technological and economic cooperation agreements which 
resulted in FDI exchanges in the mining industry.509 But Chile-China trade momentum and 
diplomatic visibility was only reached in more recent history. In November 2005, under the 
Presidency of Ricardo Lagos, the Chile-China FTA was signed, which quadrupled Chile’s 
exports to China from 2005 to 2010.510 In 2010, China consumed over 40% of the world’s 
copper production, with the imports for copper ore increasing further in 2018 to 53% of the 
global production, which only increased Chile’s value to China.511 Falling copper prices in 
recent times threatened to diminish Chile’s profitability in this area, but Chile responded by 
increasing other exports to China. Notably, Chile toppled Thailand as China’s top importer of 
fruit.512  
 
Post-FTA, Chile-China relations have been more visible, demonstrated by Michelle Bachelet’s 
attendance at the Bao forum in China at the invitation of Hu Jintao, and subsequent signing 
of additional bilateral cooperation agreements, including scholarships for Chinese students.513 
More recently, in November 2017, Bachelet and Chinese President Xi Jinping met in Vietnam 
to witness the upgrading of the Chile-China FTA.514  
 
These and other political economy factors lend context and relevance to discussions in the 
final chapter of this thesis. Chile’s multiple FTAs signed with all TPP partners, widespread 
governmental endorsement of the free market model, their close relationship and economic 
dependence on China and copper, and previous experience with U.S. bullying tactics may 
help explain Chile’s motivations during the TPP.  
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III. The Chilean public health system 
 
Chile’s health system is generally described as being well governed and well functioning.515 
Chile has in fact enjoyed increasing life expectancy above the OECD rate, and has been 
lauded for its effective cancer screening programs, among other things.516 But as with other 
upper middle-income countries, it has an increasing burden of chronic non-communicable 
diseases. Out of pocket payments for medication is also very high, with families spending 
5.4% of their total incomes to finance healthcare in addition to insurance payments.517  
 
The main characteristic of Chile’s health system is a mandatory contribution of 7% from 
salaries into either one of two health subsystems, public health insurance called Fondo 
Nacional de Salud (Fonasa) or private health insurance from local providers (Isapres).518 
These operate with different rules. While both are required to adhere to certain guarantees as 
elaborated shortly, the Isapres have more regulatory space to amend premium amounts, types 
of diseases covered, and other details, resulting in inequity.519 However, this does not mean 
Chile has universal health care – out of pocket- and co-payments are high, and for diseases 
not covered by either Fonasa or Isapres, patients who are unable to access the medications 
they need are forced to petitions courts to compel the public system to respond to their needs. 
The following paragraphs will illustrate key developments in Chilean public health history and 
the current situation, to help situate the thinking of IP negotiators in the TPP.  
 
The Pinochet government was not just neoliberal in matters of trade, but also health. In 1979, 
they introduced the Fonasa system which segmented the insured population into four tiers 
based on income category, which determines the proportion of health services is covered by 
the state and which has to be paid out of pocket by the individual. Group A includes indigent 
people and those on welfare and pensions, and they receive 100% of the benefits provided 
under Fonasa for free.520 Group B are people earning the minimum wage; they too receive 
100% of the benefits (for covered illnesses). Group C are those people who earn higher than 
the minimum wage but not more than 1.46 times that amount, in which case Fonasa covers 
75% of benefits, whereas in Group D (earning more than 1.46 times above minimum wage) 
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receive 50% of benefits and have to cover the remaining costs out-of-pocket.521 Pinochet also 
decentralised primary health services to municipal health authorities.522 
In 1981, Pinochet’s government created Isapres ‘to manage the payroll contributions allocated 
to health care for those opting out of the state system’, with the ultimate aim of having Isapres 
be the dominant health system in Chile.523 Basically the Isapres were created to cater to those 
who could afford to pay for the best quality healthcare.524 Isapres were completely unregulated 
in the first few years, resulting in exorbitant premiums.525 In terms of coverage, routine 
healthcare was covered, but not ‘catastrophic diseases’.526 They operated on a basis of risk 
selection and ‘cream skimming’, or selecting customers based on potential profitability.527 Most 
Chileans were unable to pay, and remained under Fonasa. However the government was 
adamant on ensuring more Chileans joined Isapres, and so, in 1986 introduced incentives to 
join, including a 2% subsidy targeting middle-income populations.528 While this was 
happening, the Pinochet government was progressively reducing public health spending as a 
percentage of GDP, in order to force citizens into Isapres.529 All this occurred in the midst and 
in the aftermath of severe recessionary periods. The inequality that resulted contributed to the 
increasing discontent with the Pinochet government.  
When the Concertación coalition won the general elections in 1989, key reforms to the 
healthcare system were undertaken. Public health spending increased from 2% to 3% of GDP 
in less than a decade.530 The Aylwin government then moved to regulate Isapres by creating 
an Isapres Superintendent body which would mediate conflicts between individuals and 
Isapres and produce market statistics, and secondly to ensure that Isapres could no longer 
unilaterally terminate contracts without justifications. 531 These reforms saw Isapres premiums 
drastically reduce, but since then, while the population enrolled in Isapres has remained 
stable, premiums have slowly and gradually increased again.532 But these initial reforms did 
not regulate what diseases had to be covered under both Isapres and Fonasa systems and 
this went unaddressed by the legislature for some time. 
                                                   
521 Ibid 40 
522 ISAPRE, ISAPRES 1981-2016: 35 Years Supporting Chile’s Private Health System (Asociación de ISAPRES de Chile, 
2016) 11 
523 Jean-Pierre Unger and others, ‘Chile’s Neoliberal Health Reform: An Assessment and a Critique’ (2008) 5(4) PLoS Medicine 
542, 543 
524 Alejandra Zúñiga Fajuri, ‘When Constitutional Justice has the Last Word on Health Care: the Case of Chile’ (2014) 44(2) 
International Journal of Health Services 373, 374 
525 María Soledad Martinez-Gutierrez and Cristóbal Cuadrado, ‘Health Policy in the Concertación Era (1990-2010): Reforms the 
Chilean Way’ (2017) 182 Social Science & Medicine 117, 119 
526 ibid 121 
527 Jens Holst, Ulrich Laaser, and Jürgen Hohman, ‘Chilean Health Insurance System: A Source of Inequity and Selective 
Social Insecurity’ (2004) 12 Journal of Public Health 271 
528 Martinez-Gutierrez and Cuadrado (n 525) 119 
529 ibid 119 
530 ibid 119 
531 ibid 121 
532 ibid 121 
  99 
 
The judicature in the year 2000 sought to address this issue. The Supreme Court in Santiago 
ruled that public health plans should cover at least 50% of what Fonasa covered in its libre 
elección (‘free choice’) schemes, i.e. schemes where consultation and medical attention is 
covered, but medications are covered by copayment.533 Due to intensive state and public 
pressure, later that year Isapres agreed collectively to offer additional catastrophic disease 
coverage.534 In a separate case, the Supreme Court ruled that Isapres had to cover at the 
least the equivalent of what public sector beneficiaries would have to pay out of pocket, which 
regulated the Isapres cost ceilings.535 
 
In 2004, under the administration of Ricardo Lagos, health law reform was instituted in Chile 
via Law N° 19,966, providing for diseases for which insurance coverage would be guaranteed. 
It was intended to address problems of high copayments in the private health insurance 
system.536 Initially known as the AUGE, and later renamed the Garantías Explícitas de Salud 
(Explicit Health Guarantees – GES), it insured a co-payment system for listed diseases and a 
specified upper cap per year to cover out-of-pocket payments, including those to purchase 
pharmaceutical drugs.537 Throughout its application, most AUGE/GES claims were made for 
emergency ambulatory dental conditions, followed by acute respiratory infections, primary 
arterial hypertension, and cervico-uterine cancers.538 The AUGE also covers depression, 
although the high demand and high cost of these treatments have strained Chilean health 
budgets.539 The GES not only specifies the diseases that are covered, but also what 
diagnostics and treatments that are covered for certain diseases. Patients who would like 
different medications will have to pay out of pocket. 
 
In 2010, judicial check and balance of Chile’s health system kicked in again, with the 
Constitutional Court ruling that the adjustment of price plans based on risk factor tables was 
unconstitutional.540 This explicit right to health in the Constitution, contained in Article 19 No. 
9, states: “The State protects the free and egalitarian access to actions for the promotion, 
protection, and recovery of the health of the individual” and that “it is the prime duty of the 
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State to guarantee health assistance, whether undertaken by public or private institutions”.541 
Some Chilean legal scholars have deemed the provision as ‘lacking in guarantees’,542 but in 
recent times it has been increasingly used in judicial activism to correct deficiencies in the 
health system via recursos de protección or health protection lawsuits. In a groundbreaking 
2018 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that Isapres had to cover the costs of an experimental 
therapy for a cancer patient, despite Isapres contending that there wasn’t enough scientific 
evidence.543  
 
It is not just Isapres that face recursos de protección. The public health system, with its 
stretched budgets due to high and ever increasing medicine prices due to the lack of a 
comprehensive medicines cost containment mechanism, broad (but necessary) health 
guarantees under the GES, and reliance on imported medications, has quotas for treatment 
of certain diseases. In April 2018, in April 2018, in one such constitutional protection action, 
the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court confirmed rulings ordering Fonasa to fund 
treatments for Morquio disease for two patients, stating that while Fonasa’s actions 
corresponded to public policy, i.e. that treatment for this disease was restricted to 27 patients, 
that Fonasa’s actions violated the principle of equality before the law established in the 
Constitution.544 From a historical standpoint, Chile has not seen the right to health at the 
forefront of legal discourse or public interest litigation,545 but this has changed, with a 300% 
increase in health-related petitions at the State Defense Council from 2005-2011.546 
 
In 2015, President Michelle Bachelet signed off on the Ricarte Soto law which provides 
financial coverage for specific high-cost diagnostics and treatments.547 Named after a celebrity 
TV and radio personality who died of lung cancer, the law now covers diagnostics and 
treatments for 18 high-cost diseases, including hereditary angioedema, type 1 
mucopolysaccharidosis, and pancreatic cancers for all Chileans no matter what insurance 
system they are covered by.548  
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Medicines are supplied either by international multinational companies or domestic 
laboratories. Domestic laboratories produce more than 80 percent of medicines consumed in 
Chile.549 Medicines are procured for the public health system in large volumes by the Central 
de Abastecimiento del Sistema Nacional de Servicios de Salud (CENABAST), largely from 
India, China, Malaysia, and the Ukraine. This has resulted in a large public debt. According to 
Millaleo, ‘This debt poses a difficult political problem because it reinforces the influence of 
foreign laboratories over the Chilean state’.550  
 
The framework of the health system reforms instituted by the Pinochet dictatorship has 
remained largely intact, but tweaked by various legislative and judicial decisions. It is still, 
however, plagued by several key problems. Membership of Isapres have remained stable 
through the years, with 2011 statistics indicate that approximately 17.5% of the population are 
affiliated with Isapres insurance coverage,551 and while the GES system has provided 
adequate healthcare for many conditions, even the best health plans do not cover psychiatric 
and chronic illnesses adequately.552 There are high costs of medicines and out-of-pocket 
payments for medications, of which the government is acutely aware, and has recently tried 
to improve by introducing tools for pharmacies to compare medicine prices,553 and considering 
the use of compulsory licences for hepatitis C drugs, which were priced at $36,000 per 
patient.554 These considerations, along with pressure from civil society groups may have 
influenced the decisions of TPP IP negotiators.  
 
IV. Adoption of TRIPS domestically 
 
The Chilean Political Constitution of 1980 recognises ‘industrial ownership of invention 
patents’, but at the time did not apply this to pharmaceutical products.555 The patentability of 
pharmaceuticals was first considered by the administration of Augusto Pinochet in 1984. The 
administration wanted to improve their diplomatic relations with the United States, and 
pressure from American pharmaceutical companies indicated to them that patents were a 
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good way to do so.556 It wasn’t until 1989, however, that Pinochet instituted Law No. 18.935, 
published in the Official Journal in February of the following year, which provided for the 
patenting of ‘medicines of all kinds’ contingent upon marketing authorisation in the country of 
origin, communication in writing within 90 days, and a request for a grant of patent within 180 
days of application.557 As customary with laws in Chile, the President at the time, Augusto 
Pinochet, delivered a Congressional message on occasion of the promulgation of this law, 
noting that the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (PhRMA) had condemned Chile in 
a submission to the USTR, and asked Congress to approve the law with urgency.558 
 
The TRIPS agreement, a product of the GATT Uruguay Round, would substantially change 
Chilean IP law. As discussed above in Section II, at the beginning of the Uruguay Round, 
Chile was preparing to transition into a democratic government, and so did not have official 
positions on many topics, least of all intellectual property.559 According to Chilean intellectual 
property expert Pedro Roffe, however, understanding Chile’s IP mindset going into the 
Uruguay Round requires consideration of a number of factors, including the transition of power 
as discussed above and the context of IP in Latin America in general, including medicines 
patentability on the throughout the continent, and IP decisions made in the Andean 
Community (of which Chile is a member).560  
 
The TRIPS agreement, a product of the GATT Uruguay Round, changed Chilean IP law. As 
discussed above in Section II, at the beginning of the Uruguay Round, Chile was preparing to 
transition into a democratic government, and so did not have elaborated public policy on 
intellectual property. According to Chilean intellectual property expert Pedro Roffe, however, 
understanding Chile’s IP mindset going into the Uruguay Round requires consideration of a 
number of factors, including the transition of power as discussed above and the context of IP 
in Latin America in general, including the patentability of medical products throughout the 
continent. Chile and Mexico were the first in Latin America to introduce in the early 1990s its 
protection. In general, the position of Chile was in line of that of a number of developing 
countries as expressed in the document submitted in 1990 by 12 developing countries to the 
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Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, including Trade 
in Counterfeit Goods.561 
 
Prior to the Uruguay Round (1986-1994), Latin America did not take a liberal approach to IP 
and a majority of countries did not provide for medicines patents. Decisions within the Andean 
Community indicate the restrictive flavour of the Latin American approach to IP. Decision 24, 
enacted in December of 1970, provides for the regimen for foreign capital, trademarks, 
patents, licenses, and royalties in the region, generally stating that Parties should have 
national bodies that can, among other duties, authorise license agreements for the exploitation 
of trademarks and patents, and specifying that competent bodies receiving patent and 
trademark applications shall evaluate the effective contribution of imported technologies by 
estimating its probable profits.562 Decision 85, enacted in June 1974, restrictively defined the 
scope of patentability criteria, i.e. what constituted ‘new’, ‘an invention’, and ‘of industrial 
applicability’, and specified what patents should not be granted for, including plant and animal 
varieties and pharmaceutical products.563 
 
However, in June 1990, President Patricio Aylwin introduced Law Nº 19.039, which 
recognised pharmaceutical patents, and stated in his presidential message that the 
‘comprehensive modernisation of the industrial property system’ was necessary for the 
encouragement of development and technological innovation.564  Chile therefore was the first 
country to recognise patentability of pharmaceuticals, followed by Mexico. Chile therefore 
found itself in a very difficult situation in the Uruguay Round. Developing countries were very 
influenced by the Andean Community’s positions, including their role in promoting a revision 
of the Paris Convention.565 This was further buttressed by a 1975 UNCTAD report ‘The 
International Patent System as an Instrument for National Development’ which was focused 
on the revision of the Paris Convention to increase compatibility with the needs of developing 
countries.566 Either way, developing countries simply did not have the technical or resource 
capacity to withstand developed country pressures on TRIPS.567 The TRIPS Agreement 
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became effective on 1 January 1995 with transition periods in place for developing countries, 
including Chile. 
 
Chile began to discuss the implementation of TRIPS in October 1999, and these discussions 
led to the enactment of Law Nº 19.996, amending the abovementioned Law Nº 19.039, and 
incorporating TRIPS requirements, including conferring a 20-year monopoly for patent holders 
beginning from the date of application.568 President Eduardo Frei’s presidential message 
incorporated all the trade-related intellectual property language that developed countries had 
strenuously lobbied for before and throughout the Uruguay Round negotiations; he stressed 
that competitiveness, productivity, efficiency and profitability ‘cannot be achieved without an 
effective system to protect efforts aimed at developing assets in the field of knowledge’, stated 
that intellectual property was necessary to prevent trade distortions, and that intellectual 
property was an instrument of development but also a way to protect legitimate interests of 
holders of intellectual property rights.569  
 
The Chile-U.S. FTA, a TRIPS-plus agreement, began negotiations in 2001 and entered into 
force on 1 January 2004. It imposed new obligations on Chile pertaining to data exclusivity, 
patent extensions for regulatory delay, and patent linkage, including the requirement that the 
granting of marketing approval to third parties must obtain consent of the patent holder.570 At 
the outset of the negotiations, Chile was well aware of the U.S. position on trade and TRIPS-
plus provisions based not only on public and communicated views of the Trade Promotion 
Authority, but also knew what to expect from the Jordan-U.S. FTA which had been signed on 
24 October 2000.571 Also from the outset of the negotiations, Chile wanted to avoid as far as 
possible the inclusion of TRIPS-plus provisions because it felt that it had ‘intensively 
advanced’ in implementation of the TRIPS agreement and other IP conventions.572 There was 
also some concern that further monopolies would create further inequity in the public health 
system.573  
 
Data exclusivity attracted the most opposition. The former head of the Instituto de Salud 
Pública (ISP), the governmental body in charge of quality control of medicines and vaccines, 
the grant of marketing approval for new products, medicines audits, and disease surveillance, 
                                                   
568 Ignacio Gillmore Valenzuela and José Santos Ossa Rogat, ‘Protección y Exclusividad de Datos de Prueba de Productos 
Farmacéuticos en Chile’ (2017) 77 Revista de Derecho Económico 3-30, 9;  
569 Eduardo Frei, Mensaje Presidencial Ley Nº 19.996 (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 4 October 1999) 
<https://www.bcn.cl/historiadelaley/nc/historia-de-la-ley/5621/> accessed 1 July 2018 
570 Wael Armouti and Mohammad Nsour, ‘Data Exclusivity for Pharmaceuticals in Free Trade Agreements: Models in Selected 
United States Free Trade Agreements’ (2017) 40 Houston Journal International Law 105, 117 
571 Pedro Roffe, ‘The U.S.-Chile FTA: Intellectual Property Issues’ (2004) 7 ictsd.org 17 
572 Pedro Roffe, Bilateral Agreements and a TRIPS-plus World: the Chile-USA Free Trade Agreement (Quaker International 
Affairs Programme, 2004) 9 
573 Felipe Agüero, ‘El Acuerdo de Libre Comercio Chile-Estados Unidos’ (2005) 61 Colombia Internacional 51, 58 
  105 
Gonzalo Navarrete criticised the provision as being ‘written solely from the economic point of 
view’.574 At this time, numerous stakeholders including generic medicines industry 
associations like ASILFA and RECALCINE lobbied against the U.S. proposal.575 Despite these 
efforts, concessions were made and data exclusivity was included in the final text. Chile’s 
current exclusivity rules dictate that marketing approval for a third party product shall not be 
issued until the end of the exclusivity period and that protection of test data would apply to all 
types of preclinical studies, in vivo or in vitro, and clinical studies at any phase.576 
 
Chile’s application of linkage has for years been a sore point between themselves and the 
United States and is one of the core reasons that Chile is almost an annual feature in the 
USTR’s Special 301 Priority Watch List. The ISP does not presently verify whether a patent is 
still pending when granting market approval to generics. While the Special 301 can scare 
countries into compliance, Chile’s position is that it does not recognise the Special 301.577 
Chile has, however, made efforts to comply with a bill presented to the Congress in 2012.578  
V. Chile in the international IP system 
Chile is more well known in the international IP arena for having progressive views on 
copyright and related rights,579 although in recent times, Chile has taken a number of 
progressive stances on pharmaceutical IP on the international scene.  
 
In 2017, the TRIPS agreement was amended to provide legal certainty that poorer countries 
with zero or limited pharmaceutical production capacity to use flexibilities to access generic 
medications.580 Paulina Nazal, the Director-General of DIRECON, the government body in 
charge of trade negotiations and external economic affairs, celebrated the amendment, 
stating: ‘we join the consensus on the needs of developing countries in public health. In this 
spirit, we had approved this amendment in 2013 because we believe that it reinforces our idea 
that in terms of intellectual property, countries can adopt measures to protect public health of 
the population."581 
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In February of 2018, Chile co-sponsored, together with Brazil, South Africa, Bolivia, and China, 
a document at the WTO TRIPS Council focused on intellectual property and the public interest 
focusing on the Bolar exemption, i.e. a provision to override certain exclusivities so that 
generic companies can begin relying on undisclosed data prior to patent expiration to stimulate 
competition and facilitate quick generics entry.582 In its official submission on the matter, Chile 
emphasised that the bolar exemption allowed protected subject matter to be, among other 
things, manufactured and produced for the purpose of obtaining sanitary registration or 
authorisation, that it was necessary to ‘reduce the time needed to launch generic medicines 
and bring them to market’ and that the bolar exemption was considered part of ‘the balanced 
intellectual property system that the country has sought to implement’.583  
 
Chile has also insisted on human rights provisions being included in their free trade 
agreements (FTAs).584 While these stipulations are largely aspirational and expressed in 
preambles rather than the substantive text, this sends at least a diplomatic message about 
Chile’s approach in trade-related IP and the consolidated of related norms. 585 
VI. Conclusion 
Any number of these political, strategic, and developmental factors could have influenced the 
actions of trade negotiators in the TPP. A higher economic dependence on China versus the 
United States could mean that the trade negotiators were less susceptible to U.S. demands. 
Concerns about increasing medicine prices could have predetermined the position that certain 
TPP IP provisions were ‘red lines’. Recent views expressed in the international IP arena could 
be indicative of an approach acknowledged and accepted across key agencies involved in the 
TPP. A long history of neoliberalism could have made an impression on negotiators in terms 
of their approach to market access concessions, or alternatively, made them realise that 
certain socialist elements may be more prudent in negotiating text. These will be analysed in 
the context of interviews with negotiations presented in Chapter 5 of this thesis.  
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Annex: Chronological History of Economic versus Public Health and IP Developments in Chile 
 
 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS  PUBLIC HEALTH/IP DEVELOPMENTS 
 
 1942 Servicio Medico Nacional de Empleados 
(SERMENA) was established, creating a fund 
for white-collar workers to access health 
services. 
   
 August 1952 The National Health Service (SNS) was created 
via Law N° 10,383, but did not provide universal 
healthcare 
   
The first wave of students (26 individuals) 
were sent to Chicago to study economics 
under Milton Friedman, funded by the United 
States Agency for International Development 
(USAID). A subgroup of these individuals 
became the Chicago Boys.  
1955-1964  
   
   
Salvador Allende was elected President via 
general elections.  
4 September 1970  
   
 31 December 1970 Decision 24 of the Andean Community declared 
a regime on foreign investment, patents, 
trademarks, licensing, and royalties.  
   
The final recommendation of the Chicago 
Boys, dubbed El Ladrillo, was given to Navy 
Admiral José Toribio Merino. 
 
Late August/Early 
September 1973 
 
Chilean coup d’état, resulting in the suicide 
of Salvador Allende and subsequent 
assumption of power by General Augusto 
Pinochet  
11 September 1973  
   
 5 June 1974 Decision 58 of the Andean Community 
establishes regulations for the application of 
intellectual property norms 
   
 3 August 1979 El Fondo Nacional de Salud (FONASA) or 
Chile’s national health fund, was established via 
Decree Law N° 2763 
   
 11 September 1980 New Chilean Constitution was created via 
referendum, explicitly providing for the right to 
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health as a constitutional guarantee, whether 
via the State or private entities. 
   
Chilean banking crisis brought on by radical 
neoliberal reforms, including departure from 
free floating exchange rates. This results in 
massive unemployment levels and the GDP 
falling by 14.3%. 
1982  
   
The Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations 
began 
1986  
   
Chileans voted via plebiscite to end the rule 
of Pinochet’s military government.  
October 1988  
   
Chile’s return to democracy. Elections were 
held, and Patricio Aylwin, a socialist 
democrat from the Concertación coalition 
was elected President. 
December 1989  
   
 1991 Chile joined the Paris Convention. 
   
 1993-1994 The ISAPRE association no longer excludes the 
treatment of certain high-cost diseases from 
their plans.  
   
Ricardo Lagos won the presidential runoff 
election by 51.3% of the vote to become the 
President of Chile.  
January 2000  
   
Chile-U.S. FTA comes into force 1 January 2004  
   
 25 August 2004 The Regime of Explicit Health Guarantees 
(initially known as AUGE) was promulgated via 
Law N° 19,966, specifying the diseases for 
which insurance schemes are mandated to 
provide coverage.  
   
Brunei, Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore 
sign the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic 
Partnership (TPSEP) 
July-August 2005  
   
12 countries, including Chile and Malaysia, 
sign the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement 
4 February 2016  
   
 9 March 2018 The Minister of Health in Resolution 399, 
declared that for public health reasons and due 
to the high cost of sofosbuvir for hepatitis C, that 
a compulsory licence was justified.  
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I. Introduction 
 
Like the previous chapter, this chapter seeks to detail the political, economic, and social 
background of Malaysia with the end objective of elucidating Malaysia’s decision-making on 
intellectual property tradeoffs in the TPP. While Malaysia is an relatively open economy, unlike 
Chile it did not embrace a ideological approach to neoliberalism, but rather pragmatically 
adopted trademark neoliberal policies alongside interventionist policies.586 Malaysian politics 
have also been marked by rhetoric rejecting ‘Western imperialism’ during the first period of 
the leadership of Mahathir Mohamad,587 and similar rhetoric was echoed by civil society during 
the TPP negotiations, who claimed that the TPP was a new form of colonisation.588 During the 
TPP negotiations, however, Malaysia repeatedly emphasised the value of being able to 
access to U.S. markets, particularly for automobile parts and textiles.589 Was tariff reduction 
as pertains the U.S. market perceived to be an adequate tradeoff for accepting more 
intellectual property? Or was Malaysia’s recent experience with a HIV epidemic and overriding 
patents still an overriding factor? The following paragraphs seek to make this clearer.  
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II. Socio-economic development in Malaysia 
 
Similar to Chile, Malaysia’s economy experimented with import substituting industrialisation 
(ISI) efforts.590 For Malaysia, this occurred in the first decade after independence from the 
British in 1957, but through time Malaysia’s policies underwent significant diversification to 
become the export-oriented upper-middle income economy that it is today.591  
 
Malaysia’s domestic economic strategy is characterised along ethnic lines – Malaysia’s 
Economic Planning Unit under the purview of the Prime Minister describes how in the 1970s, 
the bumiputera (ethnic Malays and other indigenous populations) lacked specialised skills and 
managerial capabilities ‘to participate effectively in modern economic sectors’, meanwhile 
Malaysians of Chinese and Indian descent dominated the business sector.592 A New 
Economic Policy (NEP 1970-1990) was launched, and included policies such as building 
industrial communities for ethnic Malays and increasing bumiputera equity shareholding, 
providing housing discounts for ethnic Malays, modernising rural areas, and boosting 
bumiputera participation in the private sector, university enrolment quotas for bumiputera, 
including bumiputera-only educational scholarships.593 While overall poverty reduced, and 
bumiputera equity increased (albeit relatively marginally), bumiputera populations continue to 
be economically marginalised, and this has been attributed to the ‘dependency syndrome’ – 
i.e. the inclination to wait and accept assistance from government.594 Bumiputera policies 
continue to be strong red lines within international trade agreements, including the TPP.  
 
In February of 1982, Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, who is widely acknowledged to be 
the architect of Malaysia’s economic and industrial success, introduced the ‘Look East’ policy 
which established Japan as the model for industrial development and became the cornerstone 
of Malaysia-Japan relations.595 This policy resulted in a drive toward Japanese investment in 
Malaysia and heavy industrialisation. At about the same time, Mahathir596 announced a ‘Buy 
British Last’ campaign – and throughout his rule he presented a very ‘visible and firm stand 
against the kinds of Western manipulations he had always resented’.597 Mahathir also 
dreamed of building massive internationally-recognised conglomerates a la Japan, and from 
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this vision Petronas,598 the multinational oil and gas conglomerate was formed. Japan was not 
the only country in the Far East that became a model for Malaysian industry. Industrialisation 
in Malaysia was driven by the state-owned Heavy Industries Corporation of Malaysia 
(HICOM), modelled after South Korea’s Heavy and Chemical Industries.599 He continued to 
emphasise other policies to advance industrialisation, including fostering close links between 
the financial and industrial sectors.600  
 
Malaysia suffered heavily during the 1997 Asian financial crisis, losing an estimated $60 billion 
in market value from July 1997 to August 1998.601 In September 1998, Malaysia applied capital 
control measures to restrict the free flow of monies in or out of the nation’s capital account – 
which is widely attributed as the cause of Malaysia’s recovery.602  Malaysia’s economy has 
continued to grow through the decades, and has in recent years shown resilience despite 
external shocks. The IMF in its 2018 assessment of the country stated that Malaysia was on-
track toward achieving high income status, but needed to improve female labour force 
participation, improve the regulatory framework for investment, and improve the quality of 
education, among other things.603 
 
While the word ‘neoliberal’ was somewhat a taboo during Mahathir’s administration, a number 
of policies were aligned with the so-called Washington Consensus, which is touted as being 
the primary delivery mechanism of neoliberal hegemony worldwide.604 Measures installed by 
Mahathir included reforms to make the investment regime more attractive for foreign direct 
investment, and the privatisation of services such as power, healthcare services, and water 
supply.605 Thus Khoo comments that Malaysia was ‘systematically interventionist and 
neoliberal’, but selectively so.606 Mahathir also emphasised the importance of free trade to 
Malaysia’s economy, but emphasised economic imperatives as a key objective, rather than 
ideological and political objectives within free trade agreements.607 
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Mahathirism is roundly credited with Malaysia’s economic and social development, although 
the prominent Malaysian economist KS Jomo characterises Mahathir’s economic legacy as a 
‘checkered record of bold experiments, false starts, partial successes, and narrow escapes’ 
and that while the cumulative effect of his policies were ‘not an unmitigated disaster’, 
Malaysia’s development would have been better without multi-billion ringgit losses due to 
speculative activities on the pound sterling, cronyism and expensive projects, and the handling 
of corporate debt.608 
 
According to the United Nations Development Programme, Malaysia is rated as having ‘very 
high human development’ – with high life expectancy, high mean years of schooling, and a 
GNI per capita that has risen from $10,170 PPP in 1990 to $20,443 PPP in 2010 to $26,107 
PPP in 2017.609 Malaysia ranks 62nd out of 160 countries in the Gender Inequality Index, with 
78.9 per cent of adult women having reached at least a secondary level of education compared 
to 81.3 per cent of their male counterparts.610  
 
Malaysia has seen a consistent rise of health expenditure as a percentage of GDP – in 2000 
this figure was 2.43% versus 4% in 2015.611 Malaysia has a heavily subsidised public health 
system, and is ranked 29th in the world for healthcare efficiency i.e. the cost of health care 
relative to incomes, above the UK and Germany.612 It is also reliant on generic medicines, with 
84.7% of brand name medicine requests being substituted with generics.613 Malaysia has used 
TRIPS flexibilities, notably government use licences, to override pharmaceutical patents and 
ensure accessibility to generics. The first of these times was in 2004 when pursuant to 
protracted price negotiations with GlaxoSmithKline and Bristol-Myers Squibb, Malaysia issued 
a government use licence for HIV drugs, reducing prices by up to 81% and enabling Malaysia 
to increase treatment coverage during a concentrated HIV epidemic caused by injecting drug 
use.614 More recently, after similarly lengthy negotiations with pharmaceutical company 
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Gilead, and amidst financial constraints in the health budget, Malaysia issued a government 
use licence for the Hepatitis C drug sofosbuvir.615  
 
III. Malaysia and international trade diplomacy 
 
Malaysia’s first bilateral investment treaty was with the Netherlands, coming into force in 
September 1972, and was primarily aimed at promoting the development of international 
shipping services.616 While it participated in a number of bilateral investment treaties 
subsequent to this, its involvement in the multilateral trading system was more muted. 
Malaysia joined the multilateral trading system in 1957, but for several decades its role in the 
GATT was minimal. The launch of the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations in the mid-1980s, 
however, saw a ‘notable turnaround’ in how Malaysia engaged in the international trade world 
given a realisation of growing importance of export-oriented manufacturing for Malaysia’s 
economy.617 At the Ministerial launching the round in Punta del Este in 1986, the Minister of 
International Trade and Industry, Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah, delivered a speech emphasising 
the support for the Round and the importance of exports to Malaysia’s economy, but notably 
said that ‘rule-making for the international trading system be the imposition of the interests of 
the strong at the expense of the weak’,618 indicating that while their active participation was 
not up to that point prominent, that they had observed machinations of the hegemonic powers 
and were in agreement with other developing countries.  
 
The next Ministerial statement was delivered in 1988 by the new Minister of Trade and 
Industry, the formidable Rafidah Aziz, who stated in no uncertain terms how Malaysia felt 
about the state of play in the negotiations, particularly in regard to negotiations on tropical 
products, stating that: 
 
[T]here still seems to be massive mental blocks in the way of compromise and goodwill. 
We have continually urged the large players to display the necessary flexibility, and to 
not allow narrow parochialism to constitute a barrier to the greater liberalisation of 
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world trade. It appears to me that some players not only ask for too much and offer too 
little, but in effect say too much and do nothing.619 
 
At this stage Malaysia was insistent at the lowering of barriers for agriculture in the short term, 
but when the United States stated that they preferred gradual long-term reforms, Minister 
Rafidah stated ‘we have moved back to square one.’ She also warned of Malaysia’s plans in 
the negotiations: ‘we did not come here to make speeches. We also want to be listened to.’620 
 
Malaysia formed a strong alliance with the other four main ASEAN economies of Singapore, 
Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines in the Uruguay Round market access negotiations, 
and at the Ministerial in Brussels in 1990 issued a paean for developing countries to take 
responsibility for the ‘tragic state of affairs’ in the economies of developing countries and urged 
them to address a lack of leadership in promulgating ‘prudent economic policies’, while urging 
major powers to ‘give and take’ on agriculture.621 
 
At the closing of the Uruguay Round in Marrakesh, Rafidah Aziz lauded the conclusion as an 
‘important milestone in international economic cooperation’, although stating strong opposition 
to the insistence of major economies to include ‘extraneous issues’ such as labour. She also 
noted a tradeoff Malaysia made – that despite already having very high foreign presence in 
the financial services sector, Malaysia liberalised services even further in this area.622  
 
In the late-90s the WTO was gearing up for another round of multilateral negotiations. In the 
lead up to the Seattle Ministerial in 1999, Malaysia gained experience of forming alliances or 
bargaining coalitions, an important tactic in trade negotiations. Instead of supporting launching 
a new round of WTO negotiations, together with other developing countries Malaysia joined 
the Group of 15 (G15), and the Like-Minded Group (LMG) led by India, Pakistan, and Egypt – 
which held the position that there were still implementation concerns resulting from the 
Uruguay Round.623 The G15/LMG submitted detailed proposals that would provide more 
distributive power to the Global South, and were against the inclusion of the so-called 
‘Singapore issues’ on the agenda, including investment rules and transparency in government 
procurements.624 
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Malaysia’s active involvement with developing country issues is further illustrated through the 
Ezulwini Statement, a statement agreed to amongst the Heads of State of Botswana, Lesotho, 
Gambia, Ghana, Malawi, Malaysia, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, South 
Africa, Sudan, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe who met in Swaziland in August 2003 to 
express their concerns about the ‘domination of one group of countries over the others’, stating 
further that rich and powerful countries preferred to act unilaterally and ‘dominate their 
economic partners through one-sided bilateral agreements’.625 The document, presented to 
the WTO by the Malaysian Minister of Foreign Affairs, emphasised:  
 
If the developing world is expected to participate in trade liberalization, developed countries 
must open their own markets fully. Intellectual property rights should not be applied equally 
between countries at different stages of development. Social (health) factors must be given full 
consideration in the application of IPR.626 
 
In an interview for this PhD, that Foreign Minister Syed Hamid Albar spoke about the sentiment 
behind the statement, extolling the virtues of trade as ‘the only way to get ourselves out of 
poverty and improve our standard of living’, but that ‘the playing field was not level’ and was 
‘always in favour of the developed countries’. Albar also spoke about the importance of 
coalition building on the Ezulwini Statement, saying that ‘individually, we don’t (didn’t) have 
the strength’ and that without ‘playing the numbers game, we would continue to be bullied’.627  
 
This marks an important point in assessing Malaysia’s negotiating capacity. The formation of 
coalitions is considered a major variable that influence negotiation processes and outcomes, 
and is one of the tools that can break deadlocks.628 Coalitions of weaker parties bound by a 
common interest are particularly useful in an asymmetrical negotiating relationship, and has 
been seen by example in the Cairns Group in the GATT negotiations, where a middle power 
(Australia) and developing countries such as Colombia, Indonesia, and Malaysia developed 
enough of a collective weight to be considered a ‘third force’ in the GATT negotiations.629  
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Despite the statement against ‘one-sided bilateral agreements’, in the early 2000s, Malaysia 
too had been bitten by the preferential trade agreement bug affecting East Asia.630 Bilaterals 
were a contemporary approach resulting from trends elsewhere, and were seen as not just 
economic tools, but also as mechanisms to foster closer ties. When Abdullah Badawi took 
over as Prime Minister in 2003, he emphasised capitalism with an ‘Islamic flavour’ and sought 
to improve human capital to ensure Malaysia’s competitiveness in the global market through 
projecting Malaysia’s image as peaceful, stable, democratic, and as working actively to 
combat corruption.631 This, Bonn Juego dubbed a ‘thin icing on a largely neoliberal capitalist 
cake’.632 During Badawi’s administration Malaysia’s first bilateral preferential trade 
agreements with Japan (2005) and Pakistan (2007) were signed, and negotiations with New 
Zealand were commenced.  
 
Figure 3: Bilateral Trade Agreements - Malaysia 
Contracting Party Date of Agreement Date of Entry into Force 
Japan 13 December 2005 13 July 2006 
Pakistan 8 November 2007 1 January 2008 
New Zealand 30 May 2009 1 August 2010 
Chile 13 November 2010 25 February 2012 
India 18 February 2011 1 July 2011 
Australia 30 March 2012 1 January 2013 
Turkey 17 April 2014 1 August 2015 
 
At the time the Japan-Malaysia FTA was signed, Japan was one of Malaysia’s top trading 
partners, and this continues to this day.633 Within the Japan-Malaysia FTA were clear 
experiences with tradeoffs in a bilateral deal – Malaysia wanted tariffs eliminated on plywood 
but this was not granted, on the other hand despite Japanese steelmakers opposed market 
opening for steel, the deal provided for phased tariff elimination.634 A number of political 
economy considerations arose before negotiations began – notably the technological 
inferiority of Malaysian car parts and the implications for tariff removal on automobiles.635  
 
Malaysia’s experience in trade negotiations and negotiating tactics were tested in the U.S.-
Malaysia FTA negotiations which commenced in June 2006. Among U.S. demands were tariff 
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cuts for 561 manufactured goods,636 that Malaysia would open up government procurement 
to U.S. bidders, and that Malaysia would adopt data exclusivity in pharmaceutical IP. 
Government procurement was a point of contention from the beginning, with the then-Minister 
of International Trade and Industry signalling that they would only have ‘non-binding’ 
discussions on the matter.637 On intellectual property, U.S. Ambassador LaFleur peddled the 
standard line on pharmaceutical IP – that it would result in increased foreign direct 
investment.638 Malaysia was reluctant to accept U.S. demands to restrict the use of 
compulsory licences, but agreed on a 5 year data exclusivity term for new pharmaceutical 
products, provided that the period run from the same data as given in the origin country.639  
 
IV. U.S.-Malaysian diplomatic relations 
 
U.S.-Malaysian diplomatic relations have been characterised as ‘deeply ambivalent’.640 Both 
are strategically important to each other – Malaysian imports are the 15th highest imports by 
country for the United States,641 and Malaysia is key to the United States for both the 
geopolitical interests of restraining China’s influence, and furthering economic interests in the 
region.642 Recent years have also seen strong gains in Malaysia-U.S. trade due to increasing 
U.S. demand for manufactured goods.643 Malaysia has been the recipient of U.S. foreign aid, 
but this is constrained to military education and anti-terrorism support in marginal and reducing 
amounts over time,644 so by and large diplomatic relations between the two are untethered to 
foreign aid.  
 
Political stances on the Middle East and opinions coming out of the 1997 Asian financial crisis 
saw the worst of bilateral tensions between Malaysia and the United States – Prime Minister 
Mahathir Mohamad attributed the crisis to stock market manipulations by George Soros, a key 
ally of the Clintons, whereas the Clinton administration (1996-2000) attributed the crisis to the 
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lack of transparency in business dealings, cronyism, and structural weaknesses in Asian 
economies.645 Relations worsened even further when Mahathir sacked his deputy, Anwar 
Ibrahim, over allegations of corruption and sodomy, in 1998. When Anwar was convicted of 
sodomy, the U.S. Department of State issued a statement that the judgment ‘cast serious 
doubt on the impartiality and independence of the Malaysian judiciary’.646 In addition to these 
tensions, the United States’ pro-Israel stance and Mahathir’s anti-Semitic comments became 
a sticking point which led to Mahathir being ‘personally rebuked’ by George W Bush in 2003.647  
 
When negotiations for the Malaysia-U.S. FTA commenced in 2006, the new Prime Minister 
Abdullah Badawi emphasised the economic importance of the United States to Malaysia, but 
a myriad of tensions continued to arise. These tensions were multipronged and arose in 
relation to trade and non-trade issues. Tensions about the war in Iraq and Palestine continued 
to arise.648 Malaysia experienced U.S. hegemony in these negotiations on intellectual property 
matters, transparency in government procurement, and Malaysia’s affirmative action policies. 
During the trade negotiations, a number of political and ideological conflicts threatened to 
derail the negotiations. These included disagreements about the war in Iraq, the U.S. 
approach to Palestine, and a particular deal between Malaysia and Iran to help develop Iranian 
gas fields. This deal resulted in significant conflict, with the then-Chairman of the House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs calling the deal ‘abhorrent’, and sending a letter to the U.S. 
Trade Representative asking for the suspension of the U.S.-Malaysia FTA negotiations until 
the Iranian deal was called off. 649  
 
Malaysia responded strongly: 
Malaysia reiterates that the FTA negotiations cannot be held hostage to any political demand, 
and cannot be conducted under such threats. Malaysia is also ready to suspend negotiations 
if the situation warrants it.650 
Negotiations broke down in 2008 amidst numerous disagreements. The 2008 U.S. elections 
and a reassessment of U.S. needs are widely attributed as the main cause of why this 
agreement did not come to fruition. Statements by Deputy Prime Minister Najib Razak, 
however, hinted as to disagreements and the power imbalance inherent in any negotiation 
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with the United States: "I hope they (the US) will see that what the world actually needs is not 
more assistance but a free trade regime that is fair and just," he said.651  
 
A turning point in Malaysia-U.S. relations arose out of the September 11 tragedy. Amid an 
outpouring of sympathy from ordinary Malaysians, Mahathir phoned the U.S. embassy in 
Kuala Lumpur the moment he found out with condolences, and arranged for increased security 
at the U.S. embassy. 652 This was followed by George W Bush phoning Mahathir to thank him 
for his anti-terrorism efforts, and U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly dubbing 
Malaysia ‘a beacon of stability’ in the region, a moment which Sodhy calls ‘a significant shift 
in U.S. policy towards Malaysia’.653 
 
The TPP was negotiated during the administrations of Najib Razak (2009-2018) and Barack 
Obama (2009-2017). The Obama administration saw Malaysia-U.S. relations grow even 
warmer. The TPP negotiations provided both Prime Minister Najib Razak and President 
Obama the opportunity to liaise on multiple occasions and build a closeness unprecedented 
in Malaysian history, and each time emphasising economic cooperation and the TPP. In 2011, 
the second year of TPP negotiation, the two met in the sidelines of the ASEAN Summit in Bali 
and emphasised the expansion of trade and investment linkages. Obama emphasised the 
strong bilateral relationship between the two and commended Najib’s ‘great leadership’ in 
boosting the economy.654 
 
In 2014, the two were spotted golfing at a Marine Corps Golf Course in Hawaii. Criticised for 
ignoring flash floods occurring in Malaysia, Najib emphasised that the golf session was in 
order to ‘establish diplomatic ties.’655 The two met again in Kuala Lumpur in 2015, the first visit 
to Malaysia by a U.S. leader in over 50 years, to discuss the TPP. In a joint press conference, 
Najib sang the TPP’s praises – that it would increase trade and investment, and that it would 
ensure that ‘TPP countries (are) able to create more wealth, more innovation, and set new 
standards in terms of things like environment and labour’.656 In his comments, Obama noted 
that bilateral relations had strengthened on a number of fronts, trade being a significant 
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factor, but also counterterrorism and maritime disputes in the South China Sea, a major 
source of dispute between the U.S. and China.657  
 
The U.S. Trade Representative, Michael Froman, too made a number of TRIPS to Malaysia 
toward the end of the negotiations, and in a forum held in Kuala Lumpur in May 2015 
emphasised how the TPP was aligned with Malaysia’s own objectives:  
For a country like Malaysia, there is much to be gained… particularly in helping Malaysia 
achieve what it has set out to do on its own for its objectives to become an advanced country 
by 2020, to grow its per capita income to a significantly higher income, and that’s why it’s been 
so important to have Malaysia as a founding member of the TPP. To be sitting at the table 
helping to shape the rules of the road for this region.658 
The pally relationship of the two countries rendered little doubt that Malaysia would sign the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership. The rhetoric had shifted – this period saw little to no mention of 
the litany of United States military actions or their pro-Israel stance, and from the United 
States, with the exception of recommendations in Malaysia’s 2013 Universal Periodic 
Review, there was reduced commentary on human rights violations committed in Malaysia. 
On many points of view in the TPP, at least outwardly, there seemed to be an alignment of 
values. Per Zaki Laïdi, ‘trade liberalisation in a globalised world no longer refers simply to 
competition between economies, but between social systems.’659 In the situation where there 
was ostensible alignment, and perhaps a certain desperation to be associated and engaged 
with the United States, would more tradeoffs be made? 
 
V. Malaysia and trade-related IP 
 
While many factors influence tradeoffs, Malaysia’s historical relationship with trade-related IP, 
particularly as regards pharmaceuticals, may have influenced Malaysia’s approach to IP 
negotiations in the TPP. Malaysia is a net importer of intellectual property, with foreign patent 
holders accounting for more than 80% of annual patent applications.660 Domestic patent 
registration too has remained stable, at the average rate of 1267 applications per year since 
2009.661  
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Malaysian patent law today is governed by the Patents Act 1983, which came into effect in 
1986. Prior to 1986, Malaysia’s patent system operated based on patents that were registered 
in the United Kingdom.662 The undue cost and burden of applying for patents in the UK was 
seen as prohibitive for Malaysian inventors and small industries by the then-Minister of 
International Trade and Industry, Mahathir Mohamad, who prompted the idea of a more 
cohesive domestic patent law.663 In the background to this, the United States had placed 
significant pressure on the Malaysian government to enact the 1983 Act, including threatening 
revocation of Malaysia’s Generalised System of Preferences duty-free status.664 At that time, 
the U.S. Trade Representative had also had contact with the Malaysian government in other 
fields of intellectual property, notably on copyright matters. Uphoff notes that the Malaysian 
government was ‘very responsive’ to American requests, and began taking on the language 
of intellectual property for innovation and foreign investment.665 In the lead up to the 1983 
Patent Law, WIPO, together with consultants from Sweden and the United States, sent a 
delegation to Malaysia to provide advice to the government.666 The result was a patent law 
which was essentially a WIPO/United States template. Reforms resulting from this Patent Act 
saw Malaysia removed from the USTR’s Special 301 Watchlist in 1991.667 
 
On 23 June 1988, Malaysia deposited its instruments of accession to the Paris Convention for 
the Protection of Industrial Property, a Convention which enables patent holders to use their 
first filing dates as effective filing dates in other contracting states,668 and establishes 
guidelines for national patent legislation.669 Upon its formal accession to the Convention in 
October 1990, Malaysia implemented a series of reforms to facilitate the recognition of patents 
granted in certain major patent offices, including those of the United States and the European 
Patent Office. These reforms meant that patents granted in these offices could forego 
substantive patent examination.670 
 
It is unclear what Malaysia’s role had been in the efforts to reform the Paris Convention in the 
mid-70s through to mid-80s. These reforms were centred around the idea that, among others, 
                                                   
662 Lim Heng Gee, ‘Patent Ownership in Malaysia – a Comparative Legal Analysis of the Patents Act 1983’ (PhD thesis, Queen 
Mary 1996)  
663 ibid 52 
664 Dylan A MacLeod, ‘U.S. Trade Pressure and the Developing Intellectual Property Law of Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia’ 
(1992) 26 University of British Columbia Law Review 343-374, 364 
665 Elisabeth Uphoff, Intellectual Property and US Relations with Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand 
 (Cornell University Press 2018) 22 
666 Lim (n 662) 52 
667 MacLeod (n 664) 370 
668 WIPO (World Intellectual Property Organization), Paris Notification No. 120: Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial 
Property: Accession by Malaysia (24 June 1988) <https://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/notifications/paris/treatyparis120.html> 
accessed 20 January 2019 
669 Sell (n 12) 108  
670 Lim Heng Gee, Ida Madieha Azmi and Rokiah Alavi, ‘Reforms towards Intellectual Property-Based Economic Development 
in Malaysia’ (2009) 12(4) The Journal of World Intellectual Property 317-337, 326 
  122 
that patents were restrictive to technology transfer from the North to South and that their main 
function was to assist profit maximisation for multinationals,671 and was led by India and the 
Andean Group of Countries. A key proposed reform was Article 5(A) which would provide for 
the issuance of ‘non-voluntary’ licences672  – an instrument which Malaysia has used a number 
of times since then. Malaysia is not present in the any of the documentation of the WIPO 
diplomatic conferences for the revision of the Paris Convention in Nairobi in 1981673 – 
signalling that her role was muted, or that IP awareness only arose beyond this date.  
 
MacLeod noted in a 1992 article that Malaysia generally responds to U.S. pressure more 
readily compared to its northern neighbour Thailand, likely due to its dependent trade 
relationship with the U.S.674 This experience with the United States prepared Malaysian 
negotiators for the upcoming TRIPS negotiations in 1994, with Judge Umi Kalthum Majid, 
Malaysia’s lead TRIPS negotiator noting in a 2015 account of her experiences that Malaysia 
had been under immense pressure from the United States to enter to bilateral agreements on 
IP, and as a result she had made observations to the Malaysian government on the impact of 
trade-related IP, particularly on issues on sovereignty vis-à-vis the United States.675 Majid was 
also made aware of developed country strategies, including drawing out negotiations into the 
early morning, wearing opponents down so that they would agree to anything – and Majid was 
determined not to horse-trade Malaysia’s positions.676 Despite being told internally that 
Malaysia would not have the ability to make a difference to the negotiations, Malaysia 
continued to play a strong role in pushing through exceptions and protections.677  
 
In an interview conducted for this PhD, however, while Majid confirmed that the U.S. had made 
threats  towards Malaysian companies in the event of non-compliance, and that she ‘fought 
tooth and nail against the American position on the TRIPS agreement’, she acknowledged 
that she bore full responsibility of negotiating for Malaysia, with zero support from IP 
academics or experts.678 This was despite an Intellectual Property Division having been 
established under the Ministry of Domestic Trade in October 1990.679  
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Leading up to the TRIPS negotiations, in October of 1993, Sak Cheng Lum, the then-Senator 
and Parliamentary Secretary of the Ministry of Domestic Trade and Consumer Affairs, stated 
in Hansard that the demands encapsulated under the upcoming TRIPS agreement would 
‘almost totally’ be met if Malaysia adhered to the Paris Convention.680 The next time TRIPS 
was mentioned in Parliament it would be in July of 1996, with Sak’s successor Tan Chai Ho 
mentioning it in the context of the newly enacted Industrial Designs Act as ‘creating jobs’ and 
‘facilitating technology transfer’.681  
 
Along with other developing countries, Malaysia was required to make amendments within 
domestic law by 1 January 2000. These manifested in the Patents (Amendment) Act 2000, 
which incorporated, among other TRIPS provisions, the 20-year patent term.682 In the 
meantime, in the mid-90s the HIV epidemic had exploded in Malaysia with an estimated 7000 
new infections annually.683 By the early 2000s, the situation budget-wise was untenable given 
the scale of the epidemic and the cost of the patented medicines. After protracted negotiations, 
in November 2002 the Malaysian government issued a government use licence, a form of 
TRIPS flexibilities, to override patents on several key HIV drugs.684 As a result, Malaysia could 
procure generic drugs at the cost of US$45 monthly versus US$261 monthly per patient.685 
While this was not specifically cited for Malaysia’s inclusion in the USTRs Special 301 Priority 
Watch Lists (PWL), described elsewhere in this thesis as the USTRs IP ‘naughty list’, Malaysia 
faced heavy intimidation from the United States for the issuance of this licence.686 It should be 
noted, however, that despite this intimidation, Malaysia issued another compulsory licence in 
2016 to override the patent for sofosbuvir, a hepatitis C drug. This too attracted threat and 
intimidation tactics, including meetings between the originator pharmaceutical company and 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs at the World Economic Forum in Davos in 2017, follow-up 
meetings at the Malaysian Embassy in Washington, D.C., and a flurry of letters between the 
USTR and the Malaysian government.687  
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In 2005, the United States was gearing up for bilateral trade negotiations with Malaysia. That 
year, their Special 301 report made their intentions clear on data exclusivity for 
pharmaceuticals and patent linkage: 
Malaysia has enacted neither protection for confidential test data nor a coordination mechanism 
between the health authorities and patent office to prevent unauthorized registrations of patent-
infringing products. The United States will work with Malaysia to make progress on these 
pressing IPR issues through the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) 
discussions, and we hope to see continued progress from the Government of Malaysia in the 
near future.688  
In a 2006 roundtable between representatives of the Malaysian and U.S. governments, 
preparing them for the upcoming FTA negotiations, Malaysia was given a clear picture of U.S. 
expectations: that the United States expected that the FTA provisions would reflect a standard 
of protection similar to U.S. law and that Malaysia would provide ‘strong protection for new 
and emerging technologies.’689 Also in 2006, Malaysia signed an FTA incorporating intellectual 
property measures, including a provision that a patent was not to be rejected solely on the 
basis that the subject matter was a microorganism, provisions on ‘unfair competition’, and the 
formation of a Subcommittee on Intellectual Property to monitor enforcement of IP under the 
agreement, among other matters.690 At least one Malaysian official underwent a research 
fellowship at WIPO sponsored by the Japanese government on the harmonisation of IP 
systems that year.691  
In March 2006, negotiations began on the U.S.-Malaysia FTA692 and as expected, the U.S. 
demanded that Malaysia accept both data exclusivity and patent linkage, and restrict the ability 
for Malaysia to issue future compulsory licences. As discussed above in Section III of this 
Chapter, negotiations broke down in 2008, and thus Malaysia did not enact data exclusivity 
laws at that time. The U.S. Government continued to work closely with Malaysia, funding a 
training program for 23 Malaysian officials conducted by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO) in 2008.693  
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The U.S. was dogged in its pursuit of data exclusivity in Malaysian law. In 2010, Malaysia was 
once again put on the US Trade Representative’s Special 301 Priority Watch List for failing to 
include data exclusivity in its laws. Malaysia was also quizzed on its failure to adopt data 
exclusivity at the 2010 WTO Trade Policy Review – where Malaysia assured Member States 
that it intended to implement test data protection but that it simply had not decided the 
mechanism for doing so.694 
One year after being including in the PWL, Malaysia adopted and implemented data 
exclusivity for pharmaceuticals via a government directive.695 In 2012, Malaysia was removed 
off the PWL, and US Trade Representative Ron Kirk in his Special 301 Report specifically 
mentioned data exclusivity as one of the key reasons for removing Malaysia off the PWL.696 
Malaysia’s experience with U.S. modus operandi as concerns maximalist IP and the Special 
301 shows a certain deference to this type of ‘aggressive unilateralism’.697 This is contrasted 
with Chile which ‘does not recognise the validity of the 301 List’.698 
Aside from its issuances of compulsory licenses, Malaysia does not often lead discussions on 
pharmaceutical IP at multilateral fora. At the WTO TRIPS Council, which monitors application 
of the TRIPS agreement and relevant flexibilities, Malaysia’s presence is generally muted. Its 
most recent intervention pertained to complaints that countries have violated the spirit of trade 
law, and Malaysia voted together with other developing countries in supporting a continued 
moratorium of the rule being applied to intellectual property, and stated that its position was 
‘well-known’.699 The U.S.-based nonprofit Knowledge Ecology International commented on 
this provision as representing ‘a stealth attack on WTO members’ sovereign right to use TRIPS 
flexibilities such as compulsory licensing to safeguard health and promote access to 
medicines for all’.700 
 
The Malaysian negotiation team was led by J Jayasiri, a negotiator of 35 years’ experience in 
government and with a background in Southeast Asian studies, and who was a negotiator for 
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Malaysia in the Uruguay Round as well as numerous multilateral and bilateral trade 
negotiations. While there is no documented evidence of Jayasiri’s approach going into the 
negotiations as pertains to intellectual property specifically, he stated that he went into the 
negotiations with a ‘tight mandate’, understanding that government procurement and 
affirmative action policies would be negotiated, and that he went into the negotiations ‘with the 
knowledge that we can negotiate flexibilities so that we will have sufficient policy space to 
continue with some of these very sensitive policy issues’.701 In the same presentation he 
emphasised the importance of access to the preferential markets of the U.S., Canada, Peru 
and Mexico, and that ‘those who join the club later will always have to pay a higher price,’702 
indicating at least that the political imperative was that market access was the ultimate aim 
and the costs of not joining were larger than incidental costs of other deep integration 
provisions.   
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
This chapter suggests a certain uncomfortable familiarity with U.S. demands on intellectual 
property – but one that could’ve possibly influenced how Malaysia approached demands on 
biologics IP in the TPP. It also shows, however, that Malaysia’s Health Ministry views 
compulsory licenses as essential tools for access to medicines – and the first round of 
intimidation from the United States did not deter them from issuing a second compulsory 
license in 2016. Whether these views were communicated to trade negotiators, and whether 
they were meaningfully integrated into country positions will be discussed further in the 
following chapter.  
 
Malaysia lacked the historical ideological endorsement of neoliberal trade policies central to 
Chile – whether by political leaders or the general public. In Chapter 3 of this thesis we saw 
the then-President of Chile Eduardo Frei issue a presidential message on the occasion of the 
incorporation of TRIPS measures, extolling the measures as necessary for competitiveness, 
productivity, and the prevention of trade distortions.703 Also in the same chapter, the redesign 
of Chile’s economy by postgraduates educated under Milton Friedman, the guru of modern 
economic neoliberalism, was described as being the foundation of Chile’s economic approach 
beginning from the Pinochet regime.  
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This did not mean that Malaysia rejected neoliberal or U.S. policies outright, despite generally 
having a relationship of distrust towards neocolonialism via legislation. As aforementioned, in 
the early 90s politicians representing the Ministry of Domestic Trade, while not at the level of 
a head of state, too extolled the virtues of the TRIPS agreement. Given that the Malaysian 
TRIPS negotiator stated that she did not receive any technical support on IP, it may be that 
while the early 90s was not where comprehensive IP awareness came about, it could have 
been its origin.  
 
The 2000s saw negotiations of bilateral FTAs with Japan and the United States, both of which 
contained IP provisions not previously existing in Malaysian law. Malaysia’s ‘Look East’ 
policies, as well as opposition to U.S. insistence on government procurement transparency in 
the FTA, combined with critique of U.S. policies in the Middle East, saw the Japan FTA signed 
and the U.S. FTA floundering and unfinished. Considering Malaysia’s role in the Ezulwini 
Statement in GATT negotiations, Malaysia’s experiences of asymmetry in negotiations 
occurred both in bilateral and multilateral negotiations. So while in terms of absolute numbers 
of signed trade agreements compared to Chile, these experiences could have increased 
Malaysia’s negotiating capacity and negotiating efficiency when it came to the TPP. The 2000s 
also saw Malaysian IP officials undergo training with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Offices, 
and training with WIPO funded by Japan, while at the same time, a HIV epidemic saw Malaysia 
issuing government use licenses and withstanding expected U.S. pressure. This changed 
beginning 2012 onwards, with Malaysia crumbling under the pressure of being included in the 
Priority Watch List, a blossoming friendship between President Obama and Prime Minister 
Najib, and respected neoliberal thinktanks defending longer patent terms as having ‘no 
negative impact’.704  
 
The non-conclusion of a U.S. FTA rendered Malaysia keen to access U.S. markets in the TPP. 
Examining these political economic factors in light of Malaysia’s keenness towards accessing 
U.S. markets for a number of key commodities in the TPP will be a key focus in the following 
Chapter. In considering political economy tradeoffs, it is important to consider what 
frameworks, precedents,705 or red lines negotiators were given entering the negotiations and 
how these were modified over time.  
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These make for an interesting dynamic – divergent domestic interests, experience of power 
asymmetries in trade, political prioritisation of public health despite external pressures, 
fragmented and late-developing IP awareness, a historical distrust of the United States and 
this morphing into an endearment of the United States and some of its policies by certain 
sectors in more recent years, complemented by the target of U.S. market access, are some 
of the key political economic factors that will be analysed in considering tradeoffs in the 
conclusion to this thesis.  
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I. Introduction: negotiation theory and relevancy to political economy 
tradeoffs  
 
In the process of considering binding commitments on the international stage, it is imperative 
that the decision and the associated tradeoffs be ‘sustainable in light of the dynamic incentives 
that the country faces vis-à-vis its trading partners as well as its domestic agents’.706 In other 
words, were the concessions ‘worth it’. In Chapter 1 of this thesis I drew upon Putnam’s game 
theory707 to understand the machinations at Level I (international negotiations) and Level II 
(discussions with domestic stakeholders) to help understand how the negotiators in the TPP 
arrived at tradeoffs, or indeed whether they made any tradeoffs at all vis-à-vis biologics. This 
                                                   
706 Conconi and Perroni (n 169) 615 
707 Putnam (n 298) 434 
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requires a consideration of what both Malaysia and Chile, and indeed the United States, would 
have considered ‘win-sets’, and what tradeoffs were impediments to those win-sets. For 
example, a Malaysian win-set could include the minimum number of years of market 
exclusivity on biologics, transparency in government procurement (discussed further below), 
and market access to the United States. Political scientist Holger Janusch drew on Putnam, 
and said that the smaller the win-set, the more credibly governments can refer to their tied 
hands at Level II to receive more concessions at Level I.708 
 
Thinking about political economy tradeoffs or concessions involves understanding the 
character of the negotiations themselves, negotiating objectives in the pre-negotiation 
environment, the experience or negotiating capacity of the parties involved, power and 
resource asymmetries, and whether concessions were made in the aftermath of deadlocks. 
Game theory alone cannot adequately explain these occurrences. Throughout this chapter, I 
contextualise my findings with a number of other theories, summarised in the following 
paragraphs.  
 
Understanding what Chile, Malaysia, and the United States considered win-sets requires a 
consideration of what they expected as they approached the negotiations from a political 
economy standpoint, i.e. what gains they expected, what red lines they would not cross, and 
what was negotiable and could be reasonably traded or conceded in return for a major gain. 
A useful consideration at this point would also be to consider whether ‘moral largesse’709 of 
the developed countries, as described by J P Singh, was something that Chile and Malaysia 
would be willing to concede for in exchange for some exclusivity on biologics. In past trade 
agreements many a developing nation has made concessions for ‘moral largesse’, such as 
trade capacity-building assistance or foreign aid, rather than real tariff reductions.710 In the 
case of Malaysia and Chile, upper middle-income countries and arguably more difficult to 
classify as a ‘developing country’ in terms of need for trade assistance, for example, may have 
been offered different kinds of moral largesse – for example perceived credibility gleaned from 
political mileage from being in a plurilateral agreement with the United States. Section II(a) of 
this Chapter unpacks political economy accounts surrounding the TPP in the three countries 
– and from this I extracted key tangible and less-tangible expectations of each country in terms 
of their perceived gains.  
 
                                                   
708 Janusch (n 293) 501  
709 ‘Moral largesse’ generally consists of offers of trade assistance, training, foreign aid, or other items with less direct economic 
ramifications, in contrast with market access concessions or tariff reductions.  
710 J P Singh, ‘Development Objectives and Trade Negotiations: Moralistic Foreign Policy or Negotiated Trade Concessions’ 
(2010) 15 International Negotiation 367-389, 371 
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Also in this Section, we see an illustration of how a country who is less economically 
dependent on the demandeur can afford to give up less concessions. This draws upon 
‘asymmetric interdependence’ theory, where an actor who profits less can be less cooperative 
because the harms of non-cooperation are less, and thus can force greater concessions from 
the opposing side.711 In this case, Chile was not seeking major economic gains for the United 
States due to previously established trade agreements, and thus entered the agreement in a 
strong position. Circumstances where an actor can afford to be less cooperative because they 
profit less increases the likelihood of a country not having to make a tradeoff on a particular 
issue.712 
 
The biologics issue in the TPP saw the creation of a coalition. Coalition theory plays a 
dominant role in asymmetrical plurilateral agreements. The main function of coalitions, as 
Dupont describes, is to ‘facilitate the attainment of outcomes through increased power’.713 
They are also one of the tools to break deadlocks, in addition to, et al, discussions through 
unofficial channels, and ‘shuttle mediation’ i.e. bilateral discussions to define each parties’ 
needs.714 There are a number of factors that determine the success of any particular coalition, 
including the ‘ideological distance’715 of the individual members within the coalition – whether 
they had similar material interests domestically and whether there were positive socialisation 
dynamics716 – and indeed, the roles of those individuals within that coalition, i.e. whether they 
were in a leadership position as ‘drivers’, or ‘benevolent neutrals’ in favour of consensus but 
playing a more passive role in negotiations, or whether they were ‘defenders’ – who have 
focused preoccupations and play a more active role in ensuring the conflict is resolved in 
accordance with their interests.717 The strength or weakness of a coalition could be the 
material difference between multiple tradeoffs for the issue in question or none at all. The 
formation and operation of biologics coalition and its influence on the resulting tradeoffs are 
discussed in detail in Section II(c) of this Chapter. These negotiation theories are seen 
throughout this Chapter and help contextualise the eventual conclusion of what tradeoffs were 
made (Section II(d)) and how these findings can help developing countries. (Section III).  
 
 
                                                   
711 Robert O Keohane and Joseph S Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Little, Brown 1977) 
712 ibid 
713 Dupont (n 628) 49 
714 Harris and Reilly (n 334) 103 
715 Dupont (n 628) 55 
716 Basically, where the individual negotiators got along well. J P Singh, ‘Coalitions, Developing Countries, and International 
Trade: Research Findings and Prospects’ (2006) 11 International Negotiation 499-514, 501 
717 Dupont (n 628) 56-57 
  132 
II. Results from turning points analysis of empirical data and data 
triangulation 
 
In total, I interviewed 15 Chilean individuals, including TPP negotiators and former negotiators, 
government advisers to negotiators, academics, and civil society actors who were actively 
involved with the TPP and had participated in Chile’s cuarto adjunto (‘side room’) mechanism 
for stakeholder engagement. All except 3 were interviewed in person at various office locations 
in Santiago, and others were conducted by Skype and audio-recorded.  
 
There were less interviews with Malaysian individuals – a number of government employees, 
including negotiators, approached for the interviews expressed reluctance to participate. 
When superiors in these governmental departments were approached for approval to 
interview their subordinates who were directly involved in negotiations, they stated that they 
were unable to elaborate on the negotiating strategy of the Malaysian government in FTAs.718 
In total, I interviewed 6 individuals, including a TPP negotiator, one former government official 
who oversaw the TPP negotiations, a former intellectual property negotiator, a former Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, and a civil society actor who attended TPP rounds as a registered 
stakeholder and engaged with Malaysian negotiators.  
 
Due to the paucity in empirical data from Malaysia, data was triangulated with testimonies of 
negotiators in the media and secondary documents such as official TPP side letters and a 
commissioned cost-benefit study. External to Chile and Malaysia, interviews with 2 
international civil society actors who had attended TPP rounds and engaged with negotiators 
were also included in data triangulation.  
 
The difference in openness between the two countries may be explained by literature on 
culture of the civil service and academic institutions in Malaysia. These reveal that while the 
Malaysian civil service is ‘performance-oriented’719, there is a ‘pervasive respect for 
authority’720 and strong bureaucratic culture, and a lack of transparency721. Siddiquee 
comments that there has been ‘very little or no attempt to delegate power at lower levels’722 
and that the civil service has a high vulnerability to political influence.723 External to culture, 
                                                   
718 Email from Alissa Rode, Ministry of International Trade and Industry to author (3 August 2018) 
719 Willy McCourt and Lee Meng Foon, ‘Malaysia as Model: Policy Transferability in an Asian Country’ (2007) 9(2) Public 
Management Review 211-229, 223 
720 Ibid 
721 Chang Da Wan, David W Chapman, Ahmad Nurulazam Zain, Sigrid Hutcheson, Molly Lee, and Ann E Austin, ‘Academic 
Culture in Malaysia: Sources of Satisfaction and Frustration’ (2015) 16 Asia Pacific Education Review 517-526, 523 
722 Noore Alam Siddiquee (ed), Public Management and Governance in Malaysia (Routledge 2013) 16 
723 ibid 44 
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the impressions of international civil society may be relevant; Peter Maybarduk from Public 
Citizen described the Malaysian and Chilean negotiation teams as follows: ‘I did have a sense 
that the Malaysian delegation was a bit more quiet and the Chilean delegation was both 
organised and vocal and came in with a sense of ‘here’s what we’re about’ whereas the 
Malaysian delegation I think came in – I’m not sure what the right word is to describe it, but, 
able to hear various ideas, and work on what they thought was appropriate.’724 
 
This results section begins with a review of media articles, Hansard, press statements by 
negotiators and government officials, and a number of secondary documents to build a 
narrative of government motivations for joining the TPP, and what were the key expectations 
of the United States. This will help illustrate what each party saw as a win-set. Section b) then 
sets out to explain key turning points during the negotiations on biologics exclusivity and how 
negotiators responded to U.S. demands during the TPP negotiations. Their responses to the 
United States not only indicate their positions, but also how strongly they held those positions. 
Section c) describes the key tactics utilised by both the Chilean and Malaysian teams in 
achieving what they saw as a win, and Section d) elaborates whether there were tangible or 
less tangible political economy tradeoffs for the result on biologics exclusivity.  
 
a) Political economy portraits on the TPP: Chile, Malaysia, and the United 
States 
 
Interviewee accounts may help explain political economy outcomes and tradeoffs in these 
negotiations. In the words of Bennett and Edelman, ‘in addition to suggesting an interpretation 
for a social happening, a well-crafted narrative can motivate the belief and action of outsiders 
toward the actors and events caught up in its plot.’725 Depending on how they are crafted, a 
political narrative may or may not represent political reality.726 In the following Subsections I 
attempted to draw out a dominant theme through triangulation of data gained from interviews 
with media articles, congressional statements and Hansards, and a number of other 
secondary documents such as studies commissioned by government agencies negotiating 
the agreement. In the words of Catherine MacKinnon, ‘Dominant narratives are not stories. 
                                                   
724 Interview with Peter Maybarduk, Director, Global Access to Medicines Program, Public Citizen (Marrakech, 16 January 
2018) 
725 W Lance Bennett and Murray Edelman, ‘Homo Narrans/Toward a New Political Narrative’ (1985) 35(4) Journal of 
Communication 156-171; 156 
726 Shaul R Shenhav, ‘Political Narratives and Political Reality’ (2006) 27(3) International Political Science 245-262, 246 
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They are called reality.’727 In the following paragraphs I try to tease out these stories and 
present dominant themes from interviewee accounts.  
 
i) Chile 
 
In an interview for this PhD, Dorotea López Giral, Professor of International Economics and 
Trade Policy at the University of Chile, described Chile’s motivations for joining the TPP as 
more ideological rather than one related to tangible market gains. According to López, ‘Chile 
has some things that they will win with this agreement (such as) in agriculture with Japan, but 
I believe this point is (closer) to which kind of economic model Chile wants the world to have… 
It’s more of a political issue because we already have free trade agreements with all the 
countries that are in the TPP and the commitments are not much more than what we have in 
the free trade agreement with the United States. We see now that the WTO is not going (to 
have) many success stories, and because we believe in free trade, (we’ll join).”728  
 
Felipe Lopeandia, the Chilean Chief Negotiator for the TPP, made similar comments as 
regards established market access deals with all the other TPP countries. He stated, 
“Considering that Chile already has trade agreements with the other eleven TPP member 
countries, the negotiating strategy in this area aimed to advance specific areas and goods in 
certain markets that are important for us.” He emphasised that the objectives on tariff 
preferences for market access were focused on Japan, Malaysia, Vietnam, and Canada, and 
focused predominantly on the agri-food sector.729  
 
Asian integration was a dominant narrative that emerged out of DIRECON, the governments 
trade negotiating authority, as well as the neoliberal think tank Libertad y Desarrollo, who 
stated that not joining the TPP would not just weaken Chile’s positioning in Asia, but also Latin 
America if Mexico and Peru joined but Chile didn’t.730 In a talk at Libertad y Desarrollo in 2015, 
the Director-General of DIRECON echoed these views, emphasising economic integration in 
Asia and that the TPP would improve ties with the region.731  
                                                   
727 Catharine A MacKinnon, ‘Law’s Stories as Reality and Politics’ in Peter Brooks and Paul Gewirtz (eds), Law’s Stories: 
Narrative and Rhetoric in the Law (Yale University Press 1996) 
728 Interview with Dorotea López Giral, Professor of International Economics and Trade Policy, University of Chile (Santiago, 17 
November 2017) 
729 DIRECON, ‘Destacan Ventajas del Acuerdo TPP para las Exportaciones de Bienes en Nueva Reunión del Cuarto Adjunto’ 
Dirección General de Relaciones Económicas Internacionales (15 October 2015) 
<https://www.direcon.gob.cl/2015/10/destacan-ventajas-del-acuerdo-tpp-para-las-exportaciones-de-bienes-en-nueva-reunion-
del-cuarto-adjunto/> accessed 22 March 2019 
730 Francisco Garcés, ‘Chile y La Importancia del Transpacific Partnership’ Libertad y Desarrollo (28 November 2013) < 
https://lyd.org/centro-de-prensa/noticias/2013/11/chile-y-la-importancia-del-transpacific-partnership-tpp/> accessed 23 
February 2019 
731 Andrés Rebolledo, ‘Director de la Direcon expuso sobre la política comercial de Chile en el Asia-Pacífico’ DIRECON (15 
June 2015) < https://www.direcon.gob.cl/2015/06/director-de-la-direcon-analizo-sobre-actuales-escenarios-y-el-desarrollo-
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Meanwhile, civil society began to express concerns about the TPP chapters pertaining to 
pharmaceutical medicines. Rodrigo López Muñoz, Director at Políticas Farmacéuticas, a 
Santiago-based NGO focused on pharmaceutical pricing and access to medicines, expressed 
a number of concerns, including patents for new indications or uses of a medicine, 
transparency provisions that might negatively affect that ability of the state to negotiate price 
reductions in the future, and investment provisions that might enable the pharmaceutical 
industry to sue the Chilean government for perceived breaches.732  
 
There were more varied views and concerns coming out of the Cámara de Diputados 
(Chamber of Deputies), the lower house of Chile’s bicameral Congress. Pressure from civil 
society had by then caught the attention of members of Congress. In 2013, the fourth year of 
TPP negotiations, Congressman Marcelo Diaz, the deputy chairman of the Foreign Relations 
Committee of the Cámara de Diputados, said that the Committee would place special attention 
on TPP Chapters focused on intellectual property, pharmaceutical systems, and regulatory 
sovereignty.733 Diaz also acknowledged concerns from domestic civil society, stating: 
 
What we have done in this Committee is to open a space for dialogue and also for the 
channelling of information from different sectors regarding the TPP and not only from the aspect 
of world economy, but also from civil society actors concerned about what is happening. We 
are very happy with what we have done so far, creating a transmission belt of those concerns 
to open paths between the Executive and the different sectors affected and we will continue to 
monitor the progress of the negotiations.734 
 
Congresswoman Mónica Zalaquett spoke in the same session, making a request that the 
Director-General of DIRECON clarify doubts raised in Congress.735 Civil society continued to 
be very vocal throughout the negotiations. Later than year in November 2013, Francisco Vera 
Hott from the digital rights organisation Derechos Digitales wrote about the implications of the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership in terms of copyright judgments and civil indemnities, emphasising 
                                                   
director-de-la-direcon-analizo-sobre-actuales-escenarios-y-el-desarrollo-de-la-politica-comercial-de-chile-en-el-asia-pacifico/> 
accessed 23 February 2019 
732 Rodrigo López Muñoz, ‘TPP y Los Riesgos en el Acceso a Medicamentos. Más Allá de las Patentes Farmacéuticas’ 
Políticas Farmacéuticas (3 June 2013) <http://www.politicasfarmaceuticas.cl/2013/06/03/tpp-y-los-riesgos-en-el-acceso-a-
medicamentos-mas-alla-de-las-patentes-farmaceuticas/> accessed 3 April 2019 
733 Parlamentarios y El Asia Pacífico, ‘Diputado Marcelo Díaz: "Las Negociaciones del TPP Se Extenderán por Varios Meses 
Más" Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile (4 September 2013) < 
https://www.bcn.cl/observatorio/asiapacifico/noticias/diputado-marcelo-diaz-negociaciones-tpp> accessed 22 March 2019 
734 Ibid 
735 Ibid 
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that these issues ‘should be discussed in an open and participatory manner, with the 
intervention of experts, civil society and in suitable bodies for this, such as our Congress.’736  
 
The association for generic pharmaceutical industry also expressed opposition to provisions 
in the TPP, with José Luis Cárdenas, legal advisor to the Industrial Association of Chilean 
Pharmaceutical Laboratories (Asociación Industrial de Laboratorios Farmacéuticos de Chile 
– ASILFA) stating that the TPP would result in patent extensions and would impede access to 
medicines, and in response to claims that domestic manufacturers would increasingly 
innovate originator drugs and benefit from more patents, "It is not realistic to think that 
developing countries will invest in research and development to produce new molecules.”737 
ASILFA attended numerous negotiation rounds as registered stakeholders. At the Auckland 
round, for example, Cardenas had presented to negotiators on data exclusivity in Chile, and 
attended the Chief Negotiator briefing, primarily to learn about and present ASILFA’s position 
on the rumoured ‘irrational’ new pharmaceuticals proposal that would contain the biologics 
provision.738 In an op-ed dated 24 December 2012, he described the impenetrability of the 
Chief Negotiator briefing to stakeholders (including himself), and how only vague and evasive 
answers were given on the new proposal.739  
 
Through the negotiations, concerns about access to medicines remained ever present, and 
magnified once the U.S. proposal on biologics became public knowledge. In November 2015, 
Congressman Jorge Tarud requested the government clarify what was happening on 
biologics, stating that all he knew was that exclusivity was maintained at 5 years instead of 
twelve years as the United States wanted.740 Tarud went on to express that he wanted more 
information about Chile’s prospective gains from the TPP, which at this point he still thought 
was quite vague.741 From 2015 to present day, the voice of Fundación Equidad, a member of 
the vocal civil society coalition Chile Mejor Sin TPP (Chile Better without TPP) became louder 
on this issue – pressuring the government and Congress on the negative impact of the TPP 
on access to medicines with public rallies and briefing documents detailing their concerns.742 
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The Chair of Fundación Equidad, Tomás Lagomarsino, detailed how his organisation went to 
Congress with the information gained from Wikileaks and got a lot of support for their 
demands. “Most of them (members of Congress) were not sure (about the provisions), and 
said that they were not good. So the Congress put a lot of pressure on the government during 
the negotiations. In fact, there was a special session in Congress where the Foreign Minister, 
Heraldo Muñoz, had to go to Congress to say what they were doing with the TPP… They 
created the cuarto adjunto to make the negotiations look more participative.”743 The cuarto 
adjunto (side rooms) were meetings between negotiators and stakeholders and took place 
after each negotiation round. While Lagomarsino expressed that he thought these meetings 
were simply a tick-the-box exercise, they illustrated the strength and organisation of domestic 
civil society.  
 
Not all Congressional interventions were ones of concern, or requests for clarification on TPP 
provisions. Far-right Congressman José Manuel Edwards lauded the TPP, stating: “[I]t is 
important to belong to the TPP because… not only the benefit that tariffs are lowered for 
several markets, but it is to belong and have a kind of insurance that the rules are going to be 
maintained. For small countries like Chile, in relation to large countries such as Japan, it is a 
very important opportunity ".744 It should be noted here that Edwards is a known pinochetista 
(or supporter of neoliberal ideals a la Pinochet) from a prominent wealthy and conservative 
family,745 and thus his support of the agreement was unsurprising. 
 
The dominant themes, or certainly the ones relevant to biologics and what tradeoffs could be 
made, were centred around Chile’s economic integration in Asia, certain market access gains 
with non-U.S. nations focused on agricultural produce, the impenetrable nature of the 
negotiations, whether to members of Congress or the general public, and the idea that access 
to medicines was a serious issue that was a red line for vocal civil society and domestic 
generic laboratories.   
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ii) Malaysia 
 
The narrative in Malaysia was a little different than Chile in that there was more of a focus on 
market access to the United States given Malaysia not having previous FTAs with the United 
States. Similar to Chile, however, were views that the TPP would threaten sovereignty in terms 
of domestic rulemaking, and that intellectual property provisions would limit access to more 
affordable generic medicines. Opening up government procurement to foreign companies was 
a highly sensitive topic – previous trade negotiations had seen Malaysia establish strong red 
lines on this issue. Due to cronyism and preferential treatment of Bumiputera companies,746 
Malaysia had long been reluctant to opening this sector of the economy to foreign companies 
and to establish transparent bidding processes. This time, however, despite pressures from 
Bumiputera companies, there was an ideological shift among government officials on this 
issue – notably that the TPP was an opportunity to increase transparency. In the words of a 
former government official who oversaw the TPP negotiations: 
 
Yes, Malaysia is in dire need of structural reform. And we’ve been trying to get that kind of 
structural reform from the inside. (It) couldn’t move. And when I want to purchase something 
for the Ministry I have to get it from this five companies. Why can’t we just have an open bidding 
system? The regulations won’t allow me (to). Those are the things that constrain us. And 
because of the lack of transparency in government procurement, you’ve got a lot of nonsense 
that’s taking place.747  
 
In 2010, the year in which negotiations began, the then-Deputy Minister of International Trade 
and Industry Mukhriz Mahathir assured Parliament that government procurement was still in 
the process of negotiation in the TPP and ‘had not become such a big problem’.748 It is 
apparent that there was now a need to balance domestic interests on government 
procurement – on one hand the interests of Bumiputera companies and on the other an 
increasing desire by government officials and academics to see government procurement 
become more ‘predictable, accessible, and transparent’.749 This desire was in line with the 
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interests of the USTR, who in their annual trade summaries of nations had often raised 
concerns about Malaysian government procurement.750  
 
In March 2011, Mukhriz751 faced Parliament again, this time responding to concerns that the 
TPP would threaten the ability of governments to use TRIPS flexibilities for accessing generic 
medicines, stating: 
 
The government will ensure that the FTA will not threaten the rights of the government to 
execute flexibilities that have been allocated under multilateral agreements such as the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) to guarantee 
Malaysian citizens’ access to affordable medicines and health services… The Ministry of Health 
have an existing system of protection to ensure that any negative effects from the application 
of data exclusivity can be minimised.752 
 
Civil society continued pressure on pharmaceutical IP, and continued to remind negotiators 
both foreign and domestic of the importance of the issue on the agenda. At the Auckland round 
of negotiations in December 2012, I (described as ‘a stakeholder from the Malaysian AIDS 
Council’),753 posed a question to the U.S. Chief Negotiator Barbara Weisel whether the U.S. 
would be tabling the new pharmaceuticals text containing biologics. Weisel responded ‘we 
know people are patiently waiting for new pharmaceutical text,’ noting that it was ‘complex, 
controversial and sensitive’, and that USTR would take the time necessary to develop a 
proposal that would have administration and congressional support.754 
 
In July 2013, opposition MPs raised concerns about rulemaking sovereignty, with Member of 
Parliament Wong Chen referring to an internal UNDP report on the TPP and stating in 
Parliament: ‘the American government today is under the undue influence of giant 
corporations, multinationals and internet companies. These giant multinational companies 
lobby and write policies.’755 These arguments were backed by civil society and domestic 
politics bloggers, who claimed the TPP would result in an increase of the ‘substantive rights 
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of the foreign investor’ and that the TPP would ‘strengthen the power of profit-laden 
pharmaceutical companies to challenge a country’s health policies’.756 
 
From 2015 onwards, more positive messaging around the TPP began to emerge – rising from 
the need to address civil society concerns on the agreement. The CEO of IDEAS, the 
Malaysian neoliberal think tank, stated that with the TPP, entrepreneurs would have 
‘immediate access to new markets, and will be able to generate revenues and create jobs.’757 
In May of that year, Obama’s US Trade Representative Michael Froman flew to Malaysia to 
promote the TPP, dissuade fears, and set a narrative of Malaysia as a regional trade 
rulemaker, stating: 
For a country like Malaysia, there is much to be gained… particularly in helping Malaysia 
achieve what it has set out to do on its own for its objectives to become an advanced country 
by 2020, to grow its per capita income to a significantly higher income, and that’s why it’s been 
so important to have Malaysia as a founding member of the TPP. To be sitting at the table 
helping to shape the rules of the road for this region.758 
In December 2015, a study commissioned by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
found that the TPP would result in a higher GDP in the range of USD$107-211 billion, 
additional investments valued between USD$136-239 billion, that Bumiputera flexibilities were 
largely preserved, and that ‘existing pharmaceutical manufacturers’ would be ‘minimally 
impacted by stronger intellectual property for drugs.’759 
 
The Malaysian negotiation team was led by J Jayasiri, a negotiator of 35 years’ experience in 
government and with a background in Southeast Asian studies, and who was a negotiator for 
Malaysia in the Uruguay Round as well as numerous multilateral and bilateral trade 
negotiations. In 2016, Jayasiri emphasised market access in his description of the benefits of 
the TPP, stating, ‘In one single negotiation, we are getting (access to) four new preferential 
markets… and these are important ones like the US, Canada, Mexico and Peru.’760 He also 
emphasised the importance of joining the TPP now rather than later, i.e. that ‘Those who join 
the club later will always have to pay a higher price.’761 He also provided an interesting insight 
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into how Malaysian negotiators approached the negotiations, alluding that Malaysia looked to 
preserving flexibilities on predetermined red (or pink) lines rather than making clear 
concessions on them for market access:  
 
[W]e were going there with a very tight mandate. Even before we went into the negotiations, 
we knew that these are important issues (government procurement, labour, affirmative action 
policies) but the Cabinet made a decision to go into the negotiations with the knowledge that 
we can negotiate flexibilities so that we will have sufficient policy space to continue with some 
of these very sensitive policy issues.”762 
 
The dominant themes were concentrated around what were red lines for the government – 
government procurement and Bumiputera privileges were key sensitive issues, as well as 
access to affordable medicines. Gains for Malaysia were predominantly focused on access to 
markets, and U.S. markets in particular.  
 
iii) United States 
 
As mentioned in previous chapters, the dominant themes in the United States was that the 
TPP was a way to curb China’s influence in the Asia Pacific region and help achieve 
‘necessary security objectives.’763 In the words of Mitt Romney, the TPP would be a ‘dramatic 
geopolitical and economic bulwark against China’764. Ron Kirk, the U.S. Trade Representative 
at the inception of the agreement, called the TPP the ‘largest, most dynamic trade 
collaboration of our time’ and that he expected the TPP ‘to serve as a model for the future of 
American trade.’765 Read with discussions of the ‘deep integration’ character of the TPP in 
Chapter 1 of this thesis, the United States saw the TPP as achieving three major objectives: 
1) the control of China; 2) economic integration via eroding differences in national economic 
policies (‘deep integration’),766 and 3) to establish a new standard for trade agreements 
globally.  
 
On pharmaceutical intellectual property, the United States was guided by the interests of 
American industry, and backed by a formidable group of bipartisan Senators, who in May 2011 
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wrote to the U.S. President Barack Obama stating that strong IP protections, including those 
specific to the biopharmaceutical industry, were necessary for the United States to continue 
being competitive in the global economy and that these were necessary to protect over 19 
million American jobs.767 
 
In July 2013, the CEO of the Washington, D.C.-based Biotechnology Industry Organization 
(BIO) wrote to the USTR describing his ideals for the TPP, including ‘effective legal protections 
for innovative biological pharmaceutical products’, further stating that these would serve as a 
‘robust incentive’ for the research and development of new biologic products.768 Later that 
year, in November 2013 (see timeline in Section II(b) below), at the Salt Lake City round, the 
United States would table the biologics provision asking for 12 years of biologics market 
exclusivity. 
 
In 2015, Barbara Weisel, the U.S. Chief Negotiator, echoed these views before stakeholders 
at the Kota Kinabalu round of negotiations, although couched in the language of ‘balance’: 
 
We are looking for the golden balance on IP. We are thinking about a system that promotes 
generics. Balanced against that is the next generation of drugs. We all share an interest in 
making sure we find that balance. So, we’ll take that time. We have to all come to an agreement 
that satisfies all parties. And it is not an issue of patients versus companies, it is not.769 
[Emphasis added]. 
 
As negotiations progressed and it became increasingly clear that the United States would not 
achieve the 12-year exclusivity period demanded by domestic stakeholders, Senator Orrin 
Hatch in particular doubled down and demanded that the other TPP countries accept the 12-
year biologics provision.770  
 
Public Citizen was one of the strongest domestic civil society voices against the TPP. In 2015, 
for example, it pointed out how the TPP was abandoning philosophies from the previous 
administration to reduce negative effects of U.S. trade policy on global access to medicines, 
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a deal dubbed the ‘May 10 deal’ that had been brokered between House Democrats and the 
George W Bush administration in 2007.771 Non-IP themes coming out from civil society were 
focused on American jobs – namely that the TPP would encourage American job offshoring 
and forgive artificial currency manipulations by East Asian nations.772 
 
b) Key turning points and departures during the negotiation process 
Nineteen formal negotiation rounds were held from 2010-2013, with the final formal round 
occurring in Bandar Sri Begawan, Brunei.773 Subsequent to the conclusion of formal rounds, 
given that there were a number of outstanding issues, including biologics, 23 additional 
meetings consisting of meetings of Chief Negotiators and/or Trade Ministers occurred 
subsequent to the close of the final formal round. Of these additional meetings, the Chief 
Negotiator’s meeting in Atlanta, Georgia in September 2015 finally saw the negotiations come 
to a close.  
Based on interviews conducted with Chilean and Malaysian negotiators, officials, and 
stakeholders, there were four rounds that were of most significance on biologics exclusivity: 
Chicago formal round (September 2011), Salt Lake City Ministerial/Chief Negotiators’ Meeting 
(November 2013), Guam Chief Negotiators’ meeting (May 2015), and Atlanta Chief 
Negotiators’ Meeting (September 2015). Other events, including my own experience at the 
Singapore formal round (March 2013) and footnotes from leaked IP chapters, are also 
included in this section to provide chronological context.  
Figure 4: Timeline on Biologics Exclusivity - TPP and Beyond 
1st Round: Melbourne, Australia 15-19 
March 
2010 
The intellectual property negotiating group 
concluded their first round of discussions on 16 
March 2010. (USTR 2010) Biologics was not 
discussed at this time.  
 
   
8th Round: Chicago, Illinois 6-15 
September 
2011 
The Chilean intellectual property negotiating team was 
first informed of US intentions on 12 years of biologics 
exclusivity. This was done via a presentation – no 
formal text was tabled.  
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15th Round: Auckland, New Zealand 3-12 
December 
2012 
The author attended as a registered stakeholder and in 
the Chief Negotiator briefing directed a question to the 
U.S. Chief Negotiator, Barbara Weisel, about when the 
new pharmaceuticals proposal on biologics would be 
tabled. Weisel responds that the U.S. is still consulting 
internally on the proposal.  
   
18th Round: Bandar Sri Begawan, Brunei 23-30 
August 
2013 
First Wikileaks leak of IP negotiating text contains the 
following ‘placeholder for biologics’: Article QQ.E.20: 
[Placeholder for specific provision applying to 
biologics]. 
   
Experts & Chief Negotiators Meeting:  
Salt Lake City, Utah 
12-24 
November 
2013 
Official language on biologics was tabled.  
   
IP Group Meeting: Ho Chi Minh City May 2014 At this time, the placeholder on biologics in the previous 
leaked document had been replaced with Article 
QQ.E.20 stating that there would be [0] / [5] / [8] / [12] 
years of biologics exclusivity starting from the date of 
marketing approval. Bracketed text indicates that there 
was still a lack of agreement on period of biologics 
exclusivity. (Wikileaks) 
   
Chief Negotiators Meeting: Guam, United States 14-28 May 
2015 
Chilean team of negotiators and government officials 
tried to figure out how to get annexes that would protect 
their access to medicines in the text. The result was a 
window period – that industry would have to market the 
biologic within 12 months of market approval in 
originator country 
   
Chief Negotiators’ Meeting: Atlanta, Georgia 
(Final TPP Talks) 
26-30 
September 
2015 
Biologics deadlock in final TPP talks. Australia leads 
alliance on biologics versus the U.S. into the early 
hours of the morning.  
   
Date of final IP chapter leaked by wikileaks 
(Consolidated text, clean) 
5 October 
2015 
Final text states that the biologics exclusivity term was 
8 years or 5 years with other measures that deliver a 
‘comparable market outcome’.  
   
U.S. withdrawal from TPP  24 
January 
2017 
U.S. President Donald Trump pulls out of the TPP, 
allowing the remaining 11 countries to suspend key 
provisions, including biologics exclusivity.  
   
Signing of CPTPP 8 March 
2018 
Repackaged TPP dubbed the Comprehensive and 
Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) signed 
without biologics exclusivity 
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Repackaged NAFTA includes 
biologics exclusivity 
 
30 
November 
2018 
U.S., Canada, and Mexico sign the repackaged NAFTA 
(dubbed USMCA), including a 10-year biologics 
exclusivity term. 
 
 
From this, key departures are extracted and condensed as shown in Crump and Druckman774: 
 
Figure 5: Departures on Biologics Exclusivity - the TPP and Beyond 
D#1 TPP negotiations begin in Melbourne, Australia March 2010 
D#2 U.S. negotiators present that they intend to table 12 years 
of biologics exclusivity (Chicago round) 
September 2011 
D#3 Deadlock and extended delay – U.S. consults with 
domestic stakeholders 
September 2011 – November 2013 
D#4 U.S. tables official text on biologics, maintaining 12 years 
of exclusivity (Salt Lake City round), resulting in further 
deadlock and extended delay 
November 2013 
D#5 Text amended with proposals for [0] / [5] / [8] / [12] years of 
biologics exclusivity (Ho Chi Minh round) 
May 2014 
D#6 Chile negotiates an annex to incorporate safeguards, in 
anticipation of final text containing 5 or 8 years of biologics 
exclusivity (Guam round) 
May 2015 
D#7 Atlanta deadlock – brief stalemate  September 2015 
D#8 U.S. exits TPP January 2017 
D#9 Biologics provision suspended from repackaged TPP 
(CPTPP) 
November 2017 
D#10 10 years biologics exclusivity included in repackaged 
NAFTA (USMCA)  
September 2018 
According to a Chilean former negotiator, it was in the Chicago formal round of negotiations 
in September 2011 that the United States first informed intellectual property negotiators from 
all of the eleven TPP countries of their intentions to table “the gift”775 - a pharmaceutical 
proposal that included 12 years of exclusivity for biologic drugs. This occurred in the format of 
a presentation of content, and a first draft of language was circulated as hard copies. Open 
discussion on the text did not occur at this time.  
Chile responded to this with outrage. They had made clear that they would not go beyond their 
current FTA with the United States, and felt blindsided. In the words of a former TPP 
negotiator, “(It was a) big shock for everybody. When we received this document, we were 
very disappointed. We had a very big argument with the U.S. Privately, we said (to them) ‘this 
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was not what we thought was going to come. We always told you we could not accept (this).’ 
We never thought it would be over (and above) any other FTAs (we had).”  
This was a key turning point that changed the logic of the negotiations on biologics. The 
language in this quote – ‘shock’, ‘disappointed’, ‘big argument’ among others – show that what 
occurred was an ‘emotional punctuation transition’, i.e. was an abrupt transition characterised 
by strong emotion, and requires adjustments to the logic guiding the negotiations.776 In other 
words, it was in Chicago that negotiators were confronted by information that required a 
paradigm shift and deeper strategy to improve their BATNA (Best Alternative to a Negotiated 
Agreement).  
Malaysia responded differently to the 12-year biologics announcement. According to their 
negotiator: 
I wasn’t surprised… [Y]ou must understand, Congress gave them the mandate to negotiate. 
And if you look at the Congressional reports, the mandate to the USTR is to negotiate an IP 
standard that reflects the standards contained in US IP laws.777  
This difference in reaction to the announcement on biologics is interesting for a number of 
reasons, especially given that at the end of the negotiations Chile and Malaysia were both 
similarly adamant that they would not go beyond the 5-year period contained in domestic law, 
suggesting the manner in which they reacted initially was immaterial to their red lines. One 
could argue that there was a knowledge differential here, that Malaysia knew how the United 
States seeks to replicate domestic IP standards in international agreements, and that Chile 
did not, but that argument is flimsy. Chile has an existing FTA with the United States and 
adopted American IP standards within their domestic law from it. They were unlikely to have 
not known how U.S. IP standards work. The difference in reaction may more likely be 
attributable to expectations from a pre-existing relationship or discussions held in the pre-
negotiation stage. The pre-negotiation stage is often used to reach a ‘joint definition’ of 
foreseeable problems,778 and Chile may simply have felt that the United States misread or 
ignored their joint definition. It may have been due to perceived closeness and assurances 
from previous discussions, or alternatively Chile may simply have been worn out from previous 
hegemonic behaviour from the United States in the U.S.-Chile FTA.  
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Alternatively, the difference in reaction could’ve simply been cultural. In a study among 
negotiators of different nationalities, the Latin Americans and the Spanish ranked themselves 
as high in emotionalism during negotiations, whereas the Chinese ranked themselves as 
having moderate levels of emotionalism, and the Japanese ranked themselves as having low 
levels of emotionalism at the negotiating table.779 Chile and Malaysia may both have 
understood that the United States would table 12 years of biologics exclusivity, and that they 
were not willing to agree to this, but due to cultural reasons, Chilean negotiators reacted with 
more emotionalism.  
It was also at the Chicago round that the USTR established a strategic initiative called the 
TEAM (or Trade Enhancing Access to Medicines), which interestingly did not mention 
biologics exclusivity, but instead included proposals for ‘access windows’ to bring innovator 
products to markets quicker, to eliminate tariff barriers for medicines, and to reaffirm 
commitment to TRIPS.780  
In March 2013, in Singapore, as was customary, a Chief Negotiators’ briefing was held with 
registered stakeholders, including me in my capacity as then-Head of Policy for the Malaysian 
AIDS Council. I asked the U.S. Chief Negotiator, Barbara Weisel, about the status of the 
pharmaceuticals proposal (containing biologics), and whether they would be tabling it soon. 
She responded that the proposal was ‘still under discussion’.781 This question was followed by 
a question from a colleague from the Breast Cancer Welfare Association, a Malaysian NGO, 
who expressed concern about the 12 years of exclusivity for biologics and similarly asked 
when it would be tabled. Weisel once again said that a decision had not been made on the 
tabling, but crucially, said that had received feedback from other negotiating countries and 
that the U.S. was considering that feedback.782 A leak of the IP chapter dated August 2013 
showed that at that time, there was still no text on biologics, but rather merely a ‘placeholder 
on biologics.’783  
In that same month, Burhan Irwan Cheong, the lead IP negotiator for the Malaysian TPP 
negotiating team, told participants in a consultation meeting that the intellectual property 
chapter “is one of the largest and more complex chapters and we have a lot of catching up to 
do to reach a state of consensus in the negotiations, compared with other sections in the 
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agreement.”784 There was little dispute as to the validity of the leaked text, as some noted that 
the Malaysian Copyright (Amendment) Act 2012 had been amended in line with proposals in 
the TPP text.785 
Later that year in Salt Lake City (November 2013), the official language on biologics exclusivity 
was tabled, maintaining a demand for 12 years. Public Citizen, the U.S.-based consumer 
rights NGO, were present at this round, and informed negotiators and government officials 
that the Obama administration themselves did not want 12 years exclusivity domestically.786  
In October 2014, there was a second leak of the IP chapter, dated 16 May 2014 (Ho Chi Minh 
round). The placeholder on biologics in the previous leaked document had been replaced with 
Article QQ.E.20 stating that there would be [0] / [5] / [8] / [12] years of biologics exclusivity 
starting from the date of marketing approval. (Wikileaks 2014) The bracketed text indicates 
that in Ho Chi Minh, negotiators were still undecided on the number of years to be included. 
However, the U.S. had already at that time made clear that they would not have accepted 0 
or 5 years.787 The U.S., Canada, and Japan also proposed specific definitions for ‘biologics’, 
whereas other countries preferred that biologics be defined according to national law. 
(Wikileaks 2014: 64 footnote 231) 
On 27 October 2014, the Malaysian Ministry of Health submitted its official position to the 
Malaysian IP negotiators.788 This internal document stated that ‘with respect to US’s proposal 
to provide (data exclusivity) for biologics for 12 years’ that the MOH would provide a maximum 
protection period of 5 years similar to other pharmaceutical products, but with 5 conditions or 
safeguard measures, including that the application for exclusivity should be made within 18 
months from the date of protection granted from the country of origin, that the duration of 
exclusivity would run from the date of protection granted in the country of origin, that no 
exclusivity would be granted for changes in dosage or strength of the product, but could be 
granted for a second indication, and that the right to compulsory licences would not be 
affected.789  
In Guam (May 2015), deliberations were held on biologics, and the Chilean team of negotiators 
and government officials tried to figure out how to get annexes that would protect their access 
to medicines in the text. The result of this was Annex 18-B, which among other things, states 
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that data exclusivity shall not apply where the application for registration or health 
authorisation is filed in Chile 12 months or more after the first registration of health 
authorisation has been obtained abroad. (Law No. 19.039 on Industrial Property 2007) What 
this means is that no exclusivity for biologics would be provided if the registration of the 
biologic product in question in Chile was later than 12 months. This ‘window period’ provision 
was supported by several other negotiating countries, and negotiations on it continued at the 
Atlanta Chief Negotiators’ meeting in September 2015.  
Biologics discussions were fraught with disagreements, continuing through to 4am.790 There 
were two reasons for this: that the coalition of countries did not want to go beyond 5 years of 
biologics exclusivity and the U.S. was steadfast on 8 years,791 and that the coalition wanted 
the window period incorporated into the main text, as opposed to having it as an annex:  
Our goal was to have that kind of rule in the main text of the agreement. Not as a footnote or in 
an annex. But since the U.S. was opposed to that, strongly. In the end we had to agree with 
having the rule in the annex. The Chief Negotiator fought hard. This was decided by the last 
round. We tried to include this in the main text for a long period of meetings, a number of 
meetings. It was a struggle. At the end, this was the result, we worked until very late at night to 
finish the negotiations. The agreement was only reached in Atlanta. (interview, government 
official) 
At the end of the negotiations, Malaysia was the only other country that obtained an annex 
containing a ‘window period’. Coalitions can often result in a positive force for countries to 
think about their best alternatives to a negotiated agreement (BATNA), and allows each 
member to take coalition-members perspectives.792 In this case, it may be argued that the 
United States had already indicated via the TEAM initiative793 that they were open to 
incorporating window periods. Was accepting a U.S.-proposed provision on window periods 
a tradeoff of accepting biologics-specific language? This is discussed further in Section II(d) 
below. 
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c) Upper middle-income country bargaining power and reliance on a 
‘common precedent’ 
The TPP involved one main rule-setter, the United States, and twelve rule-takers of differing 
development status, from middle powers such as Australia and Canada, to emerging 
economies like Vietnam.794 The United States held ‘formal power’ as the rule-setter and main 
source of draft text, and has significant technical and economic resources.795 Other countries 
have less of these resources, resulting in resource asymmetry.796 The introduction of the novel 
issue of biologics may have increased this resource and power asymmetry further due to 
several facts. Novelty means that many countries, including those in the TPP, have yet to 
develop biosimilar regulatory pathways. While these countries procure and use biologic drugs, 
even within Health Ministries there is a lack of economic modelling on how reliance on 
biologics will impact future health budgets vis-à-vis increasing health burdens. Only in 2018, 
some years after the conclusion of TPP negotiations, did the World Health Organization 
release a report examining prices of cancer drugs (all biologic).797 That is to say, outside the 
pharmaceutical industry, medical associations and some international medical charities in the 
developed world, there was a deficit of knowledge on novel market changes and impacts vis-
à-vis biologics. 
In considering resource asymmetry and power dynamics, the perceptions of external 
stakeholders of negotiating teams and individuals may be relevant. Mentioned elsewhere in 
this Chapter is the impressions of Peter Maybarduk, that the Chileans were ‘organised and 
vocal’ and had clear priorities, whereas the Malaysian team were ‘able to hear different 
ideas’.798 Burcu Kilic, also from Public Citizen, corroborated this view in a separate interview 
for this PhD:  
(The Chileans) were very proactive – they seemed to be really interested in the topic and (in) 
understanding how (the) patent system is connected to innovation and how it applied to 
developing countries… (The Malaysian negotiators) were very approachable but they were still 
trying to figure out their priorities and learn the topic.799 
Relevant also to bargaining power and resource asymmetries versus the United States is the 
extent to which domestic subject matter experts – whether from other governmental agencies 
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or external to government – were on hand to advise negotiators. Chilean Ministry of Health 
officials reported travelling frequently to negotiation rounds, and receiving financial support 
from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to attend:  
We have seen other countries. In Chile, we presented always as a team… DIRECON always 
demanded the presence of Chile, of the Ministry of Health at all the rounds. Even if I could not 
get financing from (Ministry of) Health, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs took it to the Minister and 
told them that I was not able to go to the negotiations (without financing). DIRECON always 
told me that health was above everything, was the (one of the) reddest lines and was taken into 
account at all the negotiation rounds. I was at the Utah round, the Hawaii round, in Atlanta, 
New York, at the majority of rounds. We always went as a team, and we always heard the 
health position.800  
As aforementioned, the Malaysian Ministry of Health provided a written opinion on biologics 
intellectual property, detailing a 5-year position, that the duration of exclusivity would run from 
the date of protection granted in the country of origin, and that the right to compulsory licenses 
should not be affected, among other details.801 This document did not reflect material technical 
asymmetry on the subject matter in question. However, the Malaysian Ministry of Health did 
not present as frequently as their Chilean counterparts at negotiation rounds, nor were they 
as engaged with domestic civil society: 
They were never at our discussions. So I don’t think they were (as involved), unless (meetings) 
were privately held and we were never told. When we (Breast Cancer Welfare Association) 
were discussing other things with the Ministry of Health, we did bring it up and we were always 
told that the Ministry of International Trade was dealing with it, so it looked like there was 
segregation, watching their own respective territories and not looking at a greater 
perspective.802 
Apparent is a difference between Chile and Malaysia in their approach to trans-governmental 
relations in the TPP – but whether this resulted in a reduction of bargaining power requires 
more unpacking. While it is evident that comparatively, Chile had predetermined positions, 
consultative and institutionalised intra-government relationships, and as discussed above, 
established market access deals with the United States and trade reliance on China, and 
therefore inevitably being in a stronger bargaining position than Malaysia, a similar conclusion 
cannot be easily drawn on resource asymmetry. A weaker consultative relationship with 
domestic experts in Malaysia may have been counterbalanced with technical cooperation 
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between negotiators, and unit level learning made by the negotiator based on these 
discussions or on policy research, indicators that were not gleaned from interviews. 
Responding to a question on biologics concessions, the Malaysian negotiator discussed how 
countries without existing U.S. bilateral FTAs were in more difficult bargaining positions 
compared to those who had: 
Some countries don’t have (U.S.) FTAs, like Malaysia, Brunei, Vietnam, for example. Vietnam, 
they have the first-generation FTA but that was before TRIPS, so those countries that do not 
have the recent FTAs have other issues as well. Because other countries that have already 
signed a modern bilateral FTA like Australia, Singapore, they were comfortable – they were 
more focused on biologics because they already went through mud – they already went through 
the sticky points of their domestic issues when they signed the bilateral FTA with the U.S. So 
New Zealand, Malaysia, Brunei, Vietnam, we had problems, we had other problems, not only 
on biologics. For example, on bumiputera rights, extending copyright terms from 50 to 70 years 
which is a big concession I guess for everyone, including Japan as well, Japan and Canada. 
So, countries that do not have bilaterals have other pressure issues (sic), other equally sensitive 
issues (other than) biologics. So that is why, considering Australia had the common standards 
that these 4-5 other countries that do not have bilateral FTAs with the U.S., they were 
comfortable to let Australia drive the discussions on biologics to make sure that the standards 
in the TPP is five years. 
In this quote the Malaysian negotiator demonstrates capacity on the significance of existing 
U.S. FTAs before entering TPP negotiations, in terms of so-called ‘sticky issues’ that could 
have resulted in larger concessions. This realization – that Malaysia was in a more difficult 
negotiating position compared to those countries who had previously discussed – would have 
presumably resulted in a greater incentive for unit-level learning and engagement with experts 
to minimise tradeoffs. Based on Putnam’s game theory,803 negotiators often refer to domestic 
stakeholders in explaining why their hands are tied on concessions during international 
negotiations, and relying on and consulting with a wide range of experts could potentially have 
reduced any resource asymmetry, and increased Malaysia’s bargaining power. However, 
given the particular nature of Malaysia’s bureaucracy and ‘pervasive respect for authority’804 
discussed in Section II above, it may have been the case that the Malaysian trade negotiators 
preferred to rely on expertise internal to the Trade Ministries. McKeown’s thoughts on 
hierarchical control may be relevant here – that some governments ‘are vulnerable to 
asymmetries in effective hierarchical control when they are not highly institutionalized and 
depend heavily on personal relations to manage the government. A lack of resources can 
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exacerbate these problems, but even relatively poor governments can have highly effective 
hierarchical control.’805  
The quote also alludes to the common standards shared by a number of TPP countries – i.e. 
data exclusivity periods of 5 years, and how Australia was chosen to drive the negotiations to 
apply these to negotiations on biologics exclusivity. This phenomenon, i.e. the reliance on a 
‘common precedent’ combined with effective coalition building, is what I argue to be a key 
precipitant of why both Chile and Malaysia did not have to make significant political economy 
tradeoffs on biologics.  
To understand the overall character and outcome of the negotiations, and the precipitants and 
departures which influenced tradeoffs, if any, the turning points analysis was utilised to 
analyse interviews and information from secondary documents. This methodology allows us 
to practically map the crucial moments during the negotiations and consider what factors spur 
progress beyond a stalemate, including if there were any concessions and what tactics were 
employed to avoid concessions.806 In this particular case study, a proposal was tabled on a 
novel product (biologics), with an extension of duration compared to what negotiating 
countries already had in domestic legislation for non-biologic drugs. The United States wanted 
12 years exclusivity, and a coalition of 10 countries including Chile and Malaysia, and led by 
Australia, negotiated this down to the ambiguous provision of 5 or 8 years, but one that would 
be interpreted either way and satisfied the coalition’s initial red line of 5 years contained in 
domestic law. Given that the initial preferences of Chile, Malaysia, and other countries in 
coalition, were reflected in the final text, this is arguably effective negotiation.807 But what led 
to this effectiveness, as mapped out by the turning points analysis, was a result of the effective 
utilization of several tools to move away from deadlock and towards resolution. These tools 
included reliance on precedent, effective-coalition building, and unit-level learning from 
international NGOs. Throughout the negotiations, as shown in Figures 5 and 6 below, these 
tools and or how they were used were categorised as ‘precipitants’ for departures.  
Precipitants are defined as ‘factors inside or outside the negotiation that trigger change or 
departure’, and they consist of decisions made to change the structure or format of the talks 
(procedural precipitant), new ideas or concepts introduced by one or more of the parties 
(substantive precipitant), and events that occur outside the talks, including policy and 
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leadership changes and third-party interventions (external precipitant).808 The most prominent 
precipitants of the departures listed in Table 1 above were the reliance on precedent, effective 
coalition-building, and unit-level learning from international NGOs.  
 
On one hand, the United States sought to establish a precedent, a ‘gold standard’ to be the 
norm in terms of biologics IP worldwide.809 One the other hand, several countries including 
Chile had data exclusivity provisions in their laws of 5 years duration, albeit not specific on 
biologics. For a couple of countries, these provisions had arisen as a result of U.S. intervention 
and/or pressure; Chile via the U.S.-Chile FTA and for Malaysia via being included in the 
Special 301 Priority Watch List, i.e. the United States ‘naughty list’ for violators of their IP 
standards. It was in Chicago that U.S. negotiators first informed the other TPP countries of 
their intentions to possibly incorporate 12 years of biologics exclusivity within the agreement. 
Crump and Druckman’s process model810 explaining how deadlocks occur is helpful to clarify 
what happened at the Chicago round – and illustrates that reliance on precedent i.e. a 
substantive precipitant – resulted in the deadlock: 
 
Figure 5: Process Model - Chicago Biologics Deadlock 
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Weinhardt’s socially constructed ideas on mechanisms that can delay cooperation help 
explain the deadlocks that occurred.811 U.S. negotiators were aware that Chile would not go 
beyond what was included in their previous FTA and they would rely on their precedent. 
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However, according to Weinhardt’s choice-range disjuncture mechanism, actors mistakenly 
assume there is a common understanding of the normatively acceptable ‘moves’ in a game, 
and in this case, the United States perceived tabling 12 years of biologics exclusivity to be a 
legitimate move, most likely based on the views of their domestic stakeholders, i.e. the 
pharmaceutical industry. On the other hand, as shown by Chile’s strong reaction to the tabling, 
suggests that consistent with Weinhardt’s theory, Chile interpreted this as illegitimate. 
According to Weinhardt, this ‘produces resistance based on negative feelings of unfair 
treatment’, which in turn yields understanding on why Chile demanded to know the rationale 
for a specific period of 12-years, their coalitional diplomacy, their reliance on NGO data, and 
efforts to include safeguards in the text.812 Malaysia on the other hand, based their reaction 
on knowledge of previous FTAs, and not only saw the tabling of 12 years of legitimate, but 
also predictable.  
 
In a bilateral negotiation between parties of asymmetrical power relations, the United States 
could have arguably been able to use more leverage to establish the precedent they wanted 
given the restricted power of individual negotiating countries and poor BATNA relative to the 
United States.813 In a plurilateral negotiation with asymmetrical power relations, while the 
United States remained the rule-setter, the fact that a number of countries were relying on 
precedent, enabled Chile and Malaysia to use other tools to increase their leverage. This 
common precedent gained legitimacy and clout through coalition-building.  
Impasses or stalemates can happen because negotiators are relying on established norms 
within domestic law or previous negotiations – i.e. some form of precedent that they have been 
instructed to not make concessions on.814 Referring to historical precedent confers upon the 
negotiator ‘legitimacy and authority’, and provides clarity to the opposing side of strategic 
considerations.815 Relying on a precedent can be very powerful, particularly where multiple 
parties in a multilateral agreement have precedent on the same issue. In the case of biologics 
– Chile, Malaysia, and Australia, among other countries, had a precedent of 5 years of data 
exclusivity, and thus were able to form a coalition with other countries that did not want to see 
12 years biologics exclusivity (e.g. Canada) and countries that did not yet have data exclusivity 
domestically (e.g. Vietnam). The strong coalition combined with a reliance on a ‘common 
precedent’ arguably reduced the possibility of needing to make tangible tradeoffs.  
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The role of a strong coalition against 12 years on biologics was imperative in obtaining a 
reduced duration of exclusivity and ‘softer’ or more ambiguous language on biologics. This is 
consistent with Singh’s observation that effective coalition building was especially important 
when services was introduced into GATT, and at that time had never been addressed before 
in a trade context.816 The case study at hand, Chile, Malaysia, and other countries with a 
common position versus the United States in the TPP, is a typical example of approaching a 
deadlock in an asymmetrical negotiating relationship. Coalitions of weaker parties bound by a 
common interest are particularly useful in an asymmetrical negotiating relationship, and has 
been seen by example in the Cairns Group in the GATT negotiations, where a middle power 
(Australia) and developing countries such as Colombia, Indonesia, and Malaysia developed 
enough of a collective weight to be considered a ‘third force’ in the GATT negotiations.817 In 
the TPP, the coalition on biologics saw the United States, as a major power and standard 
setter in this agreement, being unable to apply its power in a straightforward manner.818  
The role of Australia in the biologics coalition is inextricable from any analysis of Chile’s and 
Malaysia’s effectiveness in these negotiations – with Australia playing the role of a leader 
driving the issue negotiations, and Chile, Malaysia, and other TPP countries playing the role 
of defenders.819 Decision-making towards Australia playing a leading role in opposing 
extended exclusivity for biologic drugs was centred around the common precedent and the 
recognition that countries that did not have established deals with the United States would not 
be in the best position to go head-to-head with the United States on biologics: 
[C]onsidering Australia had the common standards that these 4-5 other countries that do not 
have bilateral FTAs with the U.S., (countries) were comfortable to let Australia drive the 
discussions on biologics to make sure that the standards in the TPP is five years.820 
A relevant question perhaps for future research is the role of ‘ideological distance’ in the 
effectiveness of this coalition – Australia’s defence of its Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme in 
other trade agreements, Chile establishing the Ricarte Soto Law in response to expensive 
(biologic) treatments, and Malaysia issuing government use licences to override patents and 
obtain generics, or a general approach to health as a human/constitutional right – i.e. to what 
degree did domestic challenges to health funding, affect ease of coalition building? Reduced 
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ideological distance has been noted by a number of authors to facilitate coalitions, consensus, 
and dialogue.821  
Effective coalition-building in combination with common precedent was arguably what 
precipitated the deadlock at the Atlanta round, and meant that the United States was not able 
to secure the number of years of exclusivity that they wanted at that point of time (8 years) 
and concede for the ambiguous 5- or 8-years provision. The following process model 
illustrates:  
Figure 7: Process Model - Atlanta Biologics Deadlock 
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External precipitants (such as a state policy or interventions of third parties) were also clearly 
observable in, for example, Public Citizen’s discovery and advocacy with negotiators on the 
domestic concerns of U.S. government on the duration of biologics exclusivity. In addition to 
relying on information from foreign NGOs such as Public Citizen, a strong coalition of domestic 
NGOs i.e. Chile Mejor Sin TPP campaigning against 12 years of biologics exclusivity provided 
negotiators with a reference point when balancing interests at the TPP negotiations. This is 
an illustration of Putnam’s two-level game theory,822 where domestic groups at one level (Level 
II) pursue their interests by pressuring the government, and at the international level, 
governments seek to satisfy these interests ‘while minimizing the adverse consequences of 
foreign developments’ (Level I). In this case, negotiator positions on the duration of exclusivity 
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overlapped with the interests of the NGOs, which can increase negotiation effectiveness.823  
 
The mapped turning points, departures, and precipitants not only point to Chile having a 
preordained preference – i.e. that they would not go beyond IP precedent in their previous 
FTA, but that as they learnt that the U.S. did not have a rationale for proposing a 12-year 
exclusivity period, and that there was internal disagreement on exclusivity periods, they made 
decisions that would allow them to maximise their utility, i.e. to work towards ambiguous 
wording that would allow them to interpret the provision to their favour and to leverage upon 
common precedent in the laws of other TPP countries.  
 
Chile’s unwavering position, and strength, is also interesting. Far from behaving like a ‘blank 
space’ that was waiting to be filled with Western influence,824 they refused to budge on 
predetermined red lines, and developed a cohesive, coordinated strategy with likeminded 
countries. A deadlock occurred in Atlanta, and in fact at a number of different rounds where 
heated discussions occurred on biologics. This suggests a perception of a symmetrical or near 
symmetrical power status – it matters not whether it was objectively true that the power status 
was the same,825 but rather than Chile perceived itself to be in near-symmetry with the U.S., 
due to previously established trade deals, strong internal capacity on IP, and strong economic 
dependence on China.  
Chile’s strong position on biologics is reflected in their demands for justifications and rationales 
for the 12-year proposal from the United States. The fact that the United States was unable to 
provide a satisfactory answer further buttressed Chile’s decision to reject the 12-year 
proposal. In the words of a former negotiator: 
We also asked for data. We wanted to better understand what was the philosophy of 12 years. 
Did you pick 12 years because that day you thought it was a very interesting number? Or is it 
really because you did some homework that you could convince me that that’s the way it should 
go? And that never did happen in any one round. So we weren’t convinced at all.826  
Nor did Malaysia behave like a blank space, although they recognised that due to other 
countries already having gone through ‘the sticky points of their domestic issues’827 that they 
were in a weaker bargaining position compared to countries who had established FTAs with 
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the United States. While Malaysia appeared more subdued to external actors as discussed 
above, there is no evidence that this occurred at the negotiating table. While Malaysia did not 
mention biologics in the closing press conference after the Atlanta Ministerial (unlike Chile),828 
Malaysia did maintain strong opposition towards a 12-year period of biologics exclusivity as 
initially presented by the United States.  
One of the key external precipitants of the departures was learning from Public Citizen that 
there were proposals in the United States to amend their own law to reduce the 12-year 
exclusivity period to less years. A former negotiator elaborated, “Public Citizen was very 
hardworking in developing a lot of documents that could help negotiators… there were many 
that served us while we were making our decisions on the table.” U.S. domestic disagreements 
about the duration of biologics exclusivity was a key piece of information that influenced the 
decisions of the Chilean negotiators and government officials: “President Obama wanted to 
reduce from (sic) the 12 years. As far as I know there is still some bill in the U.S. Chambers 
about the reduction. It seems that that was the reason why (the biologics proposal) was (came) 
so late in the negotiations.”829  
The economic situation of the state – i.e. its economic reliance on China over the U.S., and 
established market access deals – combined with public health realities on the ground such 
as high out-of-pocket expenditure for pharmaceuticals, and stretched pharmaceuticals 
budget, also may explain Chile’s strong stance against 12 years’ biologics exclusivity. These 
would be categorized as external precipitants according to the turning points analysis.  
The negotiators also benefited from substantive precipitants in the form of internal reports and 
structured analysis from the Ministry of Health. Notably, the report stated that due to the fact 
that there is no price containment or price regulation of pharmaceuticals in Chile, that the 12 
years exclusivity would be harmful for Chilean health. A government official elaborated: “We 
did an analysis that shows that for every year of extension, the financial impact was very high. 
It was a very red line.”830 
Negotiators also stated that learnings from other negotiators were important. They developed 
relationships where it was possible to sit down and share experiences – including on 
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implementation of different IP provisions in-country. Chief Negotiators from other countries 
had also called upon Chilean IP negotiators to explain the impact of certain IP provisions.831 
In Guam, negotiators accepted that they would have to agree to some form of biologics 
exclusivity, and thus worked on ensuring there were safeguards or limitations enshrined in the 
main text. Chile was unable to obtain this in the main text, and instead obtained the ‘window 
period’ safeguard as an annex. U.S. Congressional approval, or ‘certification’, was an 
essential reason cited:  
[The United States] didn’t want any kind of language that would undermine the general 
standard. The usual reason that the U.S. would give is that their stakeholders would withdraw 
support in Congress for the approval of the treaty. And that pharma is a big industry for the 
USTR and for the U.S. Congress and therefore, the discussion was not on a theoretical level. 
It was not about whether we need exceptions and limitations or not, because under U.S. law 
they have a lot of exceptions and limitations in their pharmaceutical sector, but rather about 
how we can maintain support for the agreement when they needed to fulfil all their 
Congressional standards for approval.832 
Aforementioned is the fact that the TEAM initiative833 was open to incorporating window 
periods as a safeguard, and as a U.S.-proposed provision, this may in itself have been a 
tradeoff to accepting an explicit provision on biologics, even if the number of years of 
exclusivity was perceived to be no different to domestic laws, and even if Malaysia and Chile 
perceived the window period to be a gain for their nations. In considering tradeoffs in the next 
Section of this Chapter, it is useful to note the comments of the then-U.S. trade representative 
Michael Froman, that the TPP was the ‘first trade agreement in history to ensure a minimum 
period of protection for biologics and in doing so will help set a regional model’.834 The tradeoffs 
may not have been for tangible goods such as dairy products, but rather the tradeoff may have 
been hinged on a perceived status quo, when in fact the agreement established a powerful 
precedent for the United States to move forward on.  
d) Political economy tradeoffs: results from the turning points analysis 
of empirical data 
 
Mentioned in previous chapters, IP is never negotiated in a silo, but rather in the context of 
other topics, for example market access or perceived technology transfer gains.835 Also 
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discussed in prior chapters and elsewhere in this chapter is the idea that tradeoffs may not be 
explicitly clear as a barter-type situation, for example, the widely publicised situation in the 
TPP with New Zealand’s deal for dairy market access provided a deal on biologics 
exclusivity.836 This less tangible aspect manifests itself as ‘perceived tradeoffs’, as seen in an 
unclassified U.S. Department of Commerce document on Dominica’s perceived shortcomings 
in its application of the TRIPS Agreement: 
 
It could either support the interests of a small group of IPR pirates, or support the interests of 
the free trade zone exporters who could be hurt by trade sanctions if adequate IPR legislation 
is not passed and implemented.837 
 
In that sense, the U.S. as the demandeur of biologics exclusivity, would present to the 
opponent either/or scenarios that would ‘limit the range of alternatives open to the 
opponent’.838 In order, this section will discuss i) wins sought by the United States, Malaysia, 
and Chile; ii) any tangible tradeoffs; and iii) perceived tradeoffs. Firstly, the United States 
sought to win extended exclusivity for biologics. This began with the initial proposal of 12 years 
and eventually culminated in a provision the U.S. interpreted as 8 years. They also sought to 
establish, for the first time in any free trade agreement, explicit reference to biologics 
exclusivity so they could export the standard into other agreements and establish a new 
universally accepted intellectual property norm. Whereas Malaysia and Chile wanted to 
maintain a 5-year period of exclusivity as contained in their domestic laws.  
 
At the Atlanta deadlock there were a number of final attempts by the United States to get 
countries allied on biologics to concede. While there is little granularity on what exactly these 
offers were, it was clear that these had created discomfort among intellectual property 
negotiators, and a resolve to not make any tradeoffs on biologics: 
 
[T]here were a lot of take it or leave it propositions on issues of bilateral importance with the 
U.S. and there were a lot of unhappy people at the end in the IP group… essentially it made 
everyone more determined to hang tough on biologics. [Emphasis added].839 
 
In the closing press conference of the deadlocked Atlanta round, Chile’s Minister for Trade, 
Andrés Rebolledo, stated:  
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(The) biologics issue is – was one of the most sensitive issues in the negotiations, at least in 
the case of Chile.  It was an exhaustive negotiation during the entire process, but also during 
this round.  In the case of Chile, we are very pleased with the final result.  We really think that 
we have a balanced result.  We are going to maintain our internal regulation in data protection, 
and also we are going to keep the regulation we already have in the previous free trade 
agreement.840 [Emphasis added.] 
 
For Chile, therefore, this was a win and there were no particular tradeoffs on biologics, as they 
had interpreted the finalised biologics provision to mean that there was five years exclusivity 
instead of the U.S. perception of 8 years. Furthermore, given established market access deals 
in previous trade agreements with all TPP countries and a strong trade relationship with China, 
unlike New Zealand, Chile did not have a specific market access concession for biologics 
exclusivity in particular.  
 
Malaysia was in a weaker position in terms of market access. According to Malaysia’s Chief 
Negotiator, J Jayasiri, access to US markets (for textiles and the automotive sector),841 good 
governance, the visibility aspect of attracting foreign investment, were seen as key objectives 
and gains from joining the TPP.842 As seen in Section II(a) above, government officials also 
saw the TPP as an opportunity to increase transparency on government procurement and 
address some of the problems of cronyism in government tender systems; problems that were 
difficult to reform solely as a result of domestic initiatives and pressures. Similar motives have 
been documented elsewhere, for example in regard to Mexican negotiators being less 
concerned with market access in the NAFTA, but were rather motivated by the desire to ‘tie 
their own hands’ on domestic reforms.843  
 
At the same time, the recognition of Malaysia’s bumiputera policies, the exemption of halal 
certification from being considered as technical barriers to trade, and safeguarding access to 
medicines were considered key red lines.844 There are a number of questions to consider, 
some within the realm of this thesis and some without. What tradeoffs were perceived to be 
‘worth it’, what Malaysia was not willing to tradeoff, and how it ensured its red lines were 
defended. Basically, in the context of biologics, was the final standard, i.e. 5 or 8 years of 
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exclusivity for biologics, deemed worth it in the name of U.S. market access and tying one’s 
hands on government procurement? 
 
The concluding sentiments on market access were fragmented. At the conclusion of the TPP, 
Jayasiri, the Chief Negotiator, stated that Malaysia obtained ‘most of what it wanted’ out of its 
trading partners.845 Analysis commissioned by MITI found that for textiles, products that met 
the ‘yarn forward’846 rule of origin were ‘likely to be more competitive’ as there would be a 10% 
import duty reduction across all product types, resulting in approximately $46.6 millions of 
savings.847 The report also stated that 87% of total textile exports to Canada would see duty 
elimination under the TPP, but that access to the United States would be compromised by 
preferential zero tariff and no yarn forward rules for non-TPP countries such as Haiti and 
Jordan.848 For automotive components, Malaysia sought a reduction in tariffs into the United 
States, Mexico, and Canada. Analysis found that tariff reduction in this sector would benefit 
component manufacturers, but did not specify whether these tariff reductions were for the 
aforementioned target markets. The report additionally identified potential barriers to entry due 
to differences in standards, to which the U.S. and Canada indicated their interest for technical 
cooperation and capacity building in Malaysia, which could potentially lead to a harmonisation 
of standards.849 
 
This type of capacity building is categorised by Singh as ‘moral largesse’, or in other words 
assurances in lieu of concrete tariff reductions as a way to placate the developing country.850 
It is perhaps due to these considerations that in an interview for this PhD, a Malaysian 
government official who formerly oversaw the talks stated: 
 
Market access was the last bit to be negotiated and at the end it was a shallow agreement 
when it came to market access. But the parties accepted it on condition that we would do better 
in the review process.851  
 
It should be noted that market access gains were not negotiated in the context of biologics a 
la New Zealand. The Malaysian negotiator stated:  
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Because for us there is no way in terms of public policy for us to justify (sic). Which is why you 
will never find, any negotiators from Malaysia that would say, we will give up 8 years, 12 years 
biologics for 100% textile or palm oil exports.852 
 
This means that like Chile, there were no tangible market access tradeoffs for Malaysia. 
However, tradeoffs seem to have manifested themselves differently – for membership of a 
prestigious trade partnership, Malaysia had accepted specific language on biologics (even if 
Malaysia did not consider the provision a material change from existing domestic legislation) 
and a shallow market access deal. The ‘window period’ for companies to register products 
within 18 months was not seen as a tradeoff by negotiators, but instead as an incentive for 
early introduction of products to Malaysia’s market, and in fact was an integral part of 
Malaysia’s domestic legislation. Negotiators further perceived that the window period would 
have technology transfer benefits:  
 
It’s about incentivising new products to Malaysia’s market, while it may be expensive for a few 
years, at least the government will have the data and have the ability to access to data, whether 
the product is safe to be consumed and whether it was really effective for Malaysian people, and 
at the same time you are creating a corridor for cheaper products, cheaper generics to follow 
on, to learn, to reverse engineer it, in a way that can provide competition after the test data 
protection is over.853 
 
In summary, due to established market access deals in previous trade agreements and an 
effective coalition, there were less political economy tradeoffs and no market access tradeoffs 
for biologics for Chile. While Malaysia was in a weaker position than Chile due to no 
established market access deals with the United States, they did not make market access 
tradeoffs. However, while not directly traded off for specific language on biologics, Malaysia 
accepted a substandard market access deal and increased regulations as the price for being 
part of the TPP.  
 
Additionally on political-economic factors that motivated tradeoffs; in Chapter 1 I detailed how 
it would be intriguing to see if negotiators took into account biotechnological development in 
both Chile and Malaysia as a reason to increase monopolies on biologics. This did not come 
through as a significant factor. As above, the negotiators could not justify an increase in 
exclusivity periods based on public policy.  
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III. Summary of Findings  
 
We’ve seen in this Chapter that both Chile and Malaysia perceived that there was no 
difference between the TPP standards and standards contained in their own laws. From a 
United States point of view, however, this agreement was to be, before the Trump exit and the 
modification of the TPP into the CPTPP, the establishing of a new minimum standard on 
exclusivity on biologics in any trade agreement, and of course that that standard was 8 years 
and not 5 years as the other countries claimed.  
 
Secondly, albeit having different reactions to the biologics announcement, both Chile and 
Malaysia ultimately had similar positions – that they would not go beyond existing exclusivity 
periods in their domestic legislation – i.e. a ‘common precedent’. Both were steadfast on their 
positions throughout and did not make any market access tradeoffs specifically for biologics, 
unlike some other TPP countries. Over and above the common precedent – Australia, a middle 
power, was the main driver of discussions around sticking to a 5-year biologics term, and both 
Chile and Malaysia played a ‘defending’ role854 to Australia.  
 
Thirdly, Malaysia was in a weaker economic position as they wanted access to American 
markets, whereas Chile had established market access deals through their previous trade 
agreement with the U.S., and had a stronger trading relationship with China. This may explain 
Malaysia’s more cautious approach to the negotiations – although this may also be due to 
cultural reasons. In any case, Chile came across more explicitly as having a predetermined 
agenda, in contrast to the more cautious and measured approach of Malaysia.  
 
Malaysia also saw the agreement as the key machinery through which transparency in 
government procurement could occur domestically. Chile’s keenness on joining was arguably 
more ideological – they saw the agreement as central to Asia Pacific economic integration 
with Chile. Ultimately, ideological closeness on access to medicines issues – due to 
constrained budgets and drug pricing –in combination with the driving force of Australia and 
reliance on common precedent were cumulatively the main reasons why the keenness to sign 
and ratify the TPP did not result on tradeoffs on biologics. 
 
While no direct market access tradeoffs (e.g. dairy for biologics) occurred for either Chile or 
Malaysia, indirect tradeoffs may have occurred solely by virtue of agreeing to have specific 
biologics language in the text. At least for Malaysia, there were marginal market access gains 
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to the United States, and promises of cooperation, technology transfer, and harmonisation, 
which are less tangible trade gains.  
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
This chapter highlights the approaches of two diverse upper middle-income countries to 
intellectual property demands and potential tradeoffs. Within the conceptual toolbox, it drew 
upon a turning points analysis and negotiation theory to understand whether tradeoffs were 
made and what political economy imperatives underlay those decisions. Within plurilateral 
trade agreements where there is asymmetry, developing nations and emerging markets use 
a multitude of tools to prevent tradeoffs on specific red lines, but success of these interventions 
still is very dependent on the prowess of a middle power.  
 
This is not to undermine the power of reliance on a ‘common precedent’ – this theory 
underpinned and created legitimacy and leverage for Australia to drive discussions at the 
biologics deadlock. Common ideations brought a set of diverse countries, all invested in a 
ratified Trans-Pacific Partnership, together in a coalition against extended exclusivity for 
biologic drugs. It does, however, raise the question of what would have happened had 
Australia not been in the negotiations – would there have been direct tradeoffs for biologics? 
In the following pages, i.e. the final chapter in this thesis, I discuss the role of Australia in the 
ultimate biologics result, and analyse reasons underpinning the findings above.  
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I. Analysis 
 
Findings in the penultimate chapter sought to answer the question: How do upper middle-
income countries strategise for, respond to, engineer, and justify political economy tradeoffs 
to maximalist intellectual property provisions that they may not necessarily agree to? A brief 
summary of the findings shows that there were no direct tangible market access tradeoffs for 
the biologics exclusivity provision, and that this was the result of a number of political economy 
factors, including impossibility of justifying long exclusivities on public health grounds, and 
existing market access deals reducing the need for concessions on intellectual property. As 
to how these upper middle-income countries strategised on biologics intellectual property 
demands – they formed coalitions and relied on common precedent, as well as were strategic 
in allowing a middle power, i.e. Australia, to lead discussions with the United States in 
advancing their common position.  
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The findings are consistent with established literature that coalitions are a key tool for moving 
past an impasse and moving closer to consensus,855 and that binding negotiators’ hands with 
domestic legislation (i.e. common precedent) improves bargaining power and reduces the 
likelihood of significant political economy tradeoffs.856 In that sense relying on Putnam’s two-
game theory to underline my approach made sense – negotiators relied on the domestic 
circumstances to bind their hands at the international stage, and that per Schelling’s 
conjecture this created a notion that these countries had very little negotiation slack, thus had 
more bargaining leverage. However, as results emerged from my analysis, it became clear 
that reliance on these alone did not illustrate the full picture. This analysis fills the gap in the 
initial proposed methodology.  
 
a) How Negotiation Tactics Modify Asymmetry in Negotiations 
 
This thesis involved the United States demanding extended intellectual property exclusivities 
for biologics from negotiating partners with less bargaining leverage. The United States has 
historical regime-making capacity857 and economic, military, and political might. Combined 
with its might in production and in technological know-how, one would say that the United 
States has structural power,858 and therefore are more likely to be able to secure outcomes 
that they want. However a number of authors posit that countries can employ various tactics 
to reduce the power differential. In the words of Pfetsch and Landau:  
 
There is a tendency during the negotiation process by the weaker party to reach functional 
equality in its negotiations with the stronger party… Whereas the stronger wants to play out its 
strength and exploit the asymmetric relationship, the weaker wants to equalise its position and 
negotiate on the basis of symmetry.859 [Emphasis added]. 
This is indicative of the fact that there can be a modification of symmetry/asymmetry as the 
negotiation progresses and upon the adoption of various tools. The strength of ideation on a 
particular red line is known to reduce asymmetry in an agreement.860 For example, in security 
negotiations between a government and rebel groups, while a government may have 
economic might and international legitimacy, ‘the rebels’ intense commitment to their cause 
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as the single defining mission of their existence creates an obvious challenge to the others’ 
straightforward application of its power… and can create a destabilising effect’,861 and this 
situation can ‘modify’ an asymmetrical relationship.  
Throughout this thesis bargaining power or leverage is discussed numerous times and at 
length. But following this notion of common ideation, trade expert Hosuk Lee-Makiyama 
comments that ‘leverage’ isn’t everything and that there are other forms of negotiating 
capacity. In his words, the approach enshrined in the P4 (Brunei, Singapore, Chile, and New 
Zealand, the initiators of the TPP) is to ‘build your leverage on the world stage with your ideas 
and ambitions, rather than your market size. And the world’s biggest economies will come to 
you.’ 862 Undoubtedly this meant that common ideas about market liberalisation and rule 
harmonisation in a geopolitically strategic region attracted large powers such as the United 
States and Japan. But it possibly also enabled the countries who were instigators of the TPP 
to make demands that they wouldn’t have been able to had they not embraced common 
ideologies with the United States in other areas.  
Also raised in the previous chapter that Malaysia was aiming for better access into the U.S. 
market than it at the time had, and Chile had existing market access deals in place with the 
United States, and had become more economically reliant on China versus the United States. 
These relation to the notion of there being asymmetric interdependence, i.e. that Malaysia 
was dependent on the prospective market access offers from the United States and had more 
to lose. The notion of asymmetric interdependence centres around the idea that the actor that 
profits less can be less cooperative.863 Perhaps this was evident in Chile’s clear and open 
rejection of U.S. demands on biologics versus Malaysia’s more muted approach, but this could 
also be rooted in cultural differences – Latin American negotiators are known to react with 
more emotionalism with Asian negotiations generally situated at the other side of the 
spectrum.864 Ultimately the asymmetry in terms of what Malaysia wanted versus what Chile 
did not need (American market access) did not materially affect the results on biologics. The 
modification of the asymmetrical relationship had in this case been materially modified as a 
result of reliance on a common precedent and the coalition led by Australia.  
In other words, while a country may not be economically or militarily on a similar level to the 
opposing side, it can achieve a kind of symmetry for the purposes of the negotiations at hand, 
or ‘functional equality/symmetry’. In the previous chapter, while the United States had the 
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economic leverage to suggest ‘take it or leave it propositions’865 to the other countries, it was 
apparent that common ideation, common precedent, a strong coalition, and perhaps hostilities 
that had arisen during the negotiations, had merely led to Australia, Chile, Malaysia, and most 
other TPP members to strengthen resolve against any tradeoffs. That is to say, in the case of 
biologics and the TPP, functional equality was advanced through the formation of a coalition, 
and having a joint position championed by a middle power or nation closer in economic 
strength (Australia) to the demandeur (United States). 
The modification of asymmetry into a more symmetrical relationship can be contextualised in 
terms of utility. In the words of Pfetsch and Landau, ‘”Good” negotiations between a strong 
and a weak negotiator are characterised by bringing about satisfactory wins to both parties, 
hence symmetric outcomes are measured in terms of utility’.866 The United States did not 
achieve its original goal of 12-years exclusivity for biologics, and this was criticised by some 
pro-pharmaceutical industry Senators.867 An optimistic, or diplomatic, American 
characterisation of the biologics negotiations then emerged. This was evident in the then-U.S. 
Trade Representative’s response to a journalist at the closing press conference of the 
negotiations in Atlanta in November 2015. Carter Dougherty, from International Business 
Times, asked: 
[R]egarding the compromises you’ve reached about biologics – or about patents in 
general:  Would you characterize this as has been an effort to ensure that current diversities in 
national systems of intellectual property can flourish or have you sought to meld something 
supranational in this context?868 
 
Michael Froman, the USTR, responded: 
 
On biologics, as you know, this is one of the most challenging issues in the negotiation.  We’ve 
worked cooperatively with all of our TPP parties – partners to secure a strong and balanced 
outcome that both incentivizes the development of these new lifesaving drugs, while ensuring 
access to these pioneering medicines and their availability.  And this is the first trade agreement 
in history to ensure a minimum period of protection for biologics and in doing so will help set a 
regional model and will create an environment in which through comparable treatment, there 
will be an effective period of protection to encourage both innovation and access.869 [Emphasis 
added.] 
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The minimum standard on biologics, had it remained intact, would’ve been made a 
requirement in all future trade agreements and exported as an intellectual property norm. In 
that sense, the agreement had perceived utility to the United States, albeit greatly diminished 
utility to their original demands. While utility, like the notion of ‘national interest’, is greatly 
ambiguous and subjective,870 in the context of U.S. perceived utility in this thesis it is taken to 
mean the idea of maximalist intellectual property being beneficial to the U.S. economy and the 
financial interests of its moneyed stakeholders, rather than being in the interest of ordinary 
Americans necessarily.  
Back to the notion of utility gained by TPP parties; it was theorised that Congress would’ve 
demanded changes to the 5 or 8-year term at the certification stage of the trade agreement, 
which would’ve increased perceived utility gained by the United States, but due to Trump’s 
withdrawal this never materialised. The greater utility was arguably won by Australia, Chile, 
Malaysia, and the other 7 countries in the biologics coalition – there were interpreting it as 5 
years and not 8 years, and for countries like Australia, Chile, and Malaysia, this means that 
they did not have to enact any modifying legislation. What was modified was the initial situation 
of asymmetry between the United States and Japan, and everyone else.  
b) Changing global philosophy on access to medicines 
The outcome that no material tradeoffs were made in negotiations for intellectual property on 
biologics requires some context. Over decades the international rulemaking scene has seen 
declining hegemony by certain nation states and the rise of the emerging market economies 
in shaping international regimes. Pfetsch and Landau describe how the EU, Turkey, South 
Korea, and other nations of varying developmental levels were strongly opposed to 
liberalisation in agriculture in the Uruguay round, stating that ‘in international economic 
negotiations, the North-South cleavage is not always manifest’.871 Nor is the North-South 
cleavage necessarily manifest in international negotiations outside the strictly economic 
sphere – relevant to this thesis are negotiations on a drug pricing transparency resolution at 
the World Health Assembly in 2019, where Italy, Malaysia, the Russian Federation, South 
Korea, Spain, South Africa, Uganda, Eswatini, and other countries co-sponsored a resolution 
to increasing transparency on drug research and development.872 Another example is the 
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Cairns Group – which some have described as ‘difficult to classify in terms of the traditional 
geopolitical criteria of North, South, East, and West’873, and included countries such as 
Australia, Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand and Uruguay, and represented a united front on 
numerous issues related to agriculture.  
 
The United States, somewhat unexpectedly, supported the WHO resolution, raising general 
questions about a shift in philosophy on drug pricing and access to medicines globally, and 
even manifesting in the diplomatic decisions of nations known to advance policies that are 
engineered to increase profitability of pharmaceutical medicines. To elaborate, high drug 
prices are no longer a developing country problem, with patients having to form buyers’ clubs 
in the United Kingdom to access the cystic fibrosis drug Orkambi,874 patients dying due to 
substitution of originator insulin in the United States,875 and CAR-T cancer therapy for cancers 
being priced at €320,000 per patient in Germany.876 The predominant view is that these high 
prices result from an intellectual property system that enables the lengthening or 
‘evergreening’ of patents and other monopolies, and other forms of patent abuse877 and the 
notion that high drug prices are needed to sustain innovation of future drugs,878 with minority 
views that high prices are due to levies, a lack of direct price controls, import licences that 
discriminate against foreign companies rather than the intellectual property system,879 and the 
industry view that poverty and a lack of health infrastructure is the root cause of a lack of 
access to medicines, rather than high prices.880 
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Concerns about intellectual property as a driver of high prices has long been evident in 
developing country diplomatic discourse.881 Results from this thesis do not show that 
negotiators explicitly and predominantly framed their biologics negotiations from the viewpoint 
of public health imperatives, but rather with the central message that they would not go beyond 
what was in domestic law, and they wanted the United States to justify why extended 
exclusivities were necessary. There is plenty to indicate, however, that their messaging was 
underlined by public health imperatives, or that public health imperatives were somehow 
implicit. Chilean negotiators, from DIRECON,882 for example, made clear to the United States 
from the beginning that they would not go beyond what was in their existing trade agreement 
with the U.S. Advisors within the government agencies stated that:  
 
Our immediate reaction was that we didn’t want to go for it. That we wanted to stay with our 5 
years and not more… we thought that was enough for protecting any kind of pharmaceutical, 
synthetic or biologic. Because that was what we provided internally. So, we didn’t want to go 
beyond the five years.883 
 
We did an analysis that shows that for every year of (biologics exclusivity) extension, the 
financial impact was very high. It was a very red line.884 
 
Whereas Malaysian negotiators said that there was no way to public policy reason to justify 
increasing the duration of exclusivity. While negotiators did not refer to the sea change in how 
global philosophies on drug pricing and access to medicines affected discourse, and more 
likely relied on knowledge on domestic access to medicines concerns, it would be amiss to 
say that these developments didn’t lubricate the process. Civil society representatives, 
including the international humanitarian medical organisation Medécins Sans Frontières, 
access to medicines teams from U.S.-based public interest NGO Public Citizen, and myself 
from the Malaysian HIV charity, the Malaysian AIDS Council, were present at many 
negotiation rounds, presenting consistent messaging and data about access to medicines and 
effects of extended intellectual property globally. Domestic press, including in Australia, 
through the negotiations highlighted threats of the TPP to access to medicines, including to 
the Australian Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme.885 In addition, reviews commissioned by the 
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Australian government found that extension of exclusivity periods for biologic drugs were 
unnecessary, stating that exclusivity ‘appears to have little impact on the levels of 
pharmaceutical investment’.886 These are all indications that the idea of excessive intellectual 
property negatively impacts access to medicines having been accepted by governments as 
somewhat of a norm versus claims only posited by developing nations and/or activists.   
 
c) Where is trade-related intellectual property law going? 
 
As far as biologics IP within trade agreements, at least for the foreseeable future, not far. 
When Trump pulled the United States out of the TPP and the agreement morphed into the 
Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), the remaining 11 
countries agreed to suspend a number of provisions, including that on biologics exclusivity.887 
Because the TPP, and subsequently the CPTPP by default, was intended to be the standard 
setting agreement on biologics exclusivity, when the suspensions were made, it was 
necessary for pharmaceutical industry lobbyists to set their sights on another agreement. This 
opportunity came about when U.S. President Donald Trump announced that he wanted to 
renegotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).888  
 
Rebranded as the USMCA (U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement), at time of writing the deal 
concluded without incorporation of biologics exclusivity, as aforementioned.889 In trying to 
understand the context of why, I interviewed Lori Wallach, the Director and Founder of Global 
Trade Watch, a division of the Washington D.C.-based consumer interest group Public Citizen. 
Significant, she said, was that Nancy Pelosi, who has historically voted for trade agreements 
containing TRIPS-plus provisions, appointed 8 Representatives to be a part of a working group 
charged with negotiating changes with the Trump administration.890 This working group 
included Reps. Rosa DeLauro (D-Connecticut) and Jan Schakowsky (D-Illinois), who have 
been allied with consumer groups on a number of drug pricing issues. According to Wallach: 
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Speaker Pelosi’s appointment of strong consumer allies on the committee to negotiate with the 
administration about changes to the revised deal Trump signed is a big deal, and means that 
there will either be major fixes or no deal with the administration on USMCA.891  
 
On whether biologics was a significant factor in the opposition to the USMCA text as is, 
Wallach explained: 
 
The medicine IP issue and the changes demanded from the Dems are not just (related to) 
biologics, although that is a big issue… Yes, the entire article providing special protections for 
biologics will have to be cut. But the Democrats also are insisting on changes relating to patent 
evergreening and more. The administration has seemed pretty resigned to having to rollback 
the IP chapter in significant ways.892  
 
In a sense this part of the Chapter relates very much to subsection (b) above – drug pricing 
issues in the United States and elsewhere have reached the general public, much due to the 
unrelenting and united focus by congressional Democrats in the past two electoral cycles and 
the persistent work of civil society such as Public Citizen and local activists. As well, district-
by-district political work has changed the House Democrats’ voting positions on trade.893 
Trade-related IP may be doomed – pharmaceutical lobbyists may have to ‘forum shift’894 away 
from trade agreements to advance IP on biologics and therapies of the future like gene 
therapies. Forum shifting has been the traditional route for IP demandeur countries – for 
example when it was too difficult for the United States to advance IP through the WTO, it 
shifted to bilateral and plurilateral trade agreements, or an earlier example where the U.S., 
finding that it was not gaining sufficient mileage on intellectual property maximalisation in 
WIPO in 1986, increased efforts into the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations.895  
 
This created a type of fragmentation which ‘provides powerful states with the opportunity to 
abandon - or threaten to abandon - any given venue for a more sympathetic venue if their 
demands are not met’.896 But these threats vis-à-vis pharmaceutical IP in trade at the moment 
do not have a sympathetic venue, and are unlikely to find one. As Lori Wallach surmises,  
 
I think it will be harder politically for future US administrations to put outrageous meds IP stuff 
into trade agreements… we did focus groups and polls in late 2018 and learned that both Trump 
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and Clinton voters were infuriated to know the revised NAFTA was “rigged by pharma” and 
could lock in high medicine prices. The meds price/pharma giveaways issue was the only one 
that moved people across all political, gender, geographic demographics.897 
 
What this means for political economy tradeoffs for trade-related IP is that developing nations 
and emerging markets can rely on a host of tactics and arguments to not have to make them. 
This does not, however, mean that countries negotiating trade agreements shouldn’t be 
vigilant. New forms of therapies, for example CAR-T, where a patient’s T-cells are modified 
using CRISPR technology to attack their own cancer cells, have numerous patent applications 
being applied for despite legal and scholarly discussion on whether these cells are novel or 
whether in fact they are drugs, rather than methods of medical treatment.898  The 
categorisation of CAR-T as one or the other would potentially restrict the number of patents 
applicable and/or change the shape and form of trade-related IP provisions. Despite a 
persisting lack of clarity on patents and cell/gene therapy, as a presentation from James 
Packard Love at the WIPO Standing Committee on the Law of Patents indicates, there is a 
clear upsurge of the number of patent applications with the term CRISPR in them, i.e. from 
only two applications in 2008 to 1380 applications in 2018.899 The CAR-T market alone is 
predicted to grow to $8 billion worldwide in 2028.900 As described earlier, pharmaceutical or 
medicines IP evolves with the market. But given recent visibility on drug pricing debates, the 
path to further IP will not be easily gained through trade. If patents for these new therapies 
cannot be advanced through trade agreements, and especially so because of the exorbitant 
prices attached to them,901 perhaps what developing countries need to be wary of is adoption 
of IP through ‘harmonisation exercises’, or through technical cooperation agreements. 
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II. Implications and wider contribution 
 
a) The new political economy of pharmaceutical intellectual property law 
 
Previous scholarship on political economy tradeoffs in intellectual property have referred to 
how negotiators balance between the need to provide more intellectual property with the 
intention to stimulate innovation, but having to tradeoff on lower prices of goods and innovation 
downstream,902 and that domestic intellectual property policies are influenced very much by 
international commitments and external pressures, such as membership of the WTO, 
dependence on the United States, or threats from the United States in the form of the Special 
301,903 the latter two which I’ve discussed elsewhere in this thesis. Shadlen, Shrank, and Kurtz 
called this the new international political economy of intellectual property,904 and analyse 
propensity of intellectual property protection using a number of metrics, including a measure 
of R&D scientists per 1,000 inhabitants of the country.905  
 
This thesis identified the negotiators’ own metrics for accepting or not accepting maximalist 
intellectual property on biologics – notably a lack of public policy space to justify concessions 
on IP and Ministry of Health objections to further maximalisation. Underlying this is the 
political-economic explanation that Shadlen et al. refer to above, i.e. the international 
commitments and developments that created an environment where the notion of accepting 
more intellectual property was simply not worth it. These international developments were 
namely the sea change in visibility of drug pricing and access to medicines issues. These 
factors constitute the new international political economy of pharmaceutical intellectual 
property.  
 
In other words, the implication of this is that the United States and other notable demandeurs 
of maximalist trade-related intellectual property such as Japan and the EU can no longer carry 
on as usual trying to establish global minimum standards simply because there are ongoing 
debates at home about pricing and accessibility of these medicines and increasing attention 
on the levels and appropriateness of IP to stimulate innovation. And for developing countries 
and emerging markets, this means that utilising public policy concerns, including drug pricing, 
in avoiding needing to make tradeoffs, are likely to be less encumbered.  
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b) Theoretical contribution on ‘common precedent’ 
 
International relations theorists introduced the notion of negotiators relying on precedent to 
bind their hands at the negotiating table. Defined as ‘past behaviours or events that guide or 
dictate present positions’, examples include Chileans pre-emptively incorporating more lenient 
European standards on financial services, so when up against the United States, they had 
established precedent to show what they would not go beyond.906 There is also the example 
of U.S. navy ships being literally rammed by Soviet ships and pushed into international waters 
as the precursor of a bilateral agreement on interpretation of right of free passage, and this 
being a precedent for how negotiations should be approached with China on similar conflicts 
in the South China Sea.907  
 
Both of these examples of how creating or relying on an established precedent can be used 
as a defence against modified or increased demands on similar issues – but both of these 
examples pertained to bilateral agreements. In plurilateral environments, such as the TPP or 
the TTIP, one party relying on a domestic law or policy will not the similar gravitas that it would 
have in a bilateral agreement. As such, negotiating parties in this type of agreement have to 
undertake research to determine whether there are commonalities with other countries, in the 
hope that they can establish a coalition and add on to the bargaining leverage that a precedent 
can create. In this case, at least five countries – Australia, Malaysia, Chile, New Zealand, and 
Singapore, had 5 years of data exclusivity in domestic laws, policies, or regulations. Especially 
when trying to modify asymmetry as discussed in Subsection I(a) above, realising and 
effectively applying this ‘common precedent’ increases bargaining leverage.  
 
III. Lessons for developing countries 
 
From the above analysis, there are a number of lessons that can be gleaned for developing 
countries. Lessons for developing countries, however, differ depending on the developmental 
levels and socio-political realities. There is some discomfort with the use of the term 
‘developing countries’ – as Georgalakis notes there is broad diversity in income levels in this 
group with countries like Malawi (GNI per capita of $320) and Mexico ($8,610) and ‘ignores 
the multidimensional nature of poverty’908 and indeed these countries are bound to have very 
different economic and political needs in trade. Small and Vulnerable Economies (SVEs) such 
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as Guatemala and Cuba909 are have differing needs, capacity, and approaches to political 
economy tradeoffs and face ‘structural barriers to participating in global trade on the same 
terms’910 different to those that middle powers, or even non-BRICS emerging markets such as 
Chile and Malaysia, face. For the purposes of this thesis, I focus predominantly on middle 
income countries that may already have forms of intellectual property incorporated in domestic 
law, and who have some economic leverage.  
 
These lessons, based on the above analysis, are as follows: 
 
a) Anticipate and prepare for IP for new types of therapies.  
 
Medicines, therapies, and other health technologies are moving away from small 
molecule structures and will increasingly be of biologic origin, include gene- and cell-
based therapies. This will attract different forms of IP that traditional IP demandeurs 
will seek to have incorporated in enforceable agreements. As discussed above, these 
may no longer be trade agreements – but may be negotiated by way of soft diplomacy 
or in other types of agreements; 
 
b) Enact pre-emptive legislation.  
 
Pre-empting trade-related IP negotiations with domestic legislation that will ‘bind 
negotiators hands’ can reduce unwanted political economy tradeoffs. This is, however, 
contingent on interdependence on trade partners and effective utilisation of negotiating 
tools. This could include patentability exclusions on methods of treatment, so as to 
create a precedent on gene therapies; 
 
c) Capitalise on a sea change in philosophy and visibility on drug pricing and 
access to medicines.  
 
As discussed in Subsection I(b) above, no longer is drug pricing and access to 
medicines a developing country or emerging market issue. Developed nations are 
struggling – and developing countries no longer have such a large ideological gap with 
many developed nations on the issue of pharmaceutical pricing and access.  
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d) Find and utilise a ‘common precedent’.  
 
Forming coalitions with other countries that have common domestic standards 
(‘common precedent’) or common ideations, and especially if that country is a 
developed country or ‘middle power’911, increases bargaining power and reduces 
political economy tradeoffs – thus in the pre-negotiation stage countries must map 
potential negotiation partners’ IP laws, drug pricing and access to medicines barriers, 
and ideologies around health. Less ideological distance creates stronger coalitions;  
 
e) Balancing economic interdependence. The United States, the European Union, and 
Japan continue to be the main demandeurs of trade-related IP. Diversifying trade 
and/or reducing proportion of trade dependence on certain countries can reduce the 
need for direct tradeoffs in trade agreements with these nations. While the example in 
this thesis shows an increased trade dependence on China, this in turn can result in 
tradeoffs elsewhere. For example, Malaysia’s trade and investment agenda with China 
has resulted in denialism regarding human rights violations in Uighur concentration 
camps.912 As such, the emphasis would still be on balancing economic 
interdependence through diversification of interests; 
 
f) Involve civil society in meaningful consultation.  
 
Civil society and other stakeholders can be the source of technical information that 
may be powerful in negotiation settings, and can create enough noise domestically to 
‘bind negotiators’ hands’; 
 
The idea that IP is never negotiated in isolation underlines much of the above 
recommendations – negotiating trade-related IP is always couched in the language of 
concessions and tradeoffs and countries must rely on a number of strategies to ensure they 
maintain an adequate win-set. Developing countries should also be wary of being overly 
focused on market access – as discussed in Chapter 1 of this thesis, modern trade 
agreements are less about the exchange of goods and services and more about amending 
beyond-the-border regulations, i.e. ‘deep integration’.913 As evidenced in the TPP – which is 
predominantly a deep integration agreement with only 4 chapters pertaining to traditional 
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goods and services – these agreements seek to discourage internal regulations that could be 
perceived as technical barriers to trade, or seen as unfair to investors, and this could include 
sanitary and phytosanitary measures, or even legitimate public health measures. Nor are 
tradeoffs always framed in IP versus market access, despite the examples being inclined in 
that direction in this thesis. An example of this is how Colombia announcing intentions to issue 
a compulsory license for the cancer drug Glivec led to the United States threatening to impair 
the approval of aid finance for the Colombian peace process initiative ‘Paz Colombia’ in 
2016.914 Tradeoffs for IP can therefore occur or have reverberations outside of market access, 
and so countries would need to embark on building strategic partnerships with others to 
counter threats on key pressure points.  
 
Developing countries who are seeking to gain economically from trade should also consider 
economic ramifications of more abstract losses – such as through productivity losses from ill 
health, or financial losses from litigation through Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) 
mechanisms provided for in these mega-regional agreements, which can often rack up bills 
into the hundreds of millions of dollars.  
 
And while there is little doubt that the TPP was intended to be a geopolitical and security 
manoeuvre by the United States against China, as with other mega-regional trade agreements 
and modern bilateral agreements, military security did not feature strongly in the agenda, 
contrary to many realist theories.915 According to Keohane and Nye’s ‘complex 
interdependence’ theory - issues that are important to nations are ‘not arranged in a clear or 
constant hierarchy’,916 and so in designing a negotiating strategy, developing countries need 
to have adequate technical capacity to be able to identify emerging issues, and that this occur 
not just throughout negotiations, but also in the pre-negotiation stage.917 It is in pre-
negotiations that ascertaining common precedent and ideation in both IP and access to 
medicines can create in early strategic gains.  
 
To close this subsection is the idea that countries can enact legislation to pre-empt or mitigate 
potential tradeoffs on IP in the future. As aforementioned, while small molecule medicines will 
continue to be produced, it very much seems that the proportion of the market that is biologic, 
gene-based, or cell-based, will increase. CAR-T, for example, involves the use of CRISPR 
technology to edit the T-cells of a human being with a retroviral, enabling the cell to be returned 
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to its original human source to attack cancer cells.918 There is scholarship theorising that CAR-
T and other gene and cell therapies are not products in themselves but rather therapeutic 
methods or medical treatments.919 TRIPS Article 27(3) provides that countries may exclude 
‘diagnostic, therapeutic, and surgical methods’ from patentability, and as discussed by 
Abinader and Contreras, many, if not all, patents that have already been filed for these 
treatments may contravene many statutory exclusions in developed nations, given that 
patentability of medical treatments is prohibited throughout much of the developed world.920 
Incorporating these statutory exclusions and increasing technical capacity on pre-grant 
oppositions may help in preparing for these future forms of IP.  
 
IV. Future research 
 
A gap exists in terms of what happened in the pre-negotiation stage in terms of what was 
communicated to both Chile and Malaysia on U.S. expectations for the intellectual property 
chapter, and whether these discussions, if any, were at all material to the end result on 
biologics. Equally material were discussions on other chapters – and whether conflicts 
elsewhere could have set the tone for how countries approached discussions on issues for 
which there were the greatest disagreement. For example, undue heavy-handedness in a 
topic entirely different from the topic at hand, say on affirmative action policies or on insufficient 
market access, could result in retaliatory action in discussions on biologics.  
 
Pre-negotiations are important for several reasons, including that it is critical to ensuring 
parties don’t ‘use the wrong instruments in trying to move the process forward’,921 in terms of 
its causality in setting the actual agenda of the official negotiations, in eliminating non-
negotiable issues, ‘avoiding non-starters’,922 and whether or not they played a ‘central role in 
shaping the style and content of the official negotiations’.923 Taking a wider viewpoint, more 
in-depth research on bilateral country relationships and the surrounding political 
environments, and how those impact on specific negotiating approaches and behaviours is 
understudied. Garnizova comments: ‘Dynamics of negotiation is one thing – but we need to 
look at the broader framework within which countries interact and the regulatory gap’.924 While 
this thesis draws upon political economy factors such as trade reliance on China and drug 
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pricing concerns across the world, due to a narrow scope it can only do so superficially – and 
scholarship may benefit from comprehensive analysis on political economy factors that 
influence negotiating behaviour both within international trade-related intellectual property 
agreements and international agreements in different fields.  
 
As mentioned above, due to the scope of this PhD, I was unable to provide recommendations 
for LDCs, small and vulnerable economies (SVEs), and Small Island Developing States 
(SIDS). Some limited thoughts on least developed nations and small and vulnerable 
economies (SVEs) is that lessening ideological distance may be the first step towards building 
strong coalitions. Barriers to this cohesiveness were described by West Indies trade expert 
Courtenay Lindsay – that least developed nations, SVEs, and SIDS are ‘economically and 
ideologically dependent on a predominantly neoliberal global economy’, and in addition there 
is ‘inadequate unity and cohesion’ among them.925 This lack of cohesiveness may find in roots 
in, among other things, a hesitancy to work with richer countries as it may reduce their chances 
of receiving preferential treatment.926 It would be interesting to see how SVE and SIDS 
scholars examine how their countries operate in this space, and whether they are able to 
capitalise the common ‘politics of resentment’ – i.e. that emerging markets ‘they relate to the 
global system with a mutually reinforcing sense of historical grievances and claim to represent 
the interests of all developing countries’927 and whether these are material considerations at 
all in the economics and trade considerations of these smaller nations.  
 
The thesis also predominantly examines the interactions between the two upper middle-
income countries and the United States, but not interactions between each other. An in-depth 
look at how countries forming coalitions communicate, at what point after disagreements they 
communicated, whether established close relationships and positive socialisation dynamics928  
eased formations of coalitions or increased gains in other areas, and whether there were 
bilateral promises made between them is unexamined in this thesis, and could generate 
further useful insights for developing country negotiations.  
 
It would be intriguing also to see documentation expanding on the concept of a common 
precedent and where it was utilised in agreements outside intellectual property, for example 
in security or climate negotiations, to avoid unwanted political economy tradeoffs. Finally – as 
aforementioned, it will be difficult from now on for IP maximalist demandeurs to advance their 
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aims through international trade agreements. Future research tracking how pharmaceutical 
industry lobbyists seek to cement their monopolies would be strategically important.  
 
Finally, this thesis discussed the failure of the TPP (and subsequently the USMCA) in 
establishing a new biologics IP world trade order. Haass talks about how the establishment of 
a new world order ‘needs skilled statecraft, since an order is made, not born. And no matter 
how ripe the starting conditions or strong the initial desire, maintaining it demands creative 
diplomacy, functioning institutions, and effective action to adjust it when circumstances 
change and buttress it when challenges come.’929 There is little doubt that with the U.S. 
concession on biologics, ‘skilled statecraft’ and ‘creative diplomacy’ will be employed in 
adjusting expectations in the future on IP expansion, especially in the context of changing 
tides on drug pricing in the developed world. Documentation of this is imperative.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
929 Richard Haass, ‘How a World Order Ends: And What Comes in Its Wake’ Foreign Affairs (January/February 2019) 
<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2018-12-11/how-world-order-ends> accessed 24 December 2019 
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ANNEX B 
 
SCHEDULE OF INTERVIEWS 
 
No.  Assigned Pseudonym 
(If Real Name Consented 
To, Highlighted in Red) 
Pronoun Consented To  Location of 
Interview 
Date of 
Interview 
1. Montague Government Official Santiago, Chile 15 November 
2017 
2. Smithers Government Official Santiago, Chile 15 November 
2017 
3. Daphne Government Official  Santiago, Chile 15 November 
2017 
4. Therese Funcionario de Gobierno 
(Government Official) 
Santiago, Chile 16 November 
2017 
5. Lispeth Former Negotiator Vitacura, Chile 16 November 
2017 
6. Merle Negotiator Santiago, Chile 17 November 
2017 
7. Dorotea López Giral Dorotea Lopez Santiago, Chile 17 November 
2017 
8. Tomás Lagomarsino  President of Equidad 
Chile 
Valparaíso, Chile 18 November 
2017 
9. Lim Ching Wei Civil Society Kuala Lumpur, 
Malaysia 
December 
2017 
10. Peter Maybarduk Director, Public Citizen Marrakech, 
Morocco 
16 January 
2018 
11. Dr Burcu Kilic Legal Counsel, Access to 
Medicines Program, 
Public Citizen 
Skype 1 February 
2018 
12. Belinda Former Malaysian 
Government Official 
Skype 7 February 
2018 
13. Pedro Roffe Senior Fellow, 
International Centre for 
Trade and Sustainable 
Development (ICTSD) 
 
Skype 13 February 
2018 
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14. Rex Former Negotiator Skype 20 September 
2018 
15. Syed Hamid Albar Syed Hamid Albar Kuala Lumpur, 
Malaysia 
18 December 
2018 
16. Ursula Former Malaysian TRIPS 
Negotiator 
Kuala Lumpur, 
Malaysia 
20 December 
2018 
17.  Brian Negotiator Whatsapp Call 4 March 2019 
18. Lori Wallach Lori Wallach, Director, 
Global Trade Watch, 
Public Citizen 
Written answers 
through email 
12 August 
2019 
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ANNEX C 
 
Sample of Topic Guide for Interviews 
DATE: DD/MM/YYYY 
PARTICIPANT CODE: _______________/__ __ __/ __ __/__ __/ __ __ 
 
Pseudonym, town/city of interview,  
country code (CL/MY/US), gender (M/F/TG)  
and role (NEG = negotiator, CS = civil society, A = academia, 
 PI = pharmaceutical industry, GA = government agency). 
 
 
TOPIC GUIDE 
 
Main research question: “How did upper middle income countries in the TPP respond to political 
economy tradeoffs?”  
Subquestions include: “What intrinsic and extrinsic factors influenced negotiator decision making 
processes?” “Due to established market access deals with all TPP countries, was Chile in a stronger 
position?” “Did domestic industrial development in biologics and/or biosimilars influence the decisions 
of the negotiators?” “If not, what did?” “Did the novelty of biologics, both as an IP provision in trade 
agreements and as a public health commodity, change political economy tradeoffs?” “Were the 
countries seen as potential points where more maximalist IP could be spread within their own regions?” 
Dialogue: Thanks so much for agreeing to speak with me. I’d like to begin by asking about the country’s 
approach to the negotiations.  
 
No. Domains Possible questions  
[begin with general question – then 
probe] 
1. Country approach to TPP negotiations 
(ideological/historical/politico-economic) 
Could you tell me a little bit about you 
and your negotiating team’s preparation 
and approach prior to, or at the beginning 
of the trade negotiations?  Could you tell 
me about the history of IP in Chile? How 
do you see IP contributing to the 
economy? How is it important to adapt IP 
to your country? What is IP to you? Is it a 
necessary evil? 
 
Do you remember when you first were told 
about your role in the TPP? Do you think 
there was a predetermined approach to the 
TPP? Was there a historical reason for this? 
What were your key negotiating aims? What 
about predetermined red lines? How strict 
were these red lines? Were there areas were 
you thought you had leeway on 
concessions? Do you think previous 
experience with U.S.-led negotiations/U.S. 
negotiators have influenced your 
negotiations this time around? 
 
[To non-negotiators: How would you 
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characterise the country’s approach to the 
TPP? How have you formed your opinion on 
this?] 
2. Unit-level learning What were the biggest learning points during this entire TPP negotiation 
process? What informed your decision 
on biologics exclusivity? Why did you 
react so strongly to biologics? 
 
(If had predetermined red lines): Did your red 
lines/negotiating strategy change throughout 
the negotiations? What informed this? Do 
you feel like the negotiation strategy on 
biologics exclusivity was sufficiently 
informed or based on informed decisions? 
To what extent did any economic studies 
inform your decision? Did you consult any 
stakeholders in designing your strategy?  
 
[To non-negotiators: Could you tell me about 
engagement with negotiators? Did you feel 
like you were getting through? How would 
you characterise your relationship? What 
materials or information did you give to 
negotiators? Have you attended any 
negotiation rounds? Was your attendance 
specifically requested?] 
 
3. Turning points I’m interested in turning points, i.e. any significant events that happened in the 
context of the negotiations for biologics. 
Can you tell me if there were any? 
 
Do you remember when you first found out 
that the U.S. were asking for 12 years of 
market exclusivity for biologics? What were 
your thoughts? Were you prepared to agree 
with 12 years of biologics exclusivity? Why 
not? Were there any heated moments as 
pertains pharmaceutical IP and/or biologics? 
Can you tell me anything about those 
moments?  
 
The media reported that for New Zealand, 
biologics was contingent on a deal on dairy. 
Was there a similar deal for you? What did 
the U.S. want from you? 
 
Were any alliances formed on 
pharmaceutical IP? 
 
What were the circumstances that led to the 
Chilean Annex 18B/Malaysian side letter on 
biologics? The media reported a biologics 
deadlock at the Atlanta round between U.S.-
Australia, was there a similar deadlock with 
you?  
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